Essays on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts by Arioglu, Emrah
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Essays on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 
 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of 
Drexel University 
by 
Emrah Arioglu 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
May 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright 2013 
Emrah Arioglu. All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Michael Gombola, for his exceptional role in my 
professional and personal development as an academic. Dr. Gombola has counseled me in every step of my 
doctoral study and the preparation of this dissertation. His dedication in the academic profession will serve 
as a guide and inspiration for my future success. 
I would like to express my gratitude to my committee members, Dr Jie Cai, Dr. Naveen Daniel, 
Dr. Eliezer Fich, and Dr. Yoto Yotov, whose insightful comments and suggestions helped me in improving 
my dissertation. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Jacqueline Garner, Dr. Christopher Laincz for his support, our 
departmental secretary Ms. Maria Myers, as well as other faculty and doctoral students in the department of 
Finance at Drexel University for their help and encouragement during my time at Drexel. I also would like 
to thank Jerry Cao, Harry DeAngelo and Stephen McKeon, for their help through my research. 
Most importantly, I am grateful to my family, who is always supportive of my education and my 
life. I am also thankful to Amy Bonni Lucas for her support and always being by my side. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................ v 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ vii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. viii 
CHAPTER 1: ESSAY 1 
Target Capital Structure and Transitory Debt: Evidence from Reverse LBOs ............................................. 1 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 2 
2. Evolution of Leverage Ratios ............................................................................................................ 5 
2.1. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................... 5 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics.................................................................................................................. 8 
2.3. Evolution of Leverage Ratios Results ....................................................................................... 10 
3. Speed of Adjustment ....................................................................................................................... 12 
3.1. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 12 
3.2. Speed of Adjustment Results.................................................................................................... 14 
4. Uses of Proceeds............................................................................................................................. 15 
4.1. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 15 
4.2. Uses of Proceeds Results ......................................................................................................... 17 
5. Transitory Debt and Investment Spikes ........................................................................................... 19 
5.1. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................. 19 
5.2. Transitory Debt and Investment Spikes Results ........................................................................ 21 
6. Robustness Tests ............................................................................................................................ 27 
7. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 29 
CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 2 
Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Reverse LBOs ................................................ 53 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 54 
2. Data and Methodology .................................................................................................................... 60 
3. Firm Characteristics, Board of Directors and Board Committees ...................................................... 62 
3.1. Literature Review and Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 62 
3.1.1. Delaware Incorporation..................................................................................................... 62 
3.1.2. Staggered Boards .............................................................................................................. 63 
3.1.3. Controlled Firms ............................................................................................................... 64 
3.1.4. Directors and CEO Characteristics .................................................................................... 65 
3.1.5. CEO Duality ..................................................................................................................... 70 
3.1.6. Founder CEOs .................................................................................................................. 71 
iv 
 
 
3.1.7. Board Size ........................................................................................................................ 72 
3.1.8. Board Composition ........................................................................................................... 73 
3.1.9. Multiple Directorships ...................................................................................................... 75 
3.1.10. Board Committees .......................................................................................................... 77 
3.2. Results .................................................................................................................................... 79 
3.2.1. Results for Delaware Incorporation ................................................................................... 79 
3.2.2. Results for Staggered Boards ............................................................................................ 80 
3.2.3. Results for Controlled Firms ............................................................................................. 80 
3.2.4. Results for Director and CEO Characteristics .................................................................... 81 
3.2.5. Results for CEO Duality ................................................................................................... 84 
3.2.6. Results for Founder CEOs................................................................................................. 85 
3.2.7. Results for Board Size ...................................................................................................... 86 
3.2.8. Results for Board Composition ......................................................................................... 87 
3.2.9. Results for Multiple Directorships ..................................................................................... 90 
3.2.10. Results for Board Committees ......................................................................................... 93 
4. Ownership Structure and LBO Specialists ....................................................................................... 94 
4.1. Literature Review and Hypotheses ........................................................................................... 95 
4.1.1. Blockholder Ownership .................................................................................................... 95 
4.1.2. LBO Specialist Ownership ................................................................................................ 97 
4.1.3. Managerial Ownership ...................................................................................................... 99 
4.2. Results .................................................................................................................................. 102 
4.2.1. Results for Blockholder Ownership ................................................................................. 102 
4.2.2. Results for LBO Specialist Ownership ............................................................................ 103 
4.2.3. Results for Managerial Ownership .................................................................................. 103 
5. Executive Compensation ............................................................................................................... 105 
5.1. Literature Review and Hypothesis .......................................................................................... 105 
5.2. Results for Executive Compensation ...................................................................................... 110 
6. Operating Performance and Stock Performance ............................................................................. 116 
6.1 Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................ 116 
6.2. Results .................................................................................................................................. 118 
7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 121 
List of References ................................................................................................................................. 140 
Appendices ........................................................................................................................................... 151 
Appendix A ...................................................................................................................................... 151 
Appendix B ...................................................................................................................................... 152 
Vita ...................................................................................................................................................... 155 
v 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: ESSAY 1 
   Table 1: Time distribution of IPOs and reverse LBOs ........................................................................... 31 
   Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the final reverse LBO sample ............................................................ 32 
   Table 3: Use of proceeds from the equity issuance ................................................................................ 33 
   Table 4: Leverage increase years following the reverse LBO ................................................................ 34 
   Table 5: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO ........................................................................ 35 
   Table 6: Use of proceeds from equity issuance: quantitative analysis .................................................... 36 
   Table 7: Use of proceeds from the debt issuance ................................................................................... 37 
   Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the leverage increasing subsample ..................................................... 38 
   Table 9: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO for leverage increasing subsample ................... 39 
   Table 10: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO for leverage increasing subsample                                   
(using model (9)) .................................................................................................................................... 40 
   Table 11: Descriptive statistics for leverage increasing firms subsample around the increase ................. 41 
   Table 12: Speed of adjustment.............................................................................................................. 42 
   Table 13: Investment spikes ................................................................................................................. 43 
   Table 14: Descriptive statistics for leverage increasing firms subsample around the increase               
(using model (9)) .................................................................................................................................... 44 
   Table 15: Investment spikes (using model (9)) ...................................................................................... 45 
 
CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 2 
   Table 1: Time Distribution of RLBOs and descriptive statistics .......................................................... 124 
   Table  2: Delaware incorporation, classified boards, controlled firms, gender, and education ............... 125 
   Table  3: Professional expertise, age, and tenure of board members and the CEO ................................ 126 
   Table  4: Board composition .............................................................................................................. 127 
   Table  5: Board composition (alternative definition) ........................................................................... 128 
   Table  6: Number and percentage of busy directors on boards and percentage of busy boards .............. 129 
vi 
 
 
   Table  7: Number and percentage of busy directors on boards and percentage of busy boards     
(alternative definition) .......................................................................................................................... 130 
   Table  8: Founder CEOs, board size, blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, CEO ownership . 131 
   Table  9: Board committees ................................................................................................................ 132 
   Table  10: LBO specialist ownership and involvement in sample firms ............................................... 133 
   Table  11: Executive compensation (in 1000s)(in 2008 $s) .................................................................. 134 
   Table  12: Executive compensation composition (% of total compensation)(CPI adjusted) .................. 135 
   Table  13: CEO compensation (in 1000s)(in 2008 $s) ......................................................................... 136 
   Table  14: CEO composition (% of total compensation)(CPI adjusted) ................................................ 137 
   Table  15: Cumulative and buy-and-hold returns ................................................................................. 138 
   Table  16: Performance Measures ....................................................................................................... 139 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The evolution of median leverage ratios ................................................................................... 46 
Figure 2: The Evolution of leverage ratios for the final RLBO sample ..................................................... 47 
Figure 3: Market leverage, target leverage and bootstrap confidence intervals .......................................... 48 
Figure 4: The evolution of median leverage ratios for leverage increasing firms subsample ...................... 49 
Figure 5: The evolution of leverage ratios for the leverage increasing firms subsample ............................ 50 
Figure 6: The evolution of leverage ratios for the leverage increasing firms subsample around the leverage 
increase year ........................................................................................................................................... 51 
Figure 7: Evolution of mean leverage ratios if firms had not decreased long term debt post IPO ............... 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
 
Abstract 
Essays on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 
Emrah Arioglu 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation studies target capital structure, transitory debt and corporate governance 
applications in private equity firms’ portfolio companies by utilizing a unique sample of reverse leveraged 
buyouts (reverse LBOs). In chapter 1, I investigate target capital structure and transitory debt. I show that 
firms follow target capital structures and they quickly reduce their debt ratios to levels near target ratios at 
the time of the reverse LBO. A minority of firms in the sample increase debt significantly after the reverse 
LBO. In accordance with the transitory debt hypothesis, these firms value the option to borrow and 
decrease their debt levels accordingly so that they can preserve the option to borrow for future. When the 
firms have valuable investment options, they once again issue transitory debt deliberately but temporarily, 
they move away from their target leverage ratios, use the proceeds from the issue mainly for investment 
purposes, and they revert back to the target leverage levels gradually. In chapter 2, I investigate the 
corporate governance structures employed by private equity firms in their portfolio companies. I show that, 
compared to the control firms, RLBO firms prefer to be incorporated in Delaware and have unitary boards, 
have younger board members with shorter tenures, have more financial experts on their boards, have CEOs 
with shorter tenures, prefer busy board members and busy boards. They also have smaller number of 
members on their boards, compared to previous findings from earlier decades. In addition, the majority of 
board members are effectively monitoring directors and the majority of board members on various 
committees of the boards are independent directors. In addition, firms are associated with high ownership 
by blockholders, high total managerial ownership, and low CEO ownership. Lastly, the evidence suggests 
that top executives and CEOs of RLBO firms do not receive significantly higher levels of compensation 
compared to control firms. Also, RLBO firms usually prefer to pay a higher fraction of total compensation 
in form of bonuses, and less in the form of stock option grants. 
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CHAPTER 1: ESSAY 1 
Target Capital Structure and Transitory Debt: Evidence from Reverse LBOs 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Traditional target structure theories predict that all financing decisions move firms towards target 
capital structures. On the other hand, transitory debt hypothesis predicts that firms deliberately but 
temporarily deviate from target capital structures to fund a particular corporate action and then de-lever to 
re-build debt capacity. In a leveraged buyout, the maximum possible amount of debt is used to acquire the 
assets or stock of the target firm. This disruption in financial policy provides a laboratory to test the 
prediction of the transitory debt hypothesis. Our results show that firms quickly reduce their debt ratios to 
levels near target ratios at the time of the reverse LBO. A minority of firms in the sample increase debt 
significantly after the reverse LBO. In accordance with the transitory debt hypothesis, these firms value the 
option to borrow and decrease their debt levels accordingly so that they can preserve the option to borrow 
for future. When the firms have valuable investment options, they once again issue transitory debt 
deliberately but temporarily, they move away from their target leverage ratios, use the proceeds from the 
issue mainly for investment purposes, and they revert back to the target leverage levels gradually. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: G32 
Keywords: Capital structure; Reverse leveraged buyout; Transitory debt 
 
 
* This essay is co-authored with Michael Gombola, Professor of Finance, LeBow College of Business, 
Drexel University. We are grateful to Jerry Cao for making his sample of Reverse LBOs available to us; 
and to Jie Cai, Naveen Daniel, Harry DeAngelo, Eliezer Fich, Yilmaz Guney, Rongbing Huang, Peter Iliev, 
Ayla Kayhan, Josh Lerner, Stephen McKeon, Yoto Yotov and Huainan Zhao; and to conference 
participants at the 2012 Eastern Finance Association for their valuable comments. All errors are our 
responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
The tradeoff theory suggests that firms have optimal capital structures and managers would make 
financing decisions in such a manner that the firm reaches its optimal capital structure. On the other hand, 
the pecking order theory developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that, due to asymmetric 
information and adverse selection problems, raising external equity is costly for firms. Thus firms would 
follow an order when making financing decisions. Rebalancing towards optimal capital structures, when 
leverage levels deviate from the target levels, would not be the primary concern of the managers.  
More recently, DeAngelo et al. (2011) estimate a capital structure model, in which firms 
deliberately but temporarily deviate from target leverage by issuing transitory debt. DeAngelo et al. (2011) 
predict that this decision will be systematically related to their investment opportunities and thus, opposed 
to the predictions of traditional trade-off theory, firms might deviate from the target leverage levels 
deliberately. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) suggest leveraged buyouts (LBOs) as an example that would 
fit into the transitory debt hypothesis. In a leveraged buyout, the maximum possible amount of debt is used 
to acquire the assets or stock of the target firm. Once the benefits of high levels of debt are realized, firms 
engaging in a reverse leveraged buyout issue equity and decrease leverage. However, some of these firms 
increase leverage significantly following the reverse leveraged buyout, once again, mainly for investment 
purposes. The tradeoff theory would predict the de-levering following these deviations, however according 
to the traditional target structure theories, none of these displacements from the target leverage should 
occur in the first place. These disruptions in financial policy and the subsequent de-levering provide a 
laboratory to test the prediction of the transitory debt hypothesis. The investigation of firms’ capital 
structure rebalancing with a sample of reverse leveraged buyouts  provides unique insights into whether the 
prediction of transitory debt hypothesis holds or not. 
In previous studies, Fama and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Huang and Ritter (2009), Harford et al. (2009), provide evidence that 
firms rebalance their capital structures towards a target capital structure. In contrast, Hovakimian (2004) 
and Denis and McKeon (2012) provide evidence suggesting that firms’ capital structure choices frequently 
move them away from their target capital structure, rather than moving them towards the target. These 
findings would be considered as evidence in “close spirit” to the predictions of the transitory debt 
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hypothesis in DeAngelo et al. (2011), which predicts that firms deliberately but temporarily deviate from 
target leverage. 
In this study, we investigate the predictions of traditional trade-off theory and transitory debt 
hypothesis with a unique sample group: reverse LBOs. Firms that go through a reverse LBO are those that 
used to be public firms and went private through an LBO. These firms increase leverage significantly and 
deviations from the target capital structures are endogenous displacements from the target. According to the 
prediction of the traditional trade-off theory, this displacement should not occur. Once the benefits of high 
leverage are realized, the firms go public again. As a natural outcome of the equity issue, their leverage 
levels are expected to decrease significantly. We investigate whether the decrease in their leverage levels at 
the time of the IPO moves firms’ capital structures towards a target. According to both the transitory debt 
hypothesis and traditional trade-off theory, we would expect these firms to rebalance their capital structures 
towards a target. Or alternatively, the firms and managers might prefer not to rebalance to the target capital 
structure.  
We observe a significant decrease in median book leverage levels from 3 years prior to the reverse 
LBO to the year of the IPO, a decrease from 0.677 to 0.370. The excess market leverage, which shows the 
deviation between the actual market leverage and the target market leverage stays in the + 0.030 and -0.060 
interval in the 7 years following the IPO. In accordance with this, at the year of the IPO and the 4 years 
following it, the firms’ market leverage levels stay within the 95 % bootstrapped confidence intervals of the 
target leverage levels. This finding supports the hypothesis that even if firms deviate from target capital 
structures due to endogenous displacements, they follow a target capital structure and revert back to target 
leverage levels. 
Next, we investigate the speed of adjustment (SOA) to estimate how fast these firms close the gap 
between previous year’s leverage and the target of the current period. We report the result of 2 different 
methods we employed to estimate the SOA: the system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM-SYS) 
and long differencing Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM-DIF). Our results suggest that firms close 
26.09 % (GMM-DIF) to 30.38 % (GMM-SYS) of the gap between previous year’s leverage and the target 
of the current period. Supporting our earlier evidence of firms rebalancing towards target capital structures, 
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this suggests the continuation of active capital structure adjustments that took place while reducing 
substantial leverage levels before the reverse LBO. 
In addition, we analyze how the firms use the proceeds of the equity issue. It provides us with the 
opportunity to understand the main motivation lying underneath the equity issue. The main use of equity 
proceeds is debt payment for 162 firms out of 211 firms. For 31 firms the main use of equity proceeds is 
working capital, while for 11 firms the main use is investment, for 6 firms it is payout and for only 1 firm it 
is operations. These results also support the hypothesis that firms follow a target capital structure, thus 
revert back to target leverage levels and issue equity mainly to repay debt with the proceeds of the equity 
issue. 
We also investigate a subsample of firms that increase their leverages significantly following the 
reverse LBO. To derive this subsample, we identify firms which increase their leverage levels substantially 
in the 7 years following the IPO, and analyze the use of proceeds from the leverage increase. The 
difference between the actual and target leverage is 0.198 in the leverage increase year and gradually 
declines to a lowest value of 0.052 in the following 7 years. The deviation in leverage following the reverse 
LBO should not be observed according to traditional tradeoff theory. In these instances, in which post-
reverse LBO behavior is incompatible with de-leveraging to target, we find that firms borrow to fund new 
investment, 43 firms out of 61 in the subsample.  This is a pattern that again conforms to the transitory debt 
hypothesis.   
To provide further evidence, we also analyze the leverage increase and investment outlay 
relationship, in a dual manner, to investigate whether an increase in one is accompanied by an increase in 
the other one. For this purpose, we analyze investment spikes (significant investment outlays). We observe 
that when firms increase investment substantially, it is accompanied with a significant increase in leverage 
as well, compared to nonspikes (no significant investment outlay). And when firms increase their leverage 
significantly, it is accompanied with a significant increase in their investment outlays, compared to when 
they do not increase leverage significantly. 
The evidence provided by the investigation of the leverage increase subsample supports the 
prediction of the transitory debt hypothesis. Firms value the option to borrow and decrease their debt levels 
accordingly so that they can preserve debt option for future. When they have valuable investment options, 
5 
 
 
they issue transitory debt deliberately but temporarily, moving away from their target leverage ratios, use 
the proceeds from the issue mainly for investment purposes, and revert back to the target leverage levels 
gradually.  
Overall, we provide evidence suggesting that firms that conduct a reverse LBO rebalance their 
capital structures toward a target, and they close around 26.09 % (GMM-DIF) to 30.38 % (GMM-SYS) of 
the gap between previous year’s leverage and the target of the current period each year. In addition, firms 
issue equity mainly to repay debt with the proceeds of the equity issue. By investigating our “leverage 
increasing firms” subsample, we provide evidence suggesting that even though firms follow a target before 
a substantial leverage increase, they deliberately but temporarily deviate from the target, mainly for 
investment purposes, and gradually decrease leverage towards the target in the following years.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I is the introduction. Section II summarizes the data and 
methodology and results for the evolution of leverage ratios. Section III summarizes the Speed of 
Adjustment. Section IV summarizes the data and methodology and the results for uses of proceeds.  Section 
V summarizes the data and methodology and the results for transitory debt and investment spikes. Section 
VI presents the concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Evolution of Leverage Ratios 
2.1. Data and Methodology 
We identified an initial sample of 373 full reverse LBOs for the period from 1980 to 2006. We did 
not include divisional reverse LBOs since the subsidiaries’ capital structure decisions would potentially 
reflect the capital structure decisions of the parent firms’ financing policies. We chose 1980 as the 
beginning of our sample period due to the scarcity of reverse LBOs prior to 1980. Due to this scarcity, the 
data in prior reverse LBO studies does not go beyond 1980 (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990, DeGeorge 
and Zeckhauser, 1993, Holthausen and Larcker, 1996, Chou et al., 2006, Cao and Lerner, 2009). We chose 
2006 as the end of our sample period to ensure that we have at least 3 years of leverage data for each firm 
after the reverse LBO. 
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The main challenge in reverse LBO studies is the identification of the reverse LBOs. For the 
period between 1980 and 1998, we identified the reverse LBOs from Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
Corporate New Issues database. After 1998, the database does not flag initial public offerings that were 
previously subject to an LBO. In addition, Cao and Lerner (2009) indicate that the SDC database does not 
cover all of the reverse LBOs in the earlier years. To cover as many reverse LBOs as possible and construct 
a reliable sample, we also searched through SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database, Ritter’s IPO list, 
and reverse LBO samples used in previous studies. We searched manually through Factiva to determine 
whether the IPO firms in these databases/lists had completed a prior IPO. [We are grateful to Professor 
Cao, who provided us with his reverse LBO sample, for which he gathered the sample firms from SDC 
Corporate News Issues database and Mergers and Acquisitions database, VentureXpert and Capital IQ 
(Cao and Lerner, 2009).] 
The data necessary to investigate the capital structure of the reverse LBO firms is obtained from 
COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual database. Firms missing data necessary for leverage calculations, as well 
as financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded from the sample. This leaves us with a final sample of 
301 full reverse LBOs. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of IPOs and reverse LBOs by year. There are substantially fewer 
reverse LBOs in the early years, while there was a considerable increase in the number of the reverse LBOs 
in 1986, 1987 and in 1991, 1992, 1993 and again in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Table 1 also shows that the share 
of reverse LBOs in the whole IPO sample is at a modest level. Between 1980 and 2006 the number of all 
reverse LBOs that took place is 373, while the number of total IPOs that took place is 8607. 
In our sample, all the industry groups, based on Fama and French’s 48 industry definitions, are 
represented except banking, precious metals, defense, insurance, real estate, utilities and trading, which 
shows a wide selection of industries (not tabulated here). The most commonly represented industry groups 
in the sample are retail (10.96 %), electronic equipment (6.64 %), business services (5.98 %), consumer 
goods (5.65 %) and wholesale (5.65 %). 
To investigate the evolution of leverage ratios for the reverse LBO firms, we calculate 2 leverage 
ratios. One of the leverage measures we use in the study is book leverage, which is defined as the sum of 
7 
 
 
long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. We also calculate the market leverage. It is defined 
as below by Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Denis and McKeon (2012): 
                    
          
                         
 
where Dxt denotes a COMPUSTAT annual data item. D9 is the total long term debt, D25 is the 
number of common shares outstanding, D34 is the debt in current liabilities and D199 is the common share 
price at year end.  
In the prior literature, there are other variations of leverage ratios used, such as total liabilities to 
total assets ratio as in Rajan and Zingales’ (1995) study, which includes items as accounts payable in total 
liabilities.  However, the purpose of our study is to investigate the active capital structure choices of firms, 
and items such as accounts payable reflect transaction purposes rather than financing purposes, which 
might cause the leverage ratios to be overestimated.  
In addition to market leverage, we also report the excess market leverage. It measures the 
deviation in market leverage ratio and is computed as the difference between the firm’s actual market 
leverage ratio and the target market leverage ratio. Thus, we need to compute a proxy for long run target 
leverage, since it is not observable. For this purpose, we predict the target market leverage ratio using a 
double-sided tobit regression model censored at 0 and 1 for each year where actual market leverage is 
regressed on a set of independent variables. The regression model we use, following Kayhan and Titman’s 
(2007) reasoning and based on Denis and McKeon’s (2012) model, is: 
Market Leverageit = α + β1 (Med. Ind. Market Leverage)i,t-1 + β2 (M/B)i,t-1 + β3 (FA/TA)i,t-1 +  
β4 (OI/TA)i,t-1 + β5 [ln(TA)]i,t-1 + ε                                                                                     (1) 
However, unlike Kayhan and Titman’s study (2007), we estimate separate annual regressions, 
allowing us to avoid incorporating expected inflation into the model since expected inflation will be 
uniform across all firms each year. Also, in order to have causality from independent variables to the 
dependent variable, we use the lagged values of the independent variables. Alternative specifications 
employed for target leverage proxy estimations are discussed in the robustness tests section. 
Frank and Goyal (2009) suggest the independent variables employed in the above regression as 
the most reliable factors in explaining leverage. Med. Ind. Market Leverage is the median industry market 
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leverage, M/B is the market-to-book ratio (proxy for growth options), Fixed Assets to Total Assets ratio 
(FA/TA) is the proxy for asset tangibility, Operating Income to Total Assets ratio (OI/TA) is the proxy for 
profitability and ln(TA) is the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm size.  
Following Denis and McKeon (2012), we compute the median industry market leverage each year 
using 4-digit SIC codes.  When there are not at least 10 observations to use for median industry market 
leverage calculation, we compute the median industry market leverage each year within the 3-digit SIC 
codes. If there are not at least 10 observations in the 3-digit SIC code to compute industry market leverage, 
we compute the median industry market leverage within the 2-digit SIC codes. 
Market-to-book ratio is defined as: 
      
                                      
    
 
where Dxt denotes a COMPUSTAT annual data item. D6 is Assets (total), D216 is Stockholders’ 
Equity (total), D35 is Deferred Tax & Investment Tax Credit, D10 is Preferred Stock (liquidating value). 
To calculate FA/TA we divide D8, Property Plant & Equipment, by D6, Total Assets. OI/TA is calculated 
by dividing D13, Operating Income Before Depreciation, by D6, Total Assets.  
 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our final reverse LBO sample. The year, when the 
company issued equity and became public again, is denoted by t.  The reason, that the cut-off date for the 
descriptive statistics is chosen as t-3 is based on the previous findings that on average LBOs stay private for 
approximately 3 years before they go public again (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990, Kaplan, 1991, Cao 
and Lerner, 2009). Since the firms in our final sample were not public before the reverse LBO year, it is not 
possible to calculate the relevant market equity (ME) and market-to-book value (M/B) figures for the years 
t-3, t-2 and t-1. 
The mean ME for the sample is 554.8 million in year t, while the median ME is 247.0 million. 
These figures are close to Cao and Lerner’s (2009) figures. The mean and median B/M for the sample in 
year t are 2.04 and 1.58 respectively and both start decreasing after year t until year t+3, where they start 
increasing again. 
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The mean total assets (TA) for the reverse LBO sample is 1035.50 million in year t-3 and keeps 
decreasing until the time of the reverse LBO, which is expected considering the possibility that when these 
firms go private, they sell some of their assets that are not being utilized effectively. The mean TA in year t 
is 640.5 million and starts increasing in the following 2 years. The median TA is 233.00 million and a 
similar pattern to mean TAs is observed in time, however the increase after year t continues for a longer 
period.  Again, these figures are close to those in Cao and Lerner (2009) and Cao (2011) figures. 
The mean stockholder’s equity for the sample is 139.50 million in year t, which shows a 
substantial increase from year t-1 (doubles). The median stockholder’s equity is 68.2 in year t, which again 
shows a substantial increase from year t-1 (quadruples). These figures are expected since the firms 
complete an IPO in year t. 
The mean book leverage ratio for year t-3, t-2 and t-1 are 0.643, 0.651 and 0.609 respectively, 
where as the median values are 0.677, 0.600 and 0.592, respectively. The mean book leverage, which is 
defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets, for the sample is 0.377 in year 
t, while the median is 0.370.  Both values decrease gradually in the following seven years. The high mean 
and median leverage values prior to the reverse LBO, show a substantial decrease in year t, since these 
firms increase equity substantially when they complete the reverse LBO transaction. This is preliminary 
evidence of firms’ returning back to the pre-reverse LBO leverage levels at the time of the IPO. Although 
our book leverage values are close to the figures in the more recent studies such as Hogan et al. (2001) and 
Cao and Lerner (2009), they are not as high as the values in earlier studies on reverse LBOs by Kaplan 
(1991) and Holthausen and Larcker (1996).  
The mean and median operating income to total assets ratio (OI/TA) for the sample in year t are 
0.174 and 0.173, respectively. Both the mean and the median OI/TA increases in the 3 years before the 
reverse LBO, peaks at the time of the IPO and declines in the following years. This result is consistent with 
the previous findings in the literature in terms of the firms’ operating performance peaking right before the 
reverse LBO and worsening following the reverse LBO (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993, Holthausen and 
Larcker, 1996). This evidence supports the view that performance timing would take place in IPO timing, 
and that the improved performance prior to the IPO would decline after the reverse LBO (Cao, 2011). 
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The mean capital expenditures to the total assets ratio (CAPEX/TA) for the sample in year t is 
0.064, while the median value is 0.044. Both the mean and median values increase following the reverse 
LBO, which would be expected since the firms would potentially spend their proceeds from the equity 
offering on capital expenditures. This evidence is not consistent with findings of Cao (2011) and this is 
probably due to the fact that he presents the pattern of the capital expenditures in relation to sales rather 
than total assets.  
 
2.3. Evolution of Leverage Ratios Results 
In this section, we report our findings regarding the evolution of leverage ratios for our final 
reverse LBO sample in order to investigate whether firms rebalance their capital structure following a 
endogenous deviation from the target leverage levels.  
The findings so far cannot fully answer whether the firms in our reverse LBOs sample actually 
rebalance their target capital structures. Investigation of the excess market leverage ratios would be more 
insightful in this context.  One caveat at this point is that, we are not able to calculate the market leverage 
and excess market leverage before year t, since the firms are private at that time. However, we can observe 
how market leverage and especially excess market leverage evolve after the IPO. The book leverage, 
market leverage and excess market leverage values following the IPO are presented in Table 5. In addition 
to the descriptive statistics in Table 5, the evolution of these figures is presented in Figure 2. 
First, we present the evolution of book leverage for our sample firms around the time of the LBO. 
Once again, it is not possible to track the evolution of market leverages and target leverages during this 
period, since the firms’ shares are not publicly traded following the LBO. Figure 1.B presents the median 
book leverage for the fiscal year end before the LBO and in the seven years following the LBO. The 
median book leverage is 0.275 in the year before the LBO and it makes a substantial jump and increases to 
a level of 0.672 following the LBO. It is 0.555 in the following year and decreases to a level of 0.344 in the 
following years. This behavior is expected due to the specific nature of LBOs. 
Next, we look at the evolution of leverage levels, around the time of the IPO, following the LBO. 
The findings related to the book leverage ratios were summarized previously. The median market leverage 
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ratio starts at 0.266 at the year of the reverse LBO, year t, and increases until t+3, and then declines and 
increases again until t+7 where it has a value of 0.289. The mean market leverage shows a similar pattern.  
The excess market leverage is 0.012 at the time of the reverse LBO, year t, and stays the same at 
year t+2, and increases to 0.030 at year t+2 and then decreases until -0.059 in year t+5 and stays around -
0.036 levels in the following 2 years.  Overall, the excess market leverage stays in the + 0.030 and -0.060 
interval in the 7 years following the IPO. 
Even though this evidence suggests that the excess leverage follows in a tight interval in the 7 
years following the IPO, we conducted 2 bootstrap confidence interval analyses to further test our 
hypothesis. The purpose of the analysis is to investigate statistically whether firms’ median market leverage 
levels lie within the bootstrapped confidence intervals of the median target leverage levels. If the answer to 
this question is “yes”, then we can suggest that reverse LBO firms rebalance their capital structure when 
they become public. 
The first bootstrap confidence intervals for the median target leverage levels are derived by 
applying the percentile intervals method. In this method we first randomly sample the median target 
leverage levels of our original reverse LBO dataset, with replacement, for 1,000 times. And to figure out 
the 95 % confidence intervals for the median target leverage levels, we select the bootstrap estimates, 
which lie on the 2.5 % and 97.5 % percentile. We bootstrap the confidence intervals in this manner for the 
year of the IPO and the following 7 years. The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 3.A. The 
figure shows that the median market leverage level for the year of the IPO and the following 4 years lie in 
the 95 % confidence intervals of the median target leverage levels. The 3 years following that, the median 
market leverage is less than the median target leverage (as suggested by the median excess leverage earlier) 
and it is less than the lower confidence interval, as well. 
The confidence percentile intervals might be criticized for estimating biased bootstrap estimates 
compared to the original estimate and also for the potential that the standard errors will vary with the value 
of the estimate. To overcome these 2 potential problems, we also derived the bias corrected and accelerated 
(BCa) confidence intervals for the median target leverage levels. This method utilizes the bias correction 
and acceleration statistics in deriving the confidence intervals. The results of the analysis is presented in 
Figure 3.B. A similar pattern to the one observed in Figure 3.A can be observed in Figure 3.B., as well.  
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This finding is important in terms of suggesting that firms rebalance their capital structures and 
make their capital structure decisions with the intention to follow the target leverage levels. This evidence 
supports the evidence by Kayhan and Titman (2007), even though they suggest that firms move towards 
these targets slowly. These findings also support the evidence in Hovakimian et al. (2001), Huang and 
Ritter (2009), Harford et al. (2009), Lemmon et al. (2008), and Flannery and Rangan (2006). However, our 
evidence is in contrast with those in Barclay et al. (2009) and Hovakimian (2004). 
Overall, our evidence suggests that when firms issue equity through a reverse LBO, their leverage 
levels drop significantly at the time of the issue and the deviation between their actual leverage levels and 
the target leverage levels is quite low. At the year of the IPO and the 4 years following it, the firms’ market 
leverage levels lie within the 95 % confidence intervals of the target leverage levels. Firms also continue to 
decrease their leverage levels in the seven years following the issue. Altogether, the evidence presented 
supports the hypothesis that, even if firms deliberately deviate from their target capital structures, the 
deviation is temporary and they rebalance their capital structure. 
 
 
3. Speed of Adjustment  
3.1. Data and Methodology 
Speed of adjustment (SOA) by the firms has been estimated in several recent studies, by 
employing various models.  Fama and French (2002), estimate the SOA as 7 % - 10 % for dividend paying 
firms and 15 % - 18 % for firms that do not pay dividends. Some of the other estimates of SOA in the 
literature are 34.4 % in Flannery and Rangan (2006), 25 % in Lemmon et al. (2008), 15.6 % - 23.2 % in 
Huang and Ritter (2009). 
Two of the models previously employed in the literature for SOA estimation are Pooled OLS and 
Firm Fixed Effects. These two models can be presented as (Huang and Ritter, 2009): 
Levit – Levit-1 = λ(TarLevit – Levit-1) +εit                          (2) 
and  
TarLevit = αi + βXit-1                                                                 (3) 
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where Levit is the book leverage of firm i at the end of year t, TarLevit is the target leverage for 
firm i, λ is the SOA, α is the firm fixed effect and Xit-1 is vector of firm characteristics and year dummies. 
The Pooled OLS version of the model, without firm fixed effects would not include α in the model.  
 The potential problem with these 2 models is that, as stated by Hsiao (2003) and Baltagi (2005) 
and also in Lemmon et al. (2008) and Huang and Ritter (2009), the SOA estimated by the Pooled OLS 
model without firm fixed effects will be biased downward, while the SOA estimated by the Firm Fixed 
Effects model will be biased upward.  
 Lemmon et al. (2008) report the SOA estimated by Pooled OLS as 17 % and the SOA estimated 
by Firm Fixed Effects as 39 %. Our results (not tabulated here) showed a similar pattern, where the SOA 
estimated by Firm Fixed Effects model is 50.64 % (and a leverage half life of 0.98 years) and the SOA 
estimated by Pooled OLS model is 16.00 % (and a leverage half life of 3.97 years).  
 As alternatives to these 2 models, in order to avoid the biased SOA and short time dimension 
problems, Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) has been employed in the most recent SOA studies. 
Lemmon et al. (2008) and Antoniou et al. (2008) employ the system GMM (GMM-SYS), whereas Huang 
and Ritter (2009) employ the Long Differencing GMM (GMM-DIF). While Antoniou et al. (2008) criticize 
the GMM-DIF for estimating poorly performing estimators in short sample periods and persistent data (as 
the leverage data is), they defend GMM-DIF for revealing efficiency gains. On the other hand, Huang and 
Ritter (2009) criticize the GMM-SYS for the tendency of the of the set of moment conditions for the 
estimator to explode as time dimension increases, and also in terms of the estimate of the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable being very sensitive to the instruments employed in the System. And they justify 
employing GMM-DIF for it estimating much less biased estimators compared to the GMM-SYS. We 
estimate and resort the SOA adjustment employing both methods. Firms in our sample (as suggested by 
evidence presented earlier in the paper) adjust their leverage levels substantially in the 3 years before the 
reverse LBO. Thus, we estimate the SOA by using data after the firms become public. 
 In GMM-SYS, the first difference of the equation (4) below is taken:  
Levit =(1- λ) Levit-1 + λαi + λβXit-1 +εit                  (4) 
resulting in equation (5) as: 
Levit  - Levit-1 =(1- λ) (Levit-1 - Levit-2  )+ λβ(Xit-1 - Xit-2) +(εit  - εit-1)                              (5) 
14 
 
 
Here, both equations (4) and (5) are run as a system at the simultaneously. For equation (4), the 
lagged differences are used as instruments, whereas for equation (5), lagged levels are used as instruments 
(Huang and Ritter (2009)). 
On the other hand in GMM-DIF, the leverage at the end of year t-k is given by: 
Levit-k =(1- λ) Levit-k-1 + λαi + λβXit-k-1 +εit-k                    (6) 
Then equation (6) is subtracted from the equation (7): 
Levit =(1- λ) Levit-1 + λαi + λβXit-1 +εit                   (7) 
resulting in equation (8): 
Levit  - Levit-k =(1- λ) (Levit-1 - Levit-k-1  )+ λβ(Xit-1 - Xit-k-1) +(εit  - εit-k)              (8) 
To derive the GMM-DIF estimates of SOA, equation (8) is estimated with iterated two stage least 
squares (Huang and Ritter, 2009), (For further details, see Huang and Ritter (2009), appendix B, p. 269). 
We report results using k = 4 years due to our sample period being shorter than similar studies, due to the 
lack of Reverse LBOs prior to 1980s. Huang and Ritter (2009) present results estimated with k = 4, 8, 18 
and 28 years. 
 
3.2. Speed of Adjustment Results 
The results for both GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS are reported in Table 12, using book leverages. 
The SOA estimated by GMM-DIF, with k=4, is 26.09 % with a half life of 2.29 years. On the other hand 
the SOA estimated by GMM-SYS is 30.38 % with a half life of 1.92 years. In other words, the results 
suggest that firms close 26.09 % (GMM-DIF) to 30.38 % (GMM-SYS) of the gap between previous year’s 
leverage and the target of the current period. As in similar prior studies, these SOAs are less than the SOA 
estimated by Pooled OLS model, and more than the SOA estimated by Firm Fixed Effects model. When the 
SOAs are estimated by employing market leverages (not tabulated here), GMM-DIF estimates a SOA of 
26.42 % while the GMM-SYS estimates a SOA of 25.31 %. In terms of the comparison between the SOAs 
estimated by GMM-SYS and GMM-DIF, we observe a similar pattern to those in Huang and Ritter (2009). 
The SOA estimated by GMM-DIF is less than the SOA estimated by GMM-SYS, when book leverages are 
employed in the process. When we compare the results derived by employing market leverages, the 
difference is reduced substantially. 
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In comparison with the earlier studies, which use larger samples and longer sample periods than 
ours, the SOAs we estimated are higher. Huang and Ritter report a SOA of 21.1 % (k=4) estimated by 
GMM-DIF, whereas Lemmon et al. (2008) report a SOA of 25 % estimated by GMM-SYS, using book 
leverages. In both cases, our estimates are around 5 % higher. This would be considered as sign of the 
continuation of active capital structure adjustments that took place while reducing substantial leverage 
levels before the reverse LBO. 
Overall, these results suggest that firms close 26.09 % (GMM-DIF) to 30.38 % (GMM-SYS) of 
the gaps between previous year’s leverage and the target of the current period, supporting our earlier 
evidence of firms rebalancing towards target capital structures. 
 
 
4. Uses of Proceeds 
4.1. Data and Methodology 
We also investigate how the firms in our sample use their proceedings from the equity issue. This 
is important since it provides us with the opportunity to understand the main motivation lying underneath 
the equity issue. A finding of debt repayment as the main motivation for equity issue uses would strengthen 
our evidence of firms’ rebalancing intents. 
Byoun (2008) suggests that when the adverse selection and/or transaction costs are lower for debt, 
compared to equity, firms would tend to reduce their debt instead of reducing equity, so that they can 
preserve their debt capacity in case of financing needs they would have in the future. Lemmon et al. (2008) 
provide evidence suggesting that highly levered firms issue equity to reduce their leverage.  
Data necessary to analyze the uses of equity proceeds are manually collected from the IPO 
prospectus. Prospectuses after 1994 are accessible through Edgar on the internet, however prospectuses 
before that date are not. Thus for firms which went public again before that year, we collected the 
necessary data through LexisNexis and Factiva. 
Evidence in prior literature suggests that firms use their equity issue or debt issue proceeds mainly 
for purposes such as funding investment outlays and capital expenditures, satisfying their debt service 
obligations, avoiding reductions in dividends, covering operational cash shortfalls, paying out to 
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stockholders, funding working capital increases (Healy and Palepu, 1990, DeAngelo et al., 2011, Denis and 
McKeon, 2012). 
In this study, we calculate the usage of equity proceeds based on the findings of prior studies and 
the stated purposes of equity proceeds use by the firms in the IPO prospectuses. The uses of the equity 
proceeds classes are: (i) Debt Payment, (ii) Operations, (iii) Payout, (iv) Working Capital and (v) 
Investment. The data items in COMPUSTAT data base used for the calculation of equity proceeds classes 
are statement of cash flow items. 
Debt Payment is the use of equity proceeds from the IPO for debt payment reduction, which is the 
most widely stated purpose of equity proceeds use in the prospectuses. It is defined as the reduction in long 
term debt. 
Operations (OCF) covers the use of equity proceeds from the IPO for covering operational cash 
shortfalls (see appendix for calculation of OCF). 
Payout covers the equity proceeds used for the purpose of paying out to stockholders. Following 
Healy and Palepu (1990) and Denis and McKeon (2012), we assume that during any year, the expected 
amount for paying out to stockholders is equal to the dividend paid in the previous year, so that our payout 
value reflects the deviations from expected payout. In this sense payout is equal to the difference between 
the sum of dividends and repurchases in year t and the dividends in year t-1. 
 Working Capital covers the change in working capital (ΔWC) that is used for funding working 
capital needs (see appendix for the calculation of change in working capital). 
Investment covers the funds used for investment opportunities. To calculate Investment (I), 
following Denis and McKeon (2012), we first calculate net investment which includes all cash used for 
investment activities, and from this figure we subtract the capital expenditures of the prior year, thus having 
cash used for funding increases in investments.  (see appendix for the calculation of investment). 
After calculating the values for each potential uses of equity proceeds classes, the next step is to 
determine the dollar value of proceeds from equity issue at IPO. And then we divide the values of each 
class by this amount, to calculate the percentages of the equity issue proceeds attributed to each class. Then 
we sum the percentages of each 5 classes up. If any class makes up for 50 % of the total percentage of the 5 
classes in the equity proceed, that class is defined as the primary use of the equity proceeds. We are able to 
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label one of the 5 classes as the primary use, for 211 firms out of 250 firms, for which we were able to 
access the dollar amount of proceeds from the IPO. 
 
 
4.2. Uses of Proceeds Results 
In this section, we present the findings related to how the firms in our sample use their proceeds 
from the equity issue at the time of IPO. In the previous section we provided evidence suggesting that firms 
issue equity and this equity issue moves them towards their target leverage levels. The reason we analyze 
this issue is to have a better understanding of the main motivation lying underneath the equity issue. Is it 
just the equity proceeds that move the firms towards their target leverage levels? Or, is it also that firms use 
the equity proceeds to pay their debt obligations, which will move the firms close to their target leverage 
levels. Hovakimian (2004) suggests that firms’ debt reductions offset the deviation between their actual and 
target leverage levels. 
The descriptive statistics and the firms’ stated purposes of equity proceed uses in the prospectuses 
are provided in Table 3. Panel A shows the resources used to gather the data for the firms in our reverse 
LBO sample. For 39 firms in our final sample, we could not have access to any data regarding the IPO. 
Panel B shows data availability regarding the amount and uses of equity proceeds. We were able to find the 
actual dollar amount of equity proceeds data for 250 firms, and the stated purpose of equity proceeds use 
for 259 firms. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the equity proceeds with available data. The mean 
value of proceeds from the equity issue (IPO) is 120.29 million, with the lowest amount of proceeds being 
5.49 million and the highest 1,267.68 million.  
Panel D shows the frequencies of purposes for equity proceeds use by the firms in their 
prospectus. Mostly, firms mention that their main motivation of use of equity proceeds is debt payment, 
244 firms state this motivation out of 259 firms, for which we were able to access the prospectus. 92 state 
general corporate purposes, 69 state working capital increase, 64 state redeeming preferred stock and 
repurchasing stocks, 46 state acquisitions and capital expenditures, 12 state dividend payment and 7 state 
R&D. Since the firms in our sample are expected to have increased their debt levels at the time of the LBO, 
after realizing the benefits of the LBO and going public again, it is not surprising to observe that their main 
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motivation for equity issue is debt payment. This is in accordance with the finding that the difference 
between the median excess leverage for the firms in the sample is only 0.012 after the equity issue.  
In Table 6, we provide the results for the use of equity issue proceeds. As a result of the analysis, 
we were able to identify the main use of equity proceeds for 211 firms, out of 250 firms, for which we 
could access the dollar amount of equity proceeds.  In accordance with the stated purpose at the time of the 
IPO in the prospectus, for 162 firms out of 211, the main use of equity proceeds is debt payment. For 31 
firms the main use of equity proceeds is working capital, while for 11 firms the main use is investment, for 
6 firms it is payout and only 1 company it is operations. This results support the hypothesis that firms 
follow a target leverage ratio and they issue equity and repay debt at the time of IPO, for this purpose. 
Lastly, we investigate how the leverage levels of RLBO firms would have been if they had not 
used their equity issue proceeds for debt payment purposes. For this purpose, we consider the firms’ mean 
book leverage levels had they not decreased their long term debts levels following the IPO. The findings 
are presented in Figure 7. It can be observed that if the firms had not decreased their long term debt levels 
following the IPO, their book leverages, on average, would have been 0.501. This is significantly higher 
than the actual mean book leverages, which is 0.377, as we have presented in the descriptive statistics. This 
choice would naturally have affected whether or not firms would be able to follow target capital structures. 
Overall, our findings in the section show that firms issue equity mainly for the purpose of debt 
payment and as a result of the increase in equity and the reduction in debt payments, firms move towards 
their target capital structures. This also suggests that firms might be preferring to use equity proceeds to 
mainly pay debt obligations in order to preserve their debt capacity in case of future financing needs. And 
when they need external financing in the future, they can issue debt without incurring further financial 
distress costs. Preserving debt capacity explanation also supports the transitory debt hypothesis’ prediction 
that firms de-lever to re-build debt capacity for future funding needs. 
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5. Transitory Debt and Investment Spikes 
5.1. Data and Methodology 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) suggest that even though low leverage would be the optimal 
structure for firms in the long-run, for investment purposes managers of the firm would sometimes prefer to 
issue debt, which in return, causes them to deviate from target leverage deliberately. And the repayment of 
the debt and reverting back to the long-run optimal structure would not be instantaneously due to the firm 
specific or market related conditions. DeAngelo et al. (2011) estimate a capital structure model, in which 
firms deliberately deviate from target leverage. This deviation is temporary and firms mainly issue 
transitory debt to fund investment needs. DeAngelo et al. (2011) predict that firms’ decision to issue 
transitory debt will be systematically related to their investment opportunities and thus, opposed to the 
predictions of traditional trade-off theory, firms might deviate from the target leverage levels deliberately.  
As our results from prior sections suggest, a reverse LBO is an extreme example of transitory 
debt. At the time of the LBO, firms deliberately increase debt and deviate from target leverage levels in 
order to benefit from the high levels of debt. Once the benefits of the new company structure after the LBO 
are realized, firms have the incentive to restructure the capital structure and rebalance back to the target 
leverage levels. In this sense, our results would be considered as evidence of transitory debt. However, due 
to the nature of the LBO firms and data not being available, it is not possible to identify the main 
motivation for the deviation at LBO. All we can conclude is that firms issue transitory debt and revert back 
to target leverage.  
On the other hand, since we are interested in whether or not firms follow target capital structures, 
which are long term targets. Thus, we investigate the evolution of firms’ capital structures for 7 years 
following the IPO, rather than investigating whether or not they revert to target capital structures only at the 
time of the IPO. This gives us the opportunity to investigate whether or not they deviate from the target 
leverage levels significantly following the IPO, and if they do, the opportunity to identify the purpose 
underlying this deviation. 
We observe that some of the firms in our sample increase their leverages substantially, as in the 
case of the LBO, in the 7 years following the reverse LBO. These firms provide us the opportunity to 
investigate transitory debt and its relationship to the investment needs of the firm in detail.  
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For this purpose, we first identify firms, which increase their leverage levels substantially in the 7 
years following the IPO. We call this subsample “leverage increasing reverse LBO sample”. We analyze 
how the capital structures of these firms change after the IPO and also after the leverage increase, in order 
to investigate whether the increase in leverage causes the firms to deviate from target leverage.  
To be identified in the leverage increasing subsample, a firms is required to have increased its 
market leverage at least 10 % compared to the prior year’s level and to have a new market leverage, that is 
at least 10 % above the target leverage. In addition to this, the firm is required to have increased its 
leverage ratio as a result of a debt increase and not an equity decline. To be able to identify these firms, 
following Denis and McKeon (2012), we calculate a new variable $ΔML which is calculated as: 
                    
    
       
 
By using this equation and setting a requirement that the change in debt is equal to at least 90 % of 
$ΔML, we can screen out the firms which did not have the leverage increase as a result a debt increase, but 
did actually have an equity decline. The firms that satisfy all of the 3 requirements for a given year are 
identified in the leverage increasing reverse LBO subsample. For the firms that make more than one jump 
in the leverage ratios in the 7 years following the IPO, we only account the first jump and ignore the 
following jumps. Table 4 shows the number of firms that increased their leverages in the 7 years following 
the reverse LBO, for the leverage increasing subsample. We were able to identify 61 firms, out of the 301 
firms in our final sample, as leverage increasing reverse LBOs and almost 67 % of them increase their 
leverages in the 3 years following the IPO.  
To understand the motivation for the transitory debt issue by these firms, we analyze the use of the 
proceeds from the debt issue in the 7 years following the IPO. The process is very similar to what we 
already described for the use of equity proceeds classes identification. However, we have only 4 potential 
uses of the debt issue proceeds classes. These are (i) Operations, (ii) Payout, (iii) Working Capital and (iv) 
Investment, following Denis and McKeon.  
The amounts of uses for Operations, Payout, Working Capital and Investment are calculated in the 
previously described manner. After calculating the values for each potential uses of debt issue proceeds 
classes, we determine the dollar value of proceeds from debt issue and then divide the values of each class 
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by this amount, to calculate the percentages of the debt issue proceeds attributed to each class. Then we 
sum the percentages of each 4 classes up, again. If any class makes up for 50 % of the total percentage of 
the 4 classes in the debt issue proceed, that class is defined as the primary use of the debt issue proceeds. 
We are able to label one of the 4 classes as the primary use, for 58 firms out of 61 firms in our leverage 
increasing subsample. Among these firms, almost all the industries are represented, with the highest 
number of leverage increasing firms being 6 for business services, followed by 5 firms in retail industry 
and 4 firms in each of chips, machinery and transportation industries. 
To investigate the relationship between the leverage increase and investments further, we also 
analyze investment “spikes”. We use 2 different investment spike definitions in our analysis. In the first 
definition, similar to DeAngelo et al. (2011), an investment spike is defined as an investment (standardized 
by total assets) outlay that is at least 2 standard deviations above mean industry investment.  The industry 
mean is calculated based on the 2 digit SIC codes. Any investment outlay, which does not fit into this 
definition is considered as “nonspike”.  In the second definition, we follow a similar approach to the one in 
the identification of substantial leverage increases. A spike is defined where the investment outlay 
(standardized by total assets) is increased at least 10 % compared to the prior year’s level and the new 
investment/total assets ratio is at least 10 % above the industry mean investment/total assets ratio. Any 
investment outlay, which does not fit into this definition is considered as “nonspike”. We present results for 
both definitions. 
Different from DeAngelo et al. (2011), we use the Investment (I) variable we have calculated 
earlier for the equity proceeds section. Investment covers the funds used for investment opportunities. To 
calculate Investment (I), we first calculate net investment which includes all cash used for investment 
activities, and from this figure we subtract the capital expenditures of the prior year, thus having cash used 
for funding increases in investments.  
 
5.2. Transitory Debt and Investment Spikes Results 
In this section, we first present the findings related to the “leverage increasing firms” subsample 
and how these firms use their proceeds from the debt issue. Table 7 presents the results of the analysis. Out 
of 61 firms in our leverage increasing subsample, the main motivation to increase leverage substantially is 
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investment, by 43 firms (70.49 %). 8 firms (13.11 %) use the proceeds from the debt issue for payout 
purposes, while 6 firms (9.83 %) use the proceeds for working capital purposes, and finally 1 (1.63 %) use 
it for operations purposes. For 3 firms, we were not able to identify any motivation as the main use of debt 
proceeds. Denis and McKeon’s (2012) results show that 67 % of the firms in their leverage increasing firms 
sample use the proceeds of the debt issue for investment purposes. This evidence provides the preliminary 
support for the transitory debt hypothesis’ prediction that firms’ decision to issue transitory debt will be 
related to their investment needs. 
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics for the leverage increasing subsample. The year of the 
reverse LBO is denoted as t, in both tables. The median ME for the leverage increasing subsample in year t 
is 168.70 million. The median M/B in year t is 1.595, whereas the median TA is 158.6. The median 
stockholder’s equity for the leverage increasing subsample increases to 55.6 millions in year t, from 15.6 
million in year t-1. The evolution of the book leverage ratios is considered on the following page with other 
leverage related ratios. The median OI/TA for the leverage increasing firms is 0.198 in year t and it 
decreases in the following 3 years. The CAPEX/TA for the leverage increasing sample is 0.042 for the 
leverage increasing firms and it increases in the following year and then starts decreasing. 
The median book leverage ratio for the leverage increasing firms subsample drops to 0.327 in the 
IPO year, from a level of 0.578 in the previous year. In the following 3 years, the median leverage ratio 
increases to 0.451 levels and after that it follows values between this and 0.405 level for the 4 years 
following that. The evolution of the median book leverage for this subsample can be visually observed in 
Figure 4.  
What should be further explanatory is how the excess leverage levels evolve after the IPO. The 
book leverage ratio, market leverage and excess market leverage values are presented in Table.  The year of 
the reverse LBO is denoted with t. The median market leverage for leverage increasing firms subsample is 
0.271 in year t and it increases to a highest value of 0.528 in the next 3 years and in the following 4 years 
after that the market leverage is between this value and a low of 0.552. The excess market leverage, on the 
other hand, is -0.014 in year t and it increases to a high of 0.166 in the next 3 years and declines to 0.112 in 
the 2 years following that and increases to 0.164 in year t+6. The evolution of the 3 values mentioned here 
can be visually observed in Figure 5. This finding supports the evidence in Leary and Roberts (2005), 
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where they show that the effect on the leverage ratios by the equity issues, is erased by debt issues in the 
following two years. 
These findings suggest that while the majority of the firms in our sample prefer to keep their 
leverage ratios lower, compared to the levels when they were private, a minority of firms in the sample  still 
prefer to issue debt after the reverse LBO and maintain high levels of debt in the following years.  
To investigate the nature of the debt increase and whether it can be considered as transitory debt 
further, we  investigate the evolution of the book leverage, market leverage and excess market leverage for 
the leverage increasing firms subsample, this time around the time of the substantial leverage increase. The 
time of the leverage increase will be denoted as t, as opposed to the previous results where t was the year of 
IPO.  
Table 11 presents the findings. The median book leverage value is 0.494 in year t, and it declines 
following the leverage increase to 0.365 levels in the next 7 years. The median market leverage in the 
leverage increase year is 0.549 and again this ratio declines to 0.483 in the following 3 years then increases 
to 0.532 in year 4 and declines to 0.480 in the following 3 years. In terms of excess market leverage, it 
jumps to 0.198 in the leverage increase year and it declines gradually to a lowest value of 0.052 in the 
following 7 years. 
The striking evidence is the behavior of the leverage levels before the substantial leverage 
increase. The median book leverage is 0.468 in t-3, decreases to 0.395 in t-2 and reaches a low of 0.251 in 
t-1. Similarly the median market leverage is 0.350 in year t-3, decreases to 0.248 in year t-2 and it is 0.228 
in year t-1. The excess market leverage is 0.017 in year t-3, 0.029 in year t-2 and -0.047 in year t-1. All 3 
ratios make a significant jump at the time of the event (The evolution of these figures is presented in Figure 
6). This evidence might be considered being in accordance with the transitory debt hypothesis, such that 
firms value the option to borrow highly and decrease their debt levels accordingly so that they can preserve 
debt option for future. When firms have valuable investment options, they issue transitory debt deliberately 
but temporarily, they move away from their target leverage ratios, use the proceeds from the issue mainly 
for investment purposes, and they revert back to the target leverage levels gradually. 
The finding that debt issues do not reduce the deviation between their actual and target leverage 
levels and actually increases the deviation also support the evidence in Hovakimian (2006). It also supports 
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the evidence that it takes a long time for firms to adjust their leverage levels and finally converge to target 
leverage levels provided by Hovakimian and Li (2011) and Lemmon et al. (2008). In contradiction with our 
results, Barclay et al. (2009) suggest that firms that issue debt following SEOS do so, to finance 
investments and this increases the firms’ leverages, but the increase moves them towards target leverage 
ratios.  
Lastly, to investigate the relationship between leverage increases and investment outlays, we 
analyze investment spikes. Table 13 presents the results. In Panel A, we present the investment and 
leverage comparisons between spikes and nonspikes, where a spike is defined as an investment 
(standardized by total assets) outlay that is at least 2 standard deviations above mean industry investment. 
We present the results for the full sample and also based on a firm’s market leverage ratio being above or 
below its target leverage ratio, in the previous year. In column A and B in Panel A we see that, the mean 
investment/TA ratio is 0.386 for spikes, as opposed to 0.082 for nonspikes. The change in investment/TA 
from the previous year is 0.307 for spikes, whereas it is -0.013 for nonspikes. The excess spike, which is 
defined as the difference between the firm’s investment/TA and industry mean investment/TA, is 0.308 for 
spikes and -0.001 for nonspikes. These figures are expected due to the definition of spike/nonspike. 
The interesting pattern is observed when we look at the leverage comparisons for both groups. The 
mean market leverage is 0.426 for the spikes and 0.332 for nonspikes, at the end of the year. More 
strikingly, in the case of a spike, the leverage change is 0.178 compared to the previous year, whereas in the 
case of the nonspike, the leverage change is only 0.023. Similarly, when there is a spike, the mean leverage 
ratio becomes 0.107 excess over the target leverage, whereas for a nonspike, it becomes only 0.026 excess 
over the target leverage. These results can be compared to those in DeAngelo et al. (2011, Table 8). In row 
6 they present the beginning of the year debt/assets, whereas in row 7 they present end of the year 
debt/assets. Similar to our results, compared to the beginning of the year the debt/assets ratio increase to 
0.283 at the end of the year, from 0.203 for spikes. On the other hand the mean debt/assets ratio is 0.248 at 
the beginning of the year and it is 0.246 at the end of the for nonspikes. 
In columns C and D we see the results for the cases when the firm’s market leverage for the 
previous year was above the target leverage and in columns E and F, we see the results for the cases when 
the market leverage was below the target leverage. Again, the figures for investment ratios should not be 
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surprising for both groups. However, when we consider the case for above target leverage firms, we see 
that when there is a spike, the mean leverage ratio is 0.445, the change in the leverage ratio is 0.104 and the 
firm becomes 0.153 excess leveraged over the target leverage. On the other hand in case of a nonspike, the 
mean leverage ratio is 0.507, the change in the leverage ratio is -0.004 and the firm becomes 0.130 excess 
leveraged over the target leverage. It can be considered as further evidence for the transitory debt 
hypothesis that even though these companies are above the target leverage levels, the firms in spikes group 
still increase their leverages compared to the previous year, whereas the ones in nonspikes group decrease 
leverage. Again, these results can be compared to those in DeAngelo et al. (2011, Table 8), even though the 
definition of being above or below leverage is different in that study. Still, it is reported that when the 
leverage is above average, the debt/assets ratio changes from 0.380 to 0.416 for spikes and in decreases 
from 0.398 to 0.379 during the year for the nonspikes.  
When we consider the case for below target leverage, we see a similar pattern for spikes and 
nonspikes in terms of investment ratios, compared to the full sample. When we look at the leverage ratios, 
we see that for spikes, the mean market leverage is 0.4206 whereas it is 0.244 for nonspikes. More 
interestingly, the spikes increase their market leverage 0.207 on average compared to the previous year, 
whereas nonspikes increase leverage only 0.042 on average. The mean excess leverage becomes 0.094 for 
the spikes, and it becomes -0.029 for the nonspikes. 
Also, it can be observed that when we compare the spikes for above and below target leverage 
groups, we see that spikes that are above the target increase their leverage by 0.104 whereas spikes that are 
below the target leverage increase it by 0.207. When we compare nonspikes in a similar fashion, we see 
that nonspikes that are above the target leverage decrease their leverage by 0.004, and the nonspikes 
increase their leverage by 0.042. Similar pattern exists in DeAngelo et al. (2011, Table 8). 
The evidence in Panel A in Table 13 suggests that when firms increase investment substantially as 
in the case of an investment outlay spike, they increase their leverages significantly compared to nonspikes, 
and they end up with excess market leverages. This pattern is valid, regardless of the firm being above or 
below the target leverage in the previous year. Especially the leverage increase in case of the spike, even 
when the firm already is above the target leverage contradicts the traditional trade-off theory, and fits into 
the transitory debt hypothesis, in terms of firm’s deviating from target leverage with an investment spike. A 
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very similar pattern exists in terms of all the figures in Panel A, when the second definition for investment 
spikes in used and the results can be observed in Panel B of Table 13.  
To investigate the relationship between leverage increases and investment outlay, in Panel C of 
Table 13, we consider the changes in leverage and investment, but this time by comparing for leverage 
increases and non leverage increases. A leverage increase is defined in the exact manner as it is previously 
in this subsection. In columns A and B, we observe the results for the full sample. The mean market 
leverage is 0.543 for the leverage increases, whereas it is 0.326 for non leverage increases. The change in 
leverage from the previous year is 0.278 for leverage increases and it is 0.014 for non increases. The excess 
leverage is 0.233 at the end of the year for leverage increases whereas it is 0.019 for the non increases. The 
leverage figures should not be surprising due to the design of the 2 groups. The interesting story, however, 
is observed when we investigate the investment ratios. We see that for leverage increases the investment 
/TA ratio is 0.235, and the change in this ratio compared to the previous year is 0.148. On the other hand 
for non leverage increases the investment/TA ratio is 0.084 on average and the change in the ratio is -0.011 
compared to the previous year.  Similar to the results in Panel A and B, where a spike is accompanied with 
a leverage increase from the previous year, in Panel C, we observe that a leverage increase is accompanied 
with an increase in investment compared to the previous year. The excess investment/TA figures support 
this notion, as well, with 0.160 for the leverage increases and 0.0003 for the non leverage increases. 
In Panel C, in columns C and D, we report the result for the cases where the firm was above the 
average investment/TA ratio the in the previous year, whereas in columns E and F, we report the result for 
the cases where the firm was below the average investment/TA ratio the in the previous year. We observed 
almost similar patterns for both groups, as for the full sample. 
Overall, the evidence in this section might be considered supporting the transitory debt hypothesis. 
Firms value the option to borrow highly and decrease their debt levels accordingly so that they can preserve 
debt option for future. When they have valuable investment options, they issue transitory debt deliberately 
but temporarily, moving away from their target leverage ratios, use the proceeds from the issue mainly for 
investment purposes, and they revert back to the target leverage levels gradually. Also, when firms increase 
investment substantially as in the case of an investment outlay spike, it is accompanied with a significant 
increase in their leverage, compared to nonspikes. This pattern is valid, regardless of the firm being above 
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or below the target leverage in the previous year. Especially the leverage increase accompanying a spike, 
even when the firm already is above the target leverage contradicts the traditional trade-off theory, and fits 
into the transitory debt hypothesis. And when firms increase their leverage significantly, it is accompanied 
with a significant increase in their investment outlays, compared to when they do not increase leverage 
significantly. 
 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
In this section, we present results derived used an alternative specification for the estimation of the 
proxy used for target leverage. The specification employed, following Kayhan and Titman’s (2007) 
reasoning and based on Denis and McKeon’s (2012) model, previously was: 
Market Leverageit = α + β1 (Med. Ind. Market Leverage)i,t-1 + β2 (M/B)i,t-1 + β3 (FA/TA)i,t-1 +  
                                                β4 (OI/TA)i,t-1 + β5 [ln(TA)]i,t-1 + ε                                                                            
In this model, the market-to-book variable was dropped from the model for the target leverage 
estimated for the year of the IPO, since it is not possible to calculate market-to-book value for the year 
preceding the IPO due to the firms not being public. 
 Thus, in this section, we estimate the proxy for target leverage for using a similar specification, 
where we replace the firm’s market-to-book value with the median industry market-to-book value for that 
firm. The median industry market-to-book value is calculated in the same manner as the median industry 
market leverage. The resulting model is presented as below: 
Market Leverageit = α + β1 (Med. Ind. Market Leverage)i,t-1 + β2 (Med. Ind. M/B)i,t-1 + β3 
(FA/TA)i,t-1 + β4 (OI/TA)i,t-1 + β5 [ln(TA)]i,t-1 + ε                         (9)                                                              
When the model above is applied, our results are parallel to the results obtained using the previous 
specification for target leverage estimation. First of all, the book leverage and market leverage levels for 
the firms stay the same, since they are not affected by target leverage estimation. The excess market 
leverage, on the other hand, is affected by the model specification. The median excess market leverage 
using the previous specification was 0.012 in the year of the IPO and was 0.012, 0.030, 0.018, -0.015, -
0.059, -0.036 and -0.039 in the following seven years, respectively. When model (9) is employed in target 
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leverage proxy estimation, the median excess market leverage for the sample firms is 0.015 in the year of 
the IPO. Parallel to the previous results, it is -0.010, 0.026, 0.021, -0.004, -0.060, -0.023 and -0.042 in the 
following seven years, respectively. In addition, the results for the bootstrap confidence intervals are 
affected when model (9) is employed and we observe that the results are very similar to those derived by 
employing the previous specification. Once again, the median market leverage level for the year of the IPO 
and the following 4 years lie in the 95 % confidence intervals of the median target leverage levels. 
 Next, we estimate the speed of adjustment by estimating the proxy for target leverage levels by 
employing model (9). Compared to the results presented in Table 12, the coefficient for GMM-DIFF 
becomes 0.7293, whereas the coefficient for GMM-SYS becomes 0.7601. These findings suggest that firms 
close 27.07 % (GMM-DIF) to 23.99 % (GMM-SYS) of the gap between previous year’s leverage and the 
target of the current period. 
 The next set of results that would be affected by the model specification for target leverage proxy 
estimation is regarding the evolution of leverage levels following the IPO. Specifically, the firms that are 
considered as increasing their leverages substantially following the IPO, and the main motivation 
underlying this leverage increase are affected. When model (9) is employed, we observed that the number 
of firms that can be considered as involved in substantial leverage increase, increases to 67 as opposed to 
61 firms when the previous specification is employed.  Similar to our previous findings, the main 
motivation underlying the substantial debt increase is investments. 68 % of the firms use the proceeds from 
the debt issue for investment purposes, whereas 1 % of the firms use the proceeds or operations purposes. 
On the other hand, 16 % of the firms use the proceeds from debt issue for payout to investors, and 10 % of 
the firms use the proceeds for working capital needs. 
 In terms of the descriptive statistics for substantial leverage increase subsample, the figures are 
parallel to those derived when the previous model was employed for target leverage proxy estimation. 
When we investigate the evolution of leverage levels in this subsample around the time of the IPO, we 
observe a similar pattern to the figures derived employing the previous model specification.  The results are 
presented in Table 10. When we investigate the evolution of the leverage levels or the same subsample, this 
time around the time of the substantial leverage increase, by employing the specification in model (9), once 
again the findings are parallel to the earlier results. The findings are presented in Table 14. Lastly, we 
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investigate the relationship between firms’ investment outlays and leverage levels, by using the model 
specification model (9). We observe that the relationship between firms’ investment outlays and leverage 
levels shows a similar pattern to that derived by employing the previous model. The results are presented in 
Table 15. 
 In addition to replacing the firms’ book-to-market ratio with median industry book-to-market ratio 
in target leverage proxy estimation, we also employ one other specification. Frank and Goyal (2009) 
suggest that the ratio of capital expenditure to assets could be used as an alternative proxy for growth, 
compared to book-to-market ratio. Thus, we replace the book-to-market ratio with capital expenditure to 
assets ratio in the model specification for target leverage proxy estimation. The findings are parallel to 
those derived by employing book-to-market ratio in the model specification. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
While research by Fama and French (2002), Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan 
(2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Huang and Ritter (2009), Harford et al. (2009) Kayhan and Titman 
(2007), suggest that firms rebalance their capital structures towards a target (optimal) capital structure as 
predicted by traditional trade-off theory; evidence by Hovakimian (2004), Hovakimian (2006), Barclay et 
al. (2009), Denis and McKeon (2012) suggest that firms’ capital structure choices move them away from 
their target capital structure, rather than moving them towards the target. DeAngelo et al. (2011) estimate a 
capital structure model, in which firms deliberately deviate from target leverage. This deviation is 
temporary and firms mainly issue transitory debt to fund investment needs. DeAngelo et al. (2011) predict 
that firms’ decision to issue transitory debt will be systematically related to their investment opportunities 
and thus, opposed to the predictions of traditional trade-off theory, firms might deviate from the target 
leverage levels deliberately. In this study, we investigate this issue with a different sample group; reverse 
LBOs, that took place between 1980 and 2006. 
We first investigated whether firms decrease their leverage levels through an equity issue at the 
time of the reverse LBO and whether this moves their capital structures towards a target. We also analyzed 
how their leverage levels behave following the equity issue. Our evidence suggests that when firms issue 
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equity through a reverse LBO, their leverage levels drop significantly at the time of the issue and the 
deviation between their actual leverage levels and the target leverage levels is quite low.  At the year of the 
IPO and the 4 years following it, the firms’ market leverage levels lie within the 95 % confidence intervals 
of the target leverage levels. Also, the firms continue to decrease their leverage levels in the seven years 
following the issue, supporting the hypothesis that firms follow a target capital structure. 
Second, we investigated how fast firms close the gap between previous year’s leverage and the 
target of the current period, represented by SOA. Our results suggest that firms close 26.09 % (GMM-DIF) 
to 30.38 % (GMM-SYS) of the gap between previous year’s leverage and the target of the current period, 
supporting our earlier evidence of firms rebalancing towards target capital structures. 
Third, we analyzed how the firms use the equity proceeds to investigate whether it is just the 
equity proceeds that move the firms towards their target leverage levels. Or is it also that firms use the 
equity proceeds to pay their debt obligations and this moves the firms close to their target leverage levels. 
This result support the hypothesis that firms follow target leverage ratios and rebalance their capital 
structures towards these targets and the main motivation underneath the equity issue is mainly paying debt 
obligations with the proceeds of the equity issue. This debt pay offs cause the firms to get closer to their 
target leverage levels. 
Lastly, we created a subsample which includes firms that increase their debt levels substantially. 
We investigated the leverage dynamics of the leverage increasing firms, the main motivation for the 
leverage increase and the relation of the transitory debt with the investment needs. The evidence suggests 
that when firms have valuable investment options, they issue transitory debt deliberately but temporarily, 
moving away from their target leverage ratios, use the proceeds from the issue mainly for investment 
purposes, and they revert back to the target leverage levels gradually. When firms increase investment 
substantially as in the case of an investment outlay spike, it is accompanied with a significant increase in 
their leverage, compared to nonspikes. And when firms increase their leverage significantly, it is 
accompanied with a significant increase in their investment outlays, compared to when they do not increase 
leverage significantly. 
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Table 1: Time distribution of IPOs and reverse LBOs 
The Table provides time distribution of IPOs, the initial reverse LBO sample and the final reverse LBOs sample, 
between 1980 and 2006. The figures for the IPO sample are based on the information provided in Jay Ritter’s webpage 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). For the initial reverse LBO sample, the reverse LBOs are identified 
from various sources including Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Corporate New Issues database, SDC’s Mergers and 
Acquisitions database, Ritter’s IPO list, Edgar’s IPO list and manual search through Factiva. The final reverse LBO 
sample excludes firms with missing data necessary for leverage calculations, as well as financial firms and regulated 
utilities. 
 
 IPO Sample Initial RLBO Sample Final RLBO Sample 
Year  IPO Percent RLBO Percent RLBO Percent 
1980  75 0.87 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1981  197 2.29 2 0.54 1 0.33 
1982  82 0.95 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1983  563 6.54 2 0.54 2 0.66 
1984  245 2.85 2 0.54 2 0.66 
1985  278 3.23 4 1.07 3 1.00 
1986  562 6.53 20 5.36 17 5.65 
1987  420 4.88 17 4.56 15 4.98 
1988  179 2.08 5 1.34 2 0.66 
1989  172 2.00 4 1.07 3 1.00 
1990  146 1.70 11 2.95 8 2.66 
1991  340 3.95 40 10.72 33 10.96 
1992  471 5.47 63 16.89 48 15.95 
1993  590 6.85 36 9.65 33 10.96 
1994  486 5.65 9 2.41 7 2.33 
1995  530 6.16 5 1.34 4 1.33 
1996  705 8.19 6 1.61 5 1.66 
1997  495 5.75 21 5.63 18 5.98 
1998  323 3.75 12 3.22 11 3.65 
1999  505 5.87 4 1.07 4 1.33 
2000  398 4.62 12 3.22 10 3.32 
2001  85 0.99 10 2.68 8 2.66 
2002  74 0.86 6 1.61 5 1.66 
2003  75 0.87 8 2.14 5 1.66 
2004  194 2.25 24 6.43 18 5.98 
2005  203 2.36 25 6.70 21 6.98 
2006  214 2.49 25 6.70 18 5.98 
Sum  8607 100.00 373 100.00 301 100.00 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the final reverse LBO sample 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for our final reverse LBO sample, which includes 301 reverse LBOs that took place between 1980 and 2006. The year, when the 
company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Panel A provides the mean values, Panel B provides the median values and Panel C provides the standard 
deviations. ME is the market value of equity, M/B is the market-to-book ratio, TA is the total assets, St. Equity is the stockholder’s equity, Book Leverage is the sum of long term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets, OI/TA is the operating income divided by total assets and CAPEX/TA is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
Panel A: Mean 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
ME - - - 554.8 635.5 603.0 567.3 672.8 807.3 948.1 1002.6 
M/B - - - 2.041 1.798 1.633 1.632 1.688 1.788 1.667 1.565 
TA 1035.5 845.9 580.2 640.5 693.6 804.3 774.8 764.0 759.4 843.3 985.4 
St. Equity 102.4 131.9 64.5 139.5 178.1 202.8 192.4 200.0 216.4 235.2 283.2 
Book Lev. 0.643 0.651 0.609 0.377 0.363 0.379 0.383 0.359 0.327 0.338 0.329 
OI/TA 0.1361 0.0696 0.1578 0.1747 0.1586 0.1362 0.1392 0.1474 0.1483 0.1397 0.1429 
CAPEX/TA 0.0504 0.0538 0.0503 0.0647 0.0729 0.0692 0.0653 0.0583 0.0532 0.0541 0.0612 
Panel B: Median 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
ME - - - 247.0 262.7 243.9 259.3 254.7 325.4 302.0 345.5 
M/B - - - 1.583 1.510 1.371 1.255 1.297 1.398 1.369 1.322 
TA 453.5 333.0 188.8 233.0 284.3 336.7 347.6 357.2 355.8 417.5 393.1 
St. Equity 25.3 17.7 17.0 68.2 84.9 100.4 113.9 106.3 111.1 124.9 132.0 
Book Lev. 0.677 0.600 0.592 0.370 0.357 0.379 0.364 0.336 0.323 0.314 0.301 
OI/TA 0.1369 0.1310 0.1571 0.1739 0.1644 0.1491 0.1411 0.1415 0.1397 0.1387 0.1384 
CAPEX/TA 0.0348 0.0311 0.0348 0.0440 0.0507 0.0749 0.0466 0.0406 0.0397 0.0419 0.0487 
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Table 3: Use of proceeds from the equity issuance 
The table provides the descriptive statistics and the stated purpose of equity proceed uses by the firms gathered from the prospectus for the IPO. Panel A shows the resources used 
to gather the data for the firms in our reverse LBO sample. Panel B shows data availability regarding the amount and uses of equity proceeds. Panel C shows the descriptive 
statistics for the equity proceeds with available data. Panel D shows the frequencies of purposes for equity proceed use by the firms in their prospectus. 
Panel A: Data Sources  
 
  
 
# of firms frequency   
Not available 39 12.96%   
Data from LexisNexis Academic 146 48.50%   
Data from prospectus 116 38.54%   
Total 301 100.00%   
Panel B: Available Proceedings Data Information     
 
Amount of proceedings Use of proceedings 
 
# of firms frequency # of firms frequency 
Available 250 83.06% 259 86.05% 
Not available 51 16.94% 42 13.95% 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics about Amount of Proceedings Data   
  
N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 
  
250 120.29 160.01 5.49 1267.68 
 
  
Panel D: Use of Proceedings Frequencies  
 
  
 
# of firms 
 
  
Redeem preferred & stock repurchases 64 
 
  
Debt payment 244 
 
  
Dividend payment 12 
 
  
Working capital increase & CAPEX 69 
 
  
General corporate purposes 92 
 
  
Acquisitions 43 
 
  
R&D 7 
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Table 4: Leverage increase years following the reverse LBO 
The Table shows the number of firms that increased their leverages in the 7 years following the reverse LBO, for the 
leverage increasing subsample. To be identified in the leverage increasing subsample, a company is required to have 
increased its market leverage at least 10 % compared to the prior year’s level and to have a new market leverage, that is 
at least 10 % above the target leverage. In addition to this, the company is required to have increased its leverage ratio 
as a result of a debt increase and not an equity decline which requires that the change in debt is equal to at least 90 % of 
$ΔML. 
# of years following RLBO # of firms percentage 
1 17 27.86 
2 15 24.59 
3 10 16.39 
4 5 8.2 
5 6 9.84 
6 6 9.84 
7 2 3.28 
 
61 100.00 
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Table 5: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for the Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in our 
final reverse LBO sample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as t. Book leverage is 
defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined as total debt 
over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the difference between 
the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
 
PANEL A: Mean 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.377 0.363 0.379 0.382 0.359 0.327 0.337 0.329 
Market Leverage 0.289 0.331 0.377 0.391 0.386 0.348 0.372 0.358 
Excess Market Leverage    0.032 0.028 0.043 0.045 0.028 -0.007 0.020 0.008 
 PANEL B: Median 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.370 0.357 0.368 0.364 0.335 0.322 0.313 0.301 
Market Leverage 0.266 0.303 0.345 0.363 0.337 0.283 0.306 0.289 
Excess Market Leverage 0.012 0.012 0.030 0.018 -0.015 -0.059 -0.036 -0.039 
 PANELC: Standard Deviation 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.243 0.221 0.235 0.343 0.245 0.237 0.262 0.254 
Market Leverage 0.205 0.214 0.246 0.266 0.266 0.253 0.279 0.263 
Excess Market Leverage 0.203 0.180 0.192 0.210 0.207 0.211 0.243 0.221 
 PANEL D: Number of Observations 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 301 278 253 213 172 146 130 111 
Market Leverage 276 264 242 204 160 131 118 99 
Excess Market Leverage 276 264 242 204 160 131 118 99 
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Table 6: Use of proceeds from equity issuance: quantitative analysis 
The Table provides the results of the quantitative analysis of the use of equity proceeds of the IPO. Data was manually 
collected from the IPO prospectus. Debt Payment is the use of equity proceeds from the IPO for debt payment 
reduction. Operations covers the use of equity proceeds from the IPO for covering operational cash shortfalls. Payout 
covers the equity proceeds used for the purpose of paying out to stockholders. Working Capital covers the change in 
working capital (ΔWC) that is used for funding working capital needs. Investment covers the funds used for investment 
opportunities. 
Use of Proceeds of New Equity Number of firms Percentage 
Debt Payment 162 76.78% 
Investment 11 5.21% 
Operations 1 0.47% 
Payout 6 2.84% 
Working Capital 31 14.69% 
Total 211 100.00% 
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Table 7: Use of proceeds from the debt issuance 
Firms, which increase their leverage levels substantially in the 7 years following the IPO are consider as leverage 
increasing firms. To be identified in the leverage increasing subsample, a company is required to have increased its 
market leverage at least 10 % compared to the prior year’s level and to have a new market leverage, that is at least 10 
% above the target leverage. In addition to this, the company is required to have increased its leverage ratio as a result 
of a debt increase and not an equity decline. Operations covers the use of debt issue proceeds for covering operational 
cash shortfalls. Payout covers the debt issue proceeds used for the purpose of paying out to stockholders. Working 
Capital covers the change in working capital (ΔWC) that is used for funding working capital needs. Investment covers 
the funds used for investment opportunities. 
Use of Proceeds of Debt Issue Number of firms Percentage 
Investment 43 70.49 % 
Operations 1 1.63 % 
Payout 8 13.11 % 
Working Capital 6 9.83 % 
None 3 4.91 % 
Total 61 100.00 % 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics for the leverage increasing subsample 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for our leverage increasing subsample, which includes 61 reverse LBOs that took place between 1980 and 2006. The year, when the 
company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Panel A provides the mean values, Panel B provides the median values and Panel C provides the standard 
deviations. ME is the market value of equity, M/B is the market-to-book ratio, TA is the total assets, St. Equity is the stockholder’s equity, Book Leverage is the sum of long term 
debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets, OI/TA is the operating income divided by total assets and CAPEX/TA is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. 
Panel A: Mean 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
ME - - - 278.4 310.1 347.9 359.7 398.5 446.5 528.0 860.4 
M/B - - - 2.092 1.615 1.483 1.398 1.435 1.382 1.394 1.413 
TA 784.9 550.1 302.4 348.8 429.3 508.2 653.8 603.6 671.2 736.3 906.1 
St. Equity 17.4 28.8 29.7 109.7 118.0 124.4 132.5 118.4 142.0 137.1 246.2 
Book Lev. 0.593 0.588 0.587 0.333 0.361 0.411 0.440 0.445 0.425 0.463 0.443 
OI/TA 0.1203 0.1364 0.1828 0.2130 0.1794 0.1524 0.1244 0.1364 0.1430 0.1211 0.1301 
CAPEX/TA 0.0335 0.0397 0.0412 0.0540 0.0644 0.0642 0.0594 0.0493 0.0466 0.0431 0.0491 
Panel B: Median 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
ME - - - 168.7 135.0 109.9 91.5 72.1 185.3 77.2 111.6 
M/B - - - 1.595 1.310 1.178 1.079 1.202 1.281 1.106 1.102 
TA 356.0 158.4 124.3 158.6 207.3 256.6 305.0 303.8 371.1 425.9 388.1 
St. Equity 27.3 5.8 15.6 55.6 67.5 71.6 77.1 63.2 59.3 70.8 63.0 
Book Lev. 0.601 0.515 0.578 0.327 0.353 0.433 0.451 0.432 0.405 0.444 0.432 
OI/TA 0.1441 0.1404 0.1642 0.1986 0.1686 0.1401 0.1271 0.1344 0.1391 0.1208 0.1171 
CAPEX/TA 0.0309 0.0304 0.0332 0.0421 0.0505 0.0488 0.0347 0.0330 0.0291 0.0325 0.0394 
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Table 9: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO for leverage increasing subsample 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for the Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in our 
leverage increasing firms subsample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as t. Book 
leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined as 
total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the 
difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
 
 
Panel A: Mean 
        
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.333 0.361 0.411 0.44 0.445 0.425 0.463 0.443 
Market Leverage 0.288 0.378 0.458 0.544 0.539 0.517 0.557 0.505 
Excess Market Leverage    0.006 0.073 0.113 0.178 0.143 0.128 0.179 0.126 
         
Panel B: Median 
        
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.327 0.353 0.433 0.451 0.432 0.405 0.444 0.432 
Market Leverage 0.271 0.384 0.438 0.528 0.522 0.500 0.552 0.478 
Excess Market Leverage -0.014 0.079 0.102 0.166 0.126 0.112 0.164 0.135 
         
Panel C: Standard Deviations 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.388 0.198 0.207 0.212 0.280 0.270 0.247 0.233 
Market Leverage 0.181 0.209 0.247 0.269 0.285 0.251 0.286 0.254 
Excess Market Leverage 0.174 0.175 0.177 0.202 0.220 0.196 0.264 0.222 
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Table 10: Evolution of leverage ratios following the IPO for leverage increasing subsample (using 
model (9)) 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for the Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in our 
leverage increasing firms subsample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as t. Book 
leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined as 
total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the 
difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
 
Panel A: Mean 
        
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.339 0.378 0.415 0.458 0.485 0.453 0.504 0.486 
Market Leverage 0.272 0.382 0.473 0.545 0.512 0.464 0.534 0.491 
Excess Market Leverage    0.026 0.083 0.143 0.196 0.154 0.115 0.207 0.163 
         
Panel B: Median 
        
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.338 0.360 0.415 0.446 0.459 0.421 0.486 0.447 
Market Leverage 0.257 0.384 0.498 0.537 0.467 0.450 0.528 0.476 
Excess Market Leverage -0.005 0.091 0.121 0.184 0.123 0.121 0.170 0.171 
         
Panel C: Standard Deviations 
 
t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.205 0.183 0.205 0.210 0.292 0.266 0.330 0.324 
Market Leverage 0.182 0.209 0.259 0.262 0.293 0.285 0.287 0.253 
Excess Market Leverage 0.159 0.180 0.177 0.196 0.225 0.232 0.236 0.217 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics for leverage increasing firms subsample around the increase 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for the Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in our leverage increasing firms subsample, between 1980 and 
2006. The year of the leverage increase is denoted as t. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined 
as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy 
for long run target leverage ratio. 
 
Panel A: Mean 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.452 0.373 0.278 0.530 0.512 0.512 0.539 0.417 0.419 0.381 0.387 
Market Leverage 0.360 0.309 0.265 0.543 0.562 0.572 0.530 0.485 0.502 0.442 0.437 
Excess Market Leverage 0.051 0.029 -0.022 0.233 0.177 0.183 0.152 0.122 0.119 0.125 0.111 
            Panel B: Median 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.468 0.395 0.251 0.494 0.482 0.467 0.462 0.412 0.413 0.370 0.365 
Market Leverage 0.350 0.248 0.228 0.549 0.551 0.549 0.483 0.531 0.508 0.479 0.480 
Excess Market Leverage 0.017 0.029 -0.047 0.198 0.184 0.192 0.160 0.142 0.125 0.091 0.052 
            Panel C: Standard Deviation 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.245 0.215 0.201 0.226 0.239 0.243 0.404 0.204 0.198 0.215 0.234 
Market Leverage 0.268 0.211 0.216 0.227 0.253 0.279 0.273 0.267 0.302 0.267 0.275 
Excess Market Leverage 0.244 0.175 0.154 0.144 0.186 0.207 0.178 0.178 0.223 0.224 0.233 
            Panel D: Number of Observations 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 49 60 61 61 53 46 39 32 30 27 22 
Market Leverage 28 43 61 61 50 43 36 29 28 24 21 
Excess Market Leverage 25 39 55 61 49 42 35 27 27 22 19 
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Table 12: Speed of adjustment 
In GMM-SYS, the first difference of the equation Levit =(1- λ) Levit-1 + λαi + λβXit-1 +εit is taken resulting in: 
Levit  - Levit-1 =(1- λ) (Levit-1 - Levit-2  )+ λβ(Xit-1 - Xit-2) +(εit  - εit-1). Both equations are run as a system at the 
simultaneously. For the first equation, the lagged differences are used as instruments. For the second equation, lagged 
levels are used as instruments. The dependent variable is the change in book leverage between the year t and t-1 of firm 
i. The independent variables are the same as described earlier in the text. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and 
use heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 
In GMM-DIF, the equation Levit-k =(1- λ) Levit-k-1 + λαi + λβXit-k-1 +εit-k is subtracted from Levit =(1- λ) Levit-1 + λαi + 
λβXit-1 +εit resulting in: Levit  - Levit-k =(1- λ) (Levit-1 - Levit-k-1  )+ λβ(Xit-1 - Xit-k-1) +(εit  - εit-k) This equation is 
estimated with iterated two stage least squares. The dependent variable is the change in book leverage between the year 
t and t-k of firm i. The independent variables are the same as described earlier in the text. The t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis and use heteroskedastic consistent standard errors. 
 
GMM-DIFF 
 
GMM-SYSTEM 
 
Coefficient 
  
Coefficient 
ΔLeverageit-1, t-k-1 0.7391 
 
Leverage it-1 0.6972 
 
(21.29) 
  
(74.67) 
ΔMB it-1, t-k-1 -0.0054 
 
MB it-1 0.0237 
 
(-0.30) 
  
(5.09) 
ΔOI it-1, t-k-1 0.2076 
 
OI it-1 -0.3308 
 
(1.37) 
  
(-13.53) 
ΔFA it-1, t-k-1 0.0472 
 
FA it-1 0.0582 
 
(0.71) 
  
(3.41) 
Δln(TA) it-1, t-k-1 0.0136 
 
ln(TA) it-1 0.0084 
 
(1.14) 
  
(5.24) 
ΔInd. Med it-1, t-k-1 0.0660 
 
Ind. Median it-1 0.1757 
 
(0.79) 
  
(10.64) 
Half Life  2.29 
 
Half Life 1.92 
Year Dummies Yes 
 
Year Dummies Yes 
Observation # 676 
 
Observation # 1468 
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Table 13: Investment spikes 
 
Table presents the results for investment spikes. Investment covers the funds used for investment opportunities, details 
of which are presented in the appendix. Panel A represents descriptive statistics based on a “Spike” defined as firm’s 
Investment/TA being 2 standard deviations above industry mean Investment/TA. Panel B represents descriptive 
statistics based on a “Spike” defined as firm’s Investment/TA ratio being 10 % above previous year’s Investment/TA 
ratio and 10 % above industry mean Investment/TA ratio in the current year.  In both Panels, Columns A & B present 
results for the full sample. Columns C & D present results for firms whose market leverage ratios were above the target 
leverage ratios in year (t-1). Columns E & F present results for firms whose market leverage ratios were below the 
target leverage ratios in year (t-1). Panel C represents descriptive statistics based on a firm being in the leverage 
increasing or non leverage increasing subsample. Columns A & B present results for the full sample. Columns C & D 
present results for firms whose Investment/TA ratios were above the industry mean Investment/TA ratios in year (t-1). 
Columns E & F present results for firms whose Investment/TA ratios were below the industry mean Investment/TA 
ratios in year (t-1). ΔInv/TA presents the change in Investment/TA from (t-1) to (t). ΔLeverage present the change in 
market leverage from (t-1) to (t). Excess Inv/TA is the difference between firm’s Investment/TA and the industry mean. 
 
Panel A 
 
Full Sample 
 
Above Target  
Leverage 
 
Below Target  
Leverage 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
Investment/TA 0.3869 0.0826 
 
0.3721 0.0591 
 
0.3911 0.0943 
Δ Inv/TA 0.3070 -0.0133 
 
0.2821 -0.0379 
 
0.3147 0.0005 
Excess Inv/TA 0.3081 -0.0014 
 
0.2879 -0.0130 
 
0.3137 0.0043 
Leverage 0.4260 0.3324 
 
0.4453 0.5072 
 
0.4206 0.2446 
ΔLeverage 0.1782 0.0234 
 
0.1044 -0.0041 
 
0.2071 0.0425 
Excess Lev. 0.1079 0.0265 
 
0.1538 0.1307 
 
0.0946 -0.0299 
Max. # of obs 41 1560 
 
9 519 
 
32 1041 
Panel B 
 
Full Sample 
 
Above Target  
Leverage 
 
Below Target  
Leverage 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
Investment/TA 0.3102 0.0708 
 
0.3350 0.0521 
 
0.3050 0.0806 
Δ Inv/TA 0.2596 -0.0288 
 
0.2361 -0.0445 
 
0.2651 -0.0194 
Excess Inv/TA 0.2309 -0.0135 
 
0.2436 -0.0194 
 
0.2282 -0.0104 
Leverage 0.3466 0.3338 
 
0.4201 0.5111 
 
0.3309 0.2399 
ΔLeverage 0.1237 0.0194 
 
0.0500 -0.0400 
 
0.1470 0.0365 
Excess Lev. 0.0835 0.0237 
 
0.1244 0.1322 
 
0.0743 -0.0383 
Max. # of obs 131 1470 
 
23 505 
 
108 965 
Panel C 
  
Full Sample 
 
Above Average 
Investment/TA 
 
Below Average 
Investment/TA 
  
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
 
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
 
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
Investment/TA 0.2353 0.0847 
 
0.2115 0.1128 
 
0.2615 0.0634 
Δ Inv/TA 0.1487 -0.0112 
 
0.0697 -0.0661 
 
0.2499 0.0371 
Excess Inv/TA 0.1605 0.0003 
 
0.1414 0.0379 
 
0.1815 -0.0282 
Leverage 0.5436 0.3261 
 
0.5395 0.3072 
 
0.5481 0.3404 
ΔLeverage 0.2785 0.0145 
 
0.2537 0.0226 
 
0.3059 0.0082 
Excess Lev. 0.2339 0.0199 
 
0.2406 0.0164 
 
0.2266 0.0226 
Max. # of obs 61 1546 
 
32 666 
 
29 880 
44 
 
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for leverage increasing firms subsample around the increase (using model (9)) 
The Table provides the descriptive statistics for the Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in our leverage increasing firms subsample, between 1980 and 
2006. The year of the leverage increase is denoted as t. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined 
as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy 
for long run target leverage ratio. 
Panel A: Mean 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.422 0.385 0.311 0.539 0.538 0.536 0.580 0.445 0.422 0.387 0.425 
Market Leverage 0.337 0.313 0.283 0.574 0.597 0.599 0.596 0.501 0.488 0.432 0.416 
Excess Market Leverage 0.039 0.042 -0.005 0.250 0.208 0.203 0.213 0.122 0.131 0.117 0.123 
            Panel B: Median 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.423 0.402 0.286 0.460 0.482 0.483 0.487 0.439 0.397 0.366 0.415 
Market Leverage 0.311 0.281 0.282 0.566 0.615 0.564 0.581 0.537 0.501 0.517 0.480 
Excess Market Leverage 0.029 0.012 -0.023 0.208 0.200 0.203 0.216 0.155 0.080 0.137 0.100 
            Panel C: Standard Deviation 
 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book Leverage 0.232 0.211 0.201 0.271 0.287 0.276 0.409 0.235 0.269 0.284 0.321 
Market Leverage 0.239 0.202 0.200 0.208 0.223 0.260 0.265 0.269 0.300 0.266 0.301 
Excess Market Leverage 0.183 0.159 0.155 0.151 0.171 0.214 0.199 0.226 0.226 0.195 0.220 
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Table 15: Investment spikes (using model (9)) 
The table presents the results for investment spikes. Panel A represents descriptive statistics based on a “Spike” defined 
as firm’s Investment/TA being 2 standard deviations above industry mean Investment/TA. Panel B represents 
descriptive statistics based on a “Spike” defined as firm’s Investment/TA ratio being 10 % above previous year’s 
Investment/TA ratio and 10 % above industry mean Investment/TA ratio in the current year.  In both Panels, Columns 
A & B present results for the full sample. Columns C & D present results for firms whose market leverage ratios were 
above the target leverage ratios in year (t-1). Columns E & F present results for firms whose market leverage ratios 
were below the target leverage ratios in year (t-1). Panel C represents descriptive statistics based on a firm being in the 
leverage increasing or non leverage increasing subsample. Columns A & B present results for the full sample. Columns 
C & D present results for firms whose Investment/TA ratios were above the industry mean Investment/TA ratios in 
year (t-1). Columns E & F present results for firms whose Investment/TA ratios were below the industry mean 
Investment/TA ratios in year (t-1).  
Panel A 
 
Full Sample 
 
Above Target  
Leverage 
 
Below Target  
Leverage 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
Investment/TA 0.3869 0.0826 
 
0.3705 0.0554 
 
0.3901 0.0954 
Δ Inv/TA 0.3070 -0.0133 
 
0.2837 -0.0359 
 
0.3134 0.0001 
Excess Inv/TA 0.3081 -0.0014 
 
0.2894 -0.0163 
 
0.3117 0.0051 
Leverage 0.4260 0.3324 
 
0.5392 0.5141 
 
0.4027 0.2393 
ΔLeverage 0.1782 0.0234 
 
0.1274 -0.0049 
 
0.1924 0.0442 
Excess Lev. 0.0876 0.0262 
 
0.1815 0.1471 
 
0.0676 -0.0406 
Max. # of obs 41 1560 
 
7 524 
 
34 1036 
Panel B 
 
Full Sample 
 
Above Target  
Leverage 
 
Below Target  
Leverage 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
 
Spike Nonspike 
Investment/TA 0.3102 0.0708 
 
0.3264 0.0491 
 
0.3072 0.0817 
Δ Inv/TA 0.2596 -0.0288 
 
0.2378 -0.0421 
 
0.2657 -0.0198 
Excess Inv/TA 0.2309 -0.0135 
 
0.2395 -0.0222 
 
0.2301 -0.0096 
Leverage 0.3466 0.3338 
 
0.4677 0.5172 
 
0.3207 0.2350 
ΔLeverage 0.1237 0.0194 
 
0.0659 -0.0053 
 
0.1407 0.0386 
Excess Lev. 0.0726 0.0239 
 
0.1606 0.1478 
 
0.0555 -0.0487 
Max. # of obs 131 1470 
 
20 512 
 
111 958 
Panel C 
  
Full Sample 
 
Above Average 
Investment/TA 
 
Below Average 
Investment/TA 
  
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
 
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
 
Leverage 
Increase 
Non Lev. 
Increase 
Investment/TA 0.2112 0.0844 
 
0.1976 0.1140 
 
0.2245 0.0624 
Δ Inv/TA 0.1232 -0.0101 
 
0.0527 -0.0650 
 
0.2127 0.0372 
Excess Inv/TA 0.1433 -0.0001 
 
0.1464 0.0383 
 
0.1403 -0.0290 
Leverage 0.5749 0.3239 
 
0.6008 0.3019 
 
0.5498 0.3402 
ΔLeverage 0.2910 0.0128 
 
0.2928 0.0203 
 
0.2892 0.0071 
Excess Lev. 0.2500 0.0174 
 
0.2887 0.0059 
 
0.2125 0.0260 
Max. # of obs 67 1534 
 
31 653 
 
36 881 
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Figure 1.A 
 
Figure 1.B 
Figure 1: The evolution of median leverage ratios 
The Figures shows the evolution of the median book leverage ratios for the 301 firms in our final reverse LBO sample, 
between 1980 and 2006. t denotes the year of the reverse LBO in Figure 1.A, and the year of the LBO in Figure 1.B. 
The book leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. 
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Figure 2: The Evolution of leverage ratios for the final RLBO sample 
The Figure shows the evolution of the book leverage, Market Leverage and Excess Market Leverage for the firms in 
our final reverse LBO sample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as t. Book leverage is 
defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is defined as total debt 
over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as the difference between 
the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
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Figure 3.A 
 
Figure 3.B 
Figure 3: Market leverage, target leverage and bootstrap confidence intervals 
The Figures show the evolution of the Market Leverage, Target Leverage and its 95 % confidence intervals for the 
firms in our final reverse LBO sample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as t. Figure A 
shows the bootstrap confidence intervals estimated by bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals method. 
Figure B shows the bootstrap confidence intervals estimated by percentage intervals method. 
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Figure 4: The evolution of median leverage ratios for leverage increasing firms subsample 
The Figure shows the evolution of the median book leverage ratios for the 61 firms in our leverage increasing firms 
subsample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is detoned as t. The book leverage is defined as the 
sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. To be identified in the leverage increasing subsample, a 
company is required to have increased its market leverage at least 10 % compared to the prior year’s level and to have a 
new market leverage, that is at least 10 % above the target leverage. And the company is required to have increased its 
leverage ratio as a result of a debt increase and not an equity decline, in the 7 years following the IPO. 
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Figure 5: The evolution of leverage ratios for the leverage increasing firms subsample 
The Figure shows the evolution of the book leverage, Market Leverage (ML) and Excess Market Leverage (excess ML) 
for the firms in our leverage increasing subsample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the reverse LBO is denoted as 
t. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market Leverage is 
defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is defined as 
the difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
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Figure 6: The evolution of leverage ratios for the leverage increasing firms subsample around the 
leverage increase year 
The Figure shows the evolution of the book leverage, Market Leverage (ML) and Excess Market Leverage (excess ML) 
for the firms in our leverage increasing subsample, between 1980 and 2006. The year of the leverage increase is 
denoted as t. Book leverage is defined as the sum of long term debt and current debt divided by total assets. Market 
Leverage is defined as total debt over the sum of total debt and market value of equity. The excess Market Leverage is 
defined as the difference between the firm’s actual leverage ratio and the proxy for long run target leverage ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.100 
0.000 
0.100 
0.200 
0.300 
0.400 
0.500 
0.600 
t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 t+6 t+7 
Book TD/TA QML Excess QML 
52 
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Figure 7: Evolution of mean leverage ratios if firms had not decreased long term debt post IPO 
The Figures shows the evolution of the mean book leverage ratios for the 301 firms in our final reverse LBO sample, 
between 1980 and 2006. t denotes the year of the reverse LBO. The line with the squares presents what firms’ book 
leverages would have looked like had they not reduced their long term debt following the IPO, as opposed to the line 
with tilted squares, which presents the actual book leverage levels. The book leverage is defined as the sum of long 
term debt and current debt divided by total assets. 
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CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 2 
Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Reverse LBOs 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Based on the hypothesis that LBO specialists would design corporate governance mechanisms of portfolio 
firms, in such a manner that governance structure of the firm would be optimal at the time of the IPO, we 
investigate the board structure, board committees, ownership structure and executive compensation of 
reverse leveraged buyout (RLBO) firms. For this purpose, we compare the governance mechanisms of 
RLBO firms to those of size and book-to-market matched control firms. Our evidence suggests that, 
compared to the control firms, RLBO firms prefer to be incorporated in Delaware and have unitary boards, 
have younger board members with shorter tenures, have more financial experts on their boards, have CEOs 
with shorter tenures, prefer busy board members and busy boards. They also have smaller number of 
members on their boards, compared to previous findings from earlier decades. In addition, the majority of 
board members are effectively monitoring directors and the majority of board members on various 
committees of the boards are independent directors. In addition, compared to control firms, RLBO firms 
are associated with higher ownership by blockholders, higher total managerial ownership, and lower CEO 
ownership. Also, LBO specialists hold substantial directorships in the portfolio firms and they own a 
substantial fraction of shares. Lastly, the evidence suggests that top executives and CEOs of RLBO firms 
do not receive significantly higher levels of compensation compared to control firms. In terms of the 
composition of total compensation, RLBO firms usually prefer to pay a higher fraction of total 
compensation in form of bonuses, and less in the form of stock option grants. 
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1. Introduction 
In “The Value Maximizing Board”, Gertner and Kaplan (1996) investigate various corporate 
governance mechanisms of reverse leveraged buyout (RLBO) firms, based on the hypothesis that LBO 
specialists would design the board structure of these portfolio firms optimally in terms of corporate 
governance. By employing a firm-matching approach, which is referred to as “a novel approach” by 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), the authors make recommendations about optimal governance 
mechanisms, which would lead to value maximization. The researchers investigate governance mechanisms 
related to the members of the board of directors. Unfortunately, the study is “incomplete” at its preliminary 
stage, as the authors refer to it. In this study, we take the research one step further to investigate other 
governance mechanisms such as ownership structure and executive compensation, in addition to post-IPO 
firm and stock performance, as well, with a more recent sample of reverse LBOs. 
Firms that go through a reverse LBO are those that used to be public firms and go private through 
an LBO. Typically, LBO specialists acquire a large portion of portfolio companies’ shares and take these 
firms private through an LBO. The portfolio company usually stays private for approximately 3 years 
(Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990, Lerner and Cao, 2009). After this period, which could be characterized 
with intensive restructuring and improvements in operational efficiency, the portfolio companies are taken 
public, once again, through an IPO. 
Jensen (1993) argues that LBOs have been successful in resolving governance problems in firms. 
Through high leverage, concentrated ownership structure and active monitoring, an organizational form 
that could lead to value maximization could be created (Jensen, 1993, Holthausan and Larcker, 1996). In 
addition, Jensen (1993) states that LBOs could “provide a blueprint for managers and boards who wish to 
revamp their top-level control systems to make them more efficient.” Also Gertner and Kaplan (1996) 
consider the boards of firms taken private by LBO specialists, and then taken public by the same specialists 
to be value maximizing, through optimal governance. They assume that LBO specialists would have strong 
incentives to structure the boards of these firms in a way that maximizes shareholder value. 
In addition, the arguments about the effectiveness of private equity involvement in structuring 
corporate governance in firms, would apply to LBO specialists, since they are private equity funds, as well. 
Klausner (2003) argues that managers of private equity funds would try to maximize the value of their 
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investments in the portfolio companies. Leslie and Oyer (2009) discuss that private equity firms mitigate 
managerial agency problems. Private equity firms achieve this through the effect of increased debt on 
managerial behavior, increased managerial incentives and improved governance mechanisms.  Cornelli and 
Karakas (2011) argue that private equity models are superior to other public firms in terms of corporate 
governance structures. Walker (2011) confirms that the portfolio companies of private equity firms are to 
be considered as models of good governance. 
There are also arguments suggesting that corporate governance would be designed more 
effectively at the time of the IPO. Daines (2002) argues that firms would be free from agency costs at the 
time of the IPO, mostly due to significant equity ownership by management, which would be expected to 
align their interests with those of the shareholders, in addition to large equity ownership by active investors. 
Similarly, Baker and Gompers (2003) discuss that since existing shareholders would bear the costs 
resulting as an outcome of suboptimal governance structure in the firm, governance mechanisms would be 
expected to be chosen optimally at the time of the IPO. 
Even though LBO specialists that take the portfolio firms public again, they usually do not 
consider the IPO as an exit strategy. As we present evidence of it in the following sections, they continue to 
hold a substantial amount of shares of the portfolio company. In addition, their partners continue to stay on 
the boards of portfolio companies. Thus, LBO specialists perform active monitoring in their portfolio 
companies and get involved in management of the companies, through their large shareholdings and board 
seats. LBO specialist involvement would also be beneficial not only in terms of the impacts of active 
monitoring, but also due to the signal given to the market. The fact that LBO specialists keep their position 
in the portfolio companies during and following the IPO, would signal the market their belief in the future 
performance of the company. 
On the other hand, one might argue that active involvement in management and large 
shareholdings by the LBO specialists could potentially lead to wealth extraction in the expense of other 
shareholders. Naturally, the LBO specialists would consider their wealth above other considerations. Still, 
they have significant investments in portfolio firms and thus they would prefer to experience wealth gains 
through value increase of their portfolio firms. After all, they have their reputations as successful LBO 
specialists. One could expect the benefits of maintaining this reputation would outweigh short term gains 
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through wealth expropriation from the portfolio firms, in a manner that would hurt other shareholders. 
Also, the amount of resources they need to take firms private in the first place depends on this reputation. 
Thus they would be willing to keep their reputations as successful monitors, which lead to successful 
restructuring. Therefore, the benefits of monitoring would be expected to outweigh the potential costs of 
increased power. 
Based on all these arguments, our main hypothesis is that LBO specialists would design corporate 
governance mechanisms, including board structure, ownership structure and executive compensation, in 
portfolio firms, in such a manner that, governance structure of the firm would be optimal at the time of the 
IPO. We refer to this hypothesis as “H1” in the remaining of the paper. We follow the procedure employed 
by Gertner and Kaplan (1996) and match the RLBO firms with a group of control firms, to compare the 
governance structures employed in both groups. We match the sample firms to those in the COMPUSTAT 
universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber and Lyon (1997). 
As Jensen and Muphy (2004) argue, since the managers of public firms will not own 100 % of the 
shares of the firm, these agents would not be expected to make decisions that would lead to value 
maximization to its full potential. Aware of these potential conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
managers, we are concerned about optimal governance, rather than strongest governance possible. Stronger 
governance does not need to imply optimal governance. The costs associated with stronger governance 
might exceed the benefits. Thus, firms pursuing stronger governance mechanisms might deviate from 
optimal governance (Gillan et al., 2004). We are concerned about an optimal governance structure that is 
possible under the existence of agency conflicts, where the costs of these conflicts would be minimized. 
We investigate governance mechanisms under three main categories: i) board and CEO 
characteristics and board committees, ii) ownership structure and, iii) executive compensation. The 
importance of these issues in finance and management literature and their potential effects on firm 
performance and value, through potential benefits and costs associated with each one, are discussed in 
greater detail in the following sections. Lastly, we investigate the operating performance and stock 
performance of the sample and control firms. 
In section III, we discuss the board characteristics, CEO characteristics and committees of the 
board and present our findings. Our findings regarding RLBO firms, compared to control firms, can be 
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summarized as follows. RLBO firms mostly prefer to be incorporated in Delaware. They prefer to have 
unitary boards as opposed to staggered boards at the time of the IPO. Due to the nature of the sample, they 
are mainly controlled by a third party at the time of the IPO. Still, the percentage of them that are controlled 
decreases substantially following the IPO. Their board members are significantly younger. However, the 
average age of the CEOs is not significantly different from the control firms’ CEOs’ average age. The 
tenure of the board members is significantly shorter, as well as the tenure of the CEO. They do not vary 
substantially in terms of gender diversity, compared to control firms. A higher fraction of their directors 
and CEOs hold Masters or MBA degrees. They have more board members with financial expertise. 
However, the fraction of directors with accounting expertise does not vary substantially between the sample 
and control firms. In addition, the percentage of academicians serving on the boards does not vary 
substantially for the sample and control firms. Also, the percentage of CEOs serving as the chairman of the 
board does not vary substantially for both groups of firms, as well. In addition, minority of the firms have 
CEOs who are also founders of the firms. On the other hand, among the founder CEOs, the CEOs of 
sample firms hold a significantly higher proportion of shares, compared to the CEOs of control firms. In 
terms of board size, the number of board members of the sample firms is similar to control firms. However, 
both groups of firms have smaller number of members on their boards, compared to previous findings from 
earlier decades. Compared to the fraction of independent directors, sample firms prefer a smaller fraction of 
inside directors on their boards. Still, the ratio of inside directors on their boards is not significantly 
different from the control firms’ boards. 
In addition, sample firms have fewer independent directors on their boards, even though the 
fraction of independent directors for the sample firm increases in the following two years. However, we 
believe that these results are driven by the definition of independent directors. Due to the substantial board 
seats of LBO specialists on RLBO firms’ boards, the findings are affected substantially by the definition of 
independent board members. Thus we employ an alternative definition. We investigate the fraction of 
board members, who are considered to be “effective monitors” since the main argument about the effects of 
independent directors is through their effective monitoring capabilities. Based on this alternative definition, 
we find that the majority of board members of RLBO firms are effectively monitoring directors. Compared 
to the firms in control group, the fraction of effective monitors is not significantly different for the RLBO 
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firms. In terms of board busyness, RLBO firms prefer less busy directors on their boards and a less busy 
board as a whole, compared to control firms. However, the concern about director independence definition 
applies to director busyness as well, since a director is required to be independent to be considered as a 
candidate to be busy, in the first place. Thus we apply our alternative definition, in terms of effectively 
monitoring directors to board busyness, as well. Based on this alternative specification, RLBO firms appear 
to prefer busy board members and busy boards. Lastly, the majority of the board members on various 
committees of the boards are independent directors for the RLBO firms. 
In section IV, we discuss the ownership structure and present our findings. Our findings are briefly 
summarized as follows. Blockholders own a higher fraction of shares in RLBO firms, compared to control 
firms. In addition, LBO specialists hold substantial directorships in the portfolio firms and they own a 
substantial fraction of shares, both before the IPO and following the IPO. On the other hand, total 
managerial ownership fractions are significantly higher in the RLBO firms, compared to control firms. Due 
to the affiliations of some directors with the LBO specialist companies, managerial ownership findings 
could be affected. Thus, we check for the managerial ownership by those who are not affiliated with the 
LBO specialists and find that these individuals own a smaller fraction of shares of the firms, compared to 
the executives and directors of control firms. On the other hand ownership stakes by CEOs are not 
substantially low or high for the RLBO firms, and are lower compared to the CEO ownership of control 
firms. 
In section V, we discuss executive compensation and present our findings. The evidence shows 
that top executives and CEOs of RLBO firms do not receive significantly higher levels of compensation 
compared to control firms. On the other hand, our evidence in section IV suggests that managerial 
ownership in sample firms is substantially high. Thus, one might argue that, these individuals are rather 
compensated through high ownership in the sample firms. However, when we analyze the components of 
managerial ownership separately, we observe that CEOs of sample firms hold smaller fractions of shares 
compared to the CEOs of control firms. In addition, the high managerial ownership in sample firms is 
mainly driven by ownership of directors; not non-director executives. The non-board member executives of 
sample firms hold a lower fraction of shares in RLBO firms, compared to control firms. Thus we cannot 
argue that executives are not compensated only through the components of executive compensation, but 
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also through their ownership stakes in the firm. Therefore, our evidence could be considered while 
discussing whether executives in US are excessively paid or not. 
On the other hand, based on the evidence regarding the composition of compensation packages 
received by both groups, RLBO firms prefer the majority of executive compensation in the form of pay 
structures that are sensitive to performance. A similar situation is valid for the control firms. However, 
while choosing among performance sensitive pay incentives, RLBO firms usually prefer to pay a higher 
fraction of total compensation in form of bonuses, and less in the form of stock option grants, compared to 
control firms. 
 In section VI, we investigate the operating and stock market performance of the reverse LBO 
firms. Our findings suggest that reverse LBOs are underpriced in the short-run. In terms of first day returns, 
their returns are significantly higher than the returns for the other benchmarks, and are statistically 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the first day returns are lower compared to the average 
first day returns for all the IPOs that took place between 1980-2010 period, which is reported as 18.0 % on 
Jay Ritter’s IPO dataset. The superior returns of the reverse LBOS continue in the following six months. 
However, in the second and third year, the average returns for the sample firms are not significantly 
superior to some of the other benchmarks, including the control firms. In terms of cumulative returns, the 
control firms’ average return is even significantly higher than those of the sample firms. Still the sample 
firms have positive average returns that are significantly different than zero. 
In terms of operating performance of reverse LBO firms, the findings suggest that in terms of 
operating income before depreciation, the sample firms perform better than the control firms and the other 
firms in the same industries, both in the year of the IPO and the following three years. The results in terms 
of return on sales also point out to the operating superiority of reverse LBO firms, compared to the 
benchmarks. However, the results are statistically not as significant this time. In terms of Q, the 
performances of reverse LBO firms are not statistically different than the performance of the firms in the 
benchmarks. 
60 
 
 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
Our initial sample consists of RLBOs that were taken private by LBO specialists, and then taken 
public through an IPO, by the same LBO specialists. The initial sample includes 622 RLBOs that went 
public between 1980 and 2006. 563 of these RLBOs have available data, necessary for matching with a 
group of control firms. Out of these, 530 have available COMPUSTAT data for the 3 years following the 
IPO. When financial firms and regulated utilities are excluded, the sample consists of 492 US firms. 
The challenging task in investigating RLBOS is their identification. For 1980-1998 period, 
RLBOs are identified through Securities Data Company’s (SDC) Corporate New Issues database. After 
1998, the database does not flag initial public offerings that were previously subject to an LBO. Also, 
Lerner and Cao (2009) indicate that this database does not cover all of the reverse LBOs in the earlier 
years. To cover as many reverse LBOs as possible in a reliable manner, we also utilized other resources as 
SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database, Ritter’s IPO list, and reverse LBO samples used in previous 
studies. We searched manually through Factiva to determine whether the IPO firms in these databases/lists 
had completed a prior IPO. We also benefitted from Lerner and Cao’s (2009) RLBO sample, for which 
they gathered the data from SDC Corporate News Issues database and Mergers and Acquisitions database, 
VentureXpert and Capital IQ.  
In order to make a comparison of the governance mechanisms employed by the sample firms, we 
constructed a set of control firms. The data needed for matching process and variables such as those in 
descriptive statistics are gathered from COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual database. Even though we do not 
compare the performance of sample firms with those of control firms, we are mainly concerned about the 
potential effects of governance mechanisms on firm performance and firm value. Thus, we constructed the 
control group by matching sample firms to firms in COMPUSTAT universe based on firm size and book-
to-market ratios, following Barber and Lyon (1997). In order to identify a size and book-to-market matched 
control firm, we first identify all firms with market value of equity between 70 percent and 130 percent of 
the market value of equity of the sample firm in COMPUSTAT universe. Among these firms, we choose 
the firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm. The matching is performed based 
on the year the RLBO firms became public. Since these firms are private before the IPO, we cannot 
61 
 
 
calculate firm size and book-to-market ratios for them, thus we would not be able to perform matching 
based on prior years’ data. The firms in the control group are also required to have 3 years’ COMPUSTAT 
data following the IPO. In addition, when matching these firms, if the matched control firm does not have 
the data in SEC, we go back to the initial matching process and match the sample firm with the next best 
match, based on the same criteria. 
The main focus of this study is the governance mechanisms of RLBO firms, thus we need the data 
for various governance mechanisms. Related data is usually available through Execucomp. However, this 
database does not include data for all the firms in our sample. Therefore we collected governance data for 
our sample and control firms manually. The data is available through SEC. However, SEC provides the 
proxies for firms only following 1994. We went through the proxies of each sample and control firm 
separately to collect the necessary data. The main categories of data we collected are ownership structure, 
executive compensation, board characteristics and board committees, in addition to LBO specialists’ data 
for the sample firms. The definitions of the variables and necessary discussions are in the Appendix B. 
Since the data is available starting at 1994 through SEC, the size of our sample becomes 307 RLBOs. Out 
of these, only 236 of them had the proxies needed for data collection on SEC. Thus, our final RLBO 
sample consists of 236 LBOs taking place between 1994 and 2006.  
The distribution of the RLBOs is presented in Table 1, Panel A. On average, 20 RLBOs take place 
in the sample period that have LBO specialists involved, for which SEC has relevant data. The descriptive 
statistics for both the sample and control firms are presented in Table 1, Panel B and C. Due to our 
matching criteria, the mean firm sizes measured as market value of equity are close for the two groups of 
firms. Similarly, the book-to-market values are close for both groups. The mean total assets are higher for 
the sample firms, compared to the firms in the control group. A similar situation is valid for stockholder’s 
equity, as well. On the other hand, the RLBO firms, on average have a substantially significant leverage 
level, which is expected considering the nature of RLBO firms. These firms are characterized with 
significantly increased leverage at the time of the LBO and then reverting back to lower levels of leverage 
gradually following the IPO.  
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3. Firm Characteristics, Board of Directors and Board Committees 
In this section, we discuss how certain characteristics of the firm, members of the board of 
directors and the CEO could potentially affect firm performance and value, in addition to the effects of 
board structure and the committees of the board on firm performance and value, based on the arguments 
and findings of prior studies. We do not investigate the potential determinants of various corporate 
governance mechanisms. Rather, we discuss the prior literature about the potential effects of these 
mechanisms, on firm performance and firm value. Based on these discussions, we form and present our 
hypotheses, followed by our findings. 
 
3.1. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
3.1.1. Delaware Incorporation 
The legal system in a country is an important part of corporate governance, especially for investor 
protection. However, investor protection does not only differ among countries with different law systems as 
reported by LaPorta et al. (1998). In US, it also differs in terms of the state that the firm is incorporated in. 
States have their unique corporate laws. And firms are required to be governed according to the corporate 
laws of the incorporated state. In US, almost 50 % of the public firms are incorporated in Delaware 
(Daines, 2001). Thus, it is important to investigate Delaware incorporation choices by firms. The main 
effect of Delaware incorporation on firm value would be related to the change in the likelihood of receiving 
takeover bids and being acquired. Thus the, quality of the Delaware law in terms of investor protection and 
the effects of Delaware incorporation has attracted significant attention. 
Event studies for the last couple decades have investigated the effect of firms’ incorporation in 
Delaware. Some of the findings in these studies can be summarized as: (i) decreased shareholder wealth 
following reincorporation decisions related to takeover defense purposes (Heron and Lewellen, 1998), (ii) 
Delaware incorporated firms being worth more than non-Delaware incorporated firms (Daines, 2001), and 
(iii) the choice of Delaware for incorporation at the time of the IPO by approximately 70 % of the firms 
(Daines, 2002). 
Based on these arguments and findings, our hypotheses are: 
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H2,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer portfolio firms to be incorporated in Delaware. 
H2,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer portfolio firms to be incorporated in Delaware. 
 
3.1.2. Staggered Boards 
Staggered boards, also known as classified boards, in public companies are a governance concept 
widely debated in recent decades. When a firm has a staggered board, only a certain fraction of the 
members of the board, usually one third, are elected annually. Directors in each class are elected once in 
every three years. The majority of the public firms in US has staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005, 
Faleye, 2007).  
Whether the board is staggered or not matters especially because either through a proxy fight or a 
hostile takeover, the ease of the removal of the incumbent directors by a third party depends largely on the 
target firm having a staggered board. By reducing the probability of removal of the incumbent directors, 
staggered boards would affect the likelihood of a potential takeover threat. This could affect shareholder 
wealth negatively. On the other hand, staggered boards might provide stability for the incumbent directors 
and letting them be free of short term pressures (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005), as well as the extra time 
provided to management to make better evaluation of potential offers (Faleye, 2007). This could affect 
shareholder wealth positively. In terms of staggered boards at the time of the IPO, Easterbrook and Fischel 
(1991) suggest that firms would be more likely to add the takeover defenses after the IPO. This view is 
based on the assumption that takeover defenses decrease firm value. 
Some of the findings in studies investigating the effect of staggered boards on firm performance 
and value are: (i) negative returns following the announcements of staggered boards (Mahoney and 
Mahoney, 1993), (ii) reduced firm value in the existence of staggered boards (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005, 
Faleye, 2007), and (iii) the common occurrence of staggered boards at the time of the IPO in firms backed 
by private equity firms (Klausner, 2003). 
Based on these arguments, our hypotheses are: 
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H3,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer portfolio firms to have staggered boards. 
H3,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer portfolio firms to have staggered boards. 
 
3.1.3. Controlled Firms 
A controlled firm is defined as a firm that is listed on a stock exchange and that holds an election 
for the board of directors of the firm in which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, 
a group or another firm (http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf). On the other hand, diffusely 
held ownership is one of the most common properties of public firms in US (Denis and McConnell, 2003, 
Franks et al., 2009), in contrast to controlling shareholders. However, in a recent study, Holderness (2009) 
criticizes the common view that ownership is diffusely held in US.  
Under the diffusely held ownership structure, the main agency problem is between managers and 
general shareholders. On the other hand, in the case of controlled firms, the main agency problem takes 
place between controlling shareholders and the remaining shareholders (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). 
These conflicts of interest might result in some forms of private benefits for the controlling group (Pagano 
and Roell, 1998). On the other hand, in controlled firms, the decreased agency costs between managers and 
general shareholders might be beneficial in such forms as reduced discretionary spending and higher 
likelihood of management removal following poor performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, 
shareholders would be expected to prefer a controlling shareholder’s existence as long as the potential 
benefits of reduced agency costs between managers and general shareholders are greater than the agency 
cost between controlling shareholders and the remaining shareholders. 
Based on these arguments, our hypotheses are: 
H4,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer portfolio firms to be controlled firms. 
H4,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer portfolio firms to be controlled firms. 
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3.1.4. Directors and CEO Characteristics 
Age 
Reform advocates suggest and companies require mandatory retirement ages for directors and 
CEOs. One reason is that directors might become less effective as they get older (Core et al., 1999). Also, 
due to career concerns and the willingness to show their worth to the market, CEOs would work harder 
when they are younger. As they get older and closer to retirement age, they would require stronger explicit 
incentives (Gibbons and Murpy, 1992). In terms of the benefit of diversity in the board, younger directors 
would bring more energy and less risk-aversion to the boards, whereas older directors would provide 
stability and wisdom (Anderson et al., 2011).  
In terms of the evidence for IPO firms and LBOs, Gertner and Kaplan (1996), Boone et al. (2007) 
and Cornelli and Karakas (2011) show that, members of the board and the CEO are relatively younger, 
compared to other firms . This could potentially be associated with private equity directors’ being younger 
compared to other directors. 
Based on these arguments, our hypotheses are: 
H5,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not  prefer younger directors on portfolio firms’ boards.  
H5,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer younger directors on portfolio firms’ boards. 
H6,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not  prefer younger CEOs for the portfolio firms. 
H6,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer younger CEOs for the portfolio firms. 
 
Tenure 
Beasley (1996) argues that as the tenure of directors increases, they would be less likely to feel 
group pressure in their decisions, and would be able to monitor management better, leading to better 
prevention of financial fraud. On the other hand, as their tenure increases, they might become more 
entrenched with the CEO and thus, more dependent. On the other hand, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
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argue that increased firm specific information, with the increased tenure of outside directors, would have a 
positive effect on firm performance. Empirically, Beasley (1996) shows that as the tenure of outside 
directors’ increases, the likelihood of financial fraud decreases, whereas, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
show that the tenure of the board is positively related to firm performance, measured by Q, concluding that 
this effect is valid for outside directors’ tenure.  
Based on these arguments and evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H7,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not  prefer directors with longer tenure. 
H7,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer directors with longer tenure. 
In terms of CEO tenure, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) argue that CEOs should not serve too 
long, since in time they might lose their flexibility, become the dominant force in the board and become 
entrenched. This would lead to a negative effect on firm performance. On the other hand, the increased 
length of the CEO’s tenure would be considered to suggest that agency problems are not too costly to the 
firm and the CEO has better ability, since the she has not been removed by the board yet. Still, this might 
be due to the increased power of the CEO on the board. In addition, CEO tenure might have an effect on 
board composition in terms of the need for CEO succession candidates, insiders, and the level of 
monitoring needed, with newer CEOs would require more monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). 
Empirically, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) show that tenure of the CEO does not affect 
profitability for low levels of tenure, whereas it affects profitability negatively for very high tenure levels. 
On the other hand, Anderson et al. (2011) show that CEOs with longer tenures, have positive effect on firm 
performance. In terms of board composition effects, Baker and Gompers (2003), investigating IPOs, show 
that as the tenure of the CEOs increases, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board decreases. 
Boone et al. (2007) provide parallel findings. 
Based on these arguments and evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H8,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not  prefer CEOs with longer tenure. 
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H8,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer CEOs with longer tenure. 
 
Gender 
The representation of women on boards in public companies has been debated in the recent years 
in US. When more women are assigned to the board, the diversity in the boardroom would increase. 
However, unlike in some European countries, the percentages of female directors in boards are still 
substantially lower compared to male directors. 
In terms of potential benefits, diversity, including gender diversity, would promote better 
understanding of the markets by matching the diversity of the markets, increase creativity, provide efficient 
problem-solving due to increased variety of perspectives, increase the speed of decision making process 
and, enhance the effectiveness of corporate leadership (Carter et al., 2003, Anderson et al., 2011, Dobbin 
and Jung, 2011).  However, all three studies point out the potential conflicts and communication costs due 
to increased heterogeneity. In empirical studies, Carter et al. (2003), and Anderson et al. (2011) provide 
evidence of the positive effects of board diversity, women or minorities, on ROA, ROI, firm performance, 
and firm value. 
On the other hand, gender diversity could have other direct or indirect effects on firm performance 
and value through: (i) effects on attendance rates (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), (ii) performance-CEO 
turnover sensitivity, and (iii) the attitudes of institutional investors (Dobbin and Jung, 2011). 
Based on these arguments and evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H9,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer boards with a higher fraction of female members. 
H9,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer boards with a higher fraction of female members. 
 
Education 
Our earlier diversity arguments would easily apply to the diversity in terms of educational 
background. The education levels of directors would especially be an important determinant of 
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occupational differences and expertise of the board members, which we discuss in the next section. Also, 
the educational background of directors might be important in terms of: (i) the linkages that the directors 
establish during their education or due to their educational associations, (ii) the potential of providing 
different perspectives for the board decisions, and (iii) increased advisory and monitoring by the board 
members due to increased heterogeneity (Anderson et al., 2011). The researchers show that managerial 
influence has a negative relationship with board heterogeneity, as well as a positive relationship between 
board heterogeneity and firm performance. 
On the other hand, Westphal and Bednar (2005) discuss the importance of educational affiliations 
and the social status provided. They point out that these affiliations can serve during the director 
appointment process as a result of in-group/out-group biases, arguing it might tend to increase pluralistic 
ignorance, leading to increased persistence, which in return might lead to poor firm performance.  
One important issue at this point is that there is no underlying theory on the relationship between 
education level and firm value or performance. Thus we do not form any hypotheses on this subject. 
 
Professional Expertise 
The benefits and costs for board heterogeneity would also apply to diversity in terms of 
professional expertise. However, there are some other potential costs and benefits when we consider the 
professional expertise of board members, rather than demographic diversity. 
We first discuss the importance of board members with financial/accounting expertise. After the 
financial scandals in the early 2000s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill was adopted and the corporate governance 
rules following it became important. Now, companies are required to have at least one financial expert in 
their audit committees. 
In terms of potential benefits, directors with financial and accounting expertise would be more 
sensitive to financial issues of the firm, compared to non expert directors (Anderson et al., 2011). They 
could also have an important role in terms of: (i) giving a signal that the firm is not likely to experience 
financial distress (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001), (ii) providing access to specific investors, and (iii) 
performing more effective monitoring when they represent a financial institution on the board. 
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 On the other hand, a director on the board of the firm, who is primarily employed by a lending 
financial institution, might pursue the interests of the financial institution, creating conflicts of interests 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). In addition, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) argue that since the time that audit 
committee members spend on reviewing firm’s financial reports is short, the existence of member/s on the 
committee might not be enough to discover problems. The existence of the expert might lead other 
committee members to pay less attention to specific issues. 
Some of evidence provided in earlier research suggest: (i) significant abnormal returns when 
financial expertise are added to the board (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990), (ii) decreased probability of 
misstatement of earnings for firms that have an independent director with financial expertise, which also 
includes individuals with CPA (Agrawal and Chadha, 2005), (iii) effects on corporate decisions however in 
the interest of financial institutions of the financial experts (Guner et al., 2008), and (iv) a positive 
influence of occupational hetereogeneity on firm performance (Anderson et al., 2011).  
Based on these discussions and findings, our hypotheses are: 
H11,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer the existence of financial experts on boards. 
H11,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer the existence of financial experts on boards. 
H12,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer the existence of accounting experts on boards. 
H12,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer the existence of accounting experts on boards. 
We next discuss the inclusion of academicians in the boards of public firms. Since academic 
directors are mostly outsiders, they would be likely to provide effective monitoring and this would affect 
firm value positively (Francis et al., 2012). Also, the academic directors are considered to be experts in 
their research area, which could lead them to be better advisors for the board decisions. In addition, 
academics would be likely to consider problems in a more scientific approach and would be beneficial in 
the decision making and problem solving process of the board. 
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On the other hand, academicians might be more concerned about scholarly research instead of the 
important factors for success in business, which would lead them to devote the majority of their time to 
academia rather than to the firm (Francis et al., 2012). They also might lack the on-the-job experience. 
Therefore, their existence in management would affect firm performance negatively. Francis et al. (2012) 
find that academics with administrative positions in the firms are associated with lower firm performance, 
whereas academics without administrative positions are associated with higher firm performance. 
Based on these discussions and the evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H13,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer the inclusion of academicians in boards. 
H13,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer the inclusion of academicians in boards. 
 
3.1.5. CEO Duality 
Core et al. (1999) and Linck et al. (2008) show that the majority of the firms in US combine the 
positions of the CEO and the chairman in one individual, CEO duality. Among others, the board’s duties 
include evaluating the performance of the CEO and taking necessary steps if the performance is not 
satisfactory. As the head of the board, these are the duties of the chairman, as well. If the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, she and the board might not be able to perform one of its most important functions, 
monitoring, effectively. Thus, Jensen (1993) suggests that the position of the CEO and the chairman should 
be separated, which should lead to a more effective board. In addition, CEO duality would lead to CEOs 
with greater power and these CEOs would be more likely to make decisions by themselves rather than 
relying on the opinions of other potential advisors (Adams et al., 2005). This would also affect the 
likelihood of removal of the CEO by the board, when necessary (Morck et al., 1989). 
On the other hand, among the potential costs associated with separate a CEO and a chairman are: 
(i) agency costs related to controlling the actions of the independent chairman, (ii) costly and incomplete 
transfer of the firm-specific very important information from the CEO to the separate chairman, (iii) 
forgone incentive mechanism for the CEO to be assigned as the chairman, (iv) rivalry between the CEO 
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and chairman, and (v) compensation costs of having a separate chairman ( Core et al., 1999). Faleye (2007) 
finds that the positive or negative effects of CEO duality depend on firm and CEO characteristics.  
Based on the discussions and prior evidence above, our hypotheses are: 
H14,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer CEO duality. 
H14,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer CEO duality. 
 
3.1.6. Founder CEOs 
CEO power and its effects on corporate governance dynamics of the firm is a widely studied 
phenomenon in finance literature. One of the variables widely used to proxy for CEO power is whether or 
not the CEO is the founder, since it would be expected that a founder CEO would have more influence on 
decisions and other managers.  
Some of the potential benefits of founder CEOs would be: (i) decreased compensation incentives 
(Palia et al., 2008), (ii)decreased agency costs related to classical owner-manager conflicts of interest, due 
to the shareholdings of the founder CEO, which would be expected to be high (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, 
Fahlenbrach, 2009), and (iii) increased effort by the founder CEO since she would probably see the firm as 
her biggest achievement, leading to a focus on long term success (Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
However, there are potential costs associated with having founder CEOs, as well. Some of the 
potential costs would be: (i) foregone professional management, (ii) increased variability in the decisions of 
the CEO since she would rely on her own opinions more than the other executives and the judgment errors 
not being well diversified (Adams et al., 2005), and (iii) the possibility that entrenched founder CEOs 
would be harder to remove following poor performance (Palia et al., 2008, Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
Empirically, Palia et al. (2008) find that founder CEOs (i) have more stock ownership compared to 
non-founder CEOs, (ii) have more insiders on their boards, (iii) are more involved in director nomination 
process, and (iv) are monitored less effectively. These findings are consistent with the argument that 
founder CEOs are more powerful. In addition, founder CEOs are less responsive to changes in pay-
performance sensitivity. Palia et al. (2008) find that firms with the founder as the CEO are more valuable. 
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Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that firms with a founder-CEO are both valued higher and have a better stock 
market performance. 
Based on these discussions and prior evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H15,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer to have founder CEOs. 
H15,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer to have founder CEOs. 
 
3.1.7. Board Size 
Board of directors is considered as one the most important internal governance mechanisms in 
firms. One of the aspects of boards that has been widely discussed in the literature is the size. Researchers 
have been trying to figure out whether or not there is an optimal board size, which would lead to value 
maximization for all firms. Huson et al. (2001) show that there is a trend towards smaller boards. Still, all 
firms do not necessarily have small boards. Based on this fact, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) question 
why Darwinism has not eliminated firms with large boards. To have a better understanding of the issue, we 
first consider the potential benefits and costs related to different board sizes. 
In prior studies, some of the potential costs of bigger boards are suggested as: (i) decreased 
efficiency since as the number of the members of the board increases, problems related to such issues as 
coordination and communication could increase (Jensen, 1993, Gertner and Kaplan, 1996, Yermack, 1996, 
Faleye, 2003), (ii) increased cost of monitoring outweighing the benefits of increased monitoring (Linck et 
al., 2008), (iii) the potential to avoid responsibilities leading to free-riding (Gertner and Kaplan, 1996), and 
(iv) increased CEO power (Dalton et al., 1999). 
On the other hand, some of the potential benefits of bigger boards would be suggested as: (i) the 
increased monitoring would be beneficial, up to a certain point, where the costs are more than the potential 
benefits, (ii) improved external links that the firm has to critical resources (Dalton et al., 1999), and (iii) 
increased talent pool in the board (Faleye, 2003). 
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Empirically, Yermack (1996) shows that smaller boards are more effective. In addition, there is 
evidence provided regarding the negative effects of bigger boards on increased likelihood for financial 
fraud (Beasley, 1996), CEO turnover likelihood (Faleye, 2003), CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999) 
However, in more recent studies, another view is commonly discussed about the importance of 
board size and its effects on firm performance and other issues. Among these studies are Gillan et al. 
(2004), Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), Linck et al. (2008) and Lehn et al. (2009). Even though the 
determinants of board size are beyond the scope of this paper, we believe that these arguments are 
important in terms of arguing the optimal board size which would lead to value maximization. These 
studies suggest and mostly provide evidence of the discussion that board size would differ across firms, 
probably driven by the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of monitoring mechanisms. Among the 
potential determinants of firm specific board size would be firm’s life cycle, firm complexity and firm size. 
The authors mentioned above provide evidence supporting this argument. More recently, applying a 
dynamic panel GMM estimator in the dynamic model, Wintoki et al. (2012) find that board size is 
associated with firm specific characteristics. However, once again, the determinants of board size are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
Based on these discussions and prior evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H16,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer to have smaller boards. 
H16,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer to have smaller boards. 
 
3.1.8. Board Composition 
In addition to the size of the board, the composition of the board is one of the most widely 
investigated subjects in the literature. In recent decades, there has been a trend towards boards with more 
independent directors, in public firms. The legal reforms and laws, such as Sarbanes-Oxley Bill, and the 
regulations by stock exchanges require public firms to compose their boards with a majority of independent 
directors, in addition to the requirement for the audit committees to be comprised of all independent 
directors. In this section, we discuss the benefits and costs related to each class of these directors. 
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Inside directors have valuable firm specific knowledge. In addition to this, they are considered as 
valuable candidates for the CEO succession process and they can deliver important information to the 
outside board members. Moreover, the inclusion of inside directors on the board helps them gain 
experience, as potential candidates to replace the current CEO in the future. It, also, gives the other 
directors the opportunity to evaluate these future CEO candidates. There is wide evidence consistent with 
the CEO succession argument (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999, Kaplan et 
al., 2012). 
However, compared to independent directors, insiders are influenced more by the CEO and their 
careers at the firm is more sensitively tied to the CEO. Thus, these individuals might not be able to 
participate in evaluating and monitoring the CEO effectively (Jensen, 1993). They also might not be able to 
act against the CEO, such as removing the CEO, when needed.  
On the other hand, independent directors are considered as better monitors, compared to insiders. 
Some of the potential reasons for this argument could be listed as: (i) careers of these directors not being 
tied to the CEO, (ii) the reputational concerns of independent directors, (iii) their important advisory and 
counseling functions, and (iv) the possibility of providing the firm with valuable connections to external 
resources. However, the biggest disadvantage of independent directors is the lack of firm specific 
information, at least when their tenure is not too long at the firm. Still, this does not mean that they are 
totally uninformed, as suggested by Ravina and Sapienza’s (2010) evidence. 
There is vast number of empirical studies investigating various aspects of the existence and the 
percentages of independent directors in boards. Some of the findings in these studies are related to: (i) the 
importance of reputational concerns and the likelihood of receiving or loosing board seats (Shivdasani, 
2007), (ii) effects on firm performance which suggest that even if independent directors are effective 
monitors, this positive effect is not necessarily reflected to performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, 
Mehran, 1995, Wintoki et al., 2012), (iii) effects on compensation structure (Mehran, 1995, Core et al., 
1999, Guthrie et al.,2012), (iv) effects on CEO removal process (Weisbach, 1988), (v) effects on incidences 
of fraud (Beasley, 1996, Uzun et al., 2004), and (vi) the reaction of markets to independent directors 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt,1990, Borokhovich et al., 1996). 
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Overall, empirical evidence is mostly unable to suggest that the inclusion of independent directors 
on the boards leads to increased performance. However, findings of the studies investigating the effects of 
board composition on various aspects other than performance, appears to be more supportive of the view 
that existence of independent directors has positive effects.  
The last set of studies we summarize is the ones that argue how board composition is determined. 
The determinants of board composition are beyond the scope of this paper. Still, we believe that these 
arguments are valuable in terms of arguing the optimal board composition potentially leading to value 
maximization.  
One important factor that would have a big impact on the composition of the board would be the 
power of the CEO. The evidence in studies such as Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), Baker and Gompers 
(2003), Boone et al. (2007), and Linck et al. (2008) suggest that CEO power would have an effect on the 
composition of the board. 
In recent years, there is a more common view about how the board composition is determined. 
Even though Denis and Sarin (1999) find that changes in the board structure are weakly related to firm 
characteristics, the majority of the empirical findings suggest the opposite. Among these are studies such as 
Raheja (2005), Boone et al. (2007), Coles et al. (2008), and Linck et al. (2008), which suggest that firm 
specific characteristics, such as the, level of the maturity of the firm, firm complexity, growth 
opportunities, and volatility would be considered as important determinants of board composition. 
Based on these discussions and prior evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H17,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer a higher fraction of independent directors. 
H17,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer a higher fraction of independent directors. 
 
3.1.9. Multiple Directorships 
Recently, the terms “busy directors” and “busy boards” have become popular in the area of 
research investigating directors with multiple directorships. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) define a busy 
76 
 
 
director as an independent director serving on three or more boards. They define a busy board as a board 
where more than 50 % of its members are busy directors. 
Opponents of busy directors discuss the negative effects of other board memberships especially on 
directors’ monitoring effectiveness. Busy directors might not be able to put enough time and effort to any 
one of the boards they serve at, which might potentially lead to directors avoiding some of their 
responsibilities. As a consequence of less effective monitoring due to multiple directorships, firm 
performance and value would be diminished (Field et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, some of the potential benefits associated with busy directors would be listed as: 
(i) extra skills due to their specific abilities and expertise, (ii) external connections to valuable resources 
and with other directors (Field et al., 2011), (iii) opportunity to gain additional experience as a result of 
dealing with different issues at different firms, and (iv) improved decision making skills. 
There is vast number of empirical studies investigating various aspects of busy directors and 
boards. Some of the findings in these studies are related to: (i) the relationship between past performance of 
firms that a director served as a board member, and the subsequent board appointments the director holds 
(Ferris et al., 2003), (ii) the likelihood of being appointed to seats in other boards based on current firm 
performance (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990), (iii) effects on current firm performance (Ferris et al., 2003, Fich 
and Shivdasani, 2006, Field et al., 2011), (iv) the the likelihood of fraud incidences (Beasley, 1996, Ferris 
et al., 2003), (v) effects on compensation structure (Core et al., 1999, Field et al., 2011), (vi) performance 
of busy directors on board committees (Ferris et al., 2003, Field et al., 2011), and (vii) the market reaction 
of multiple directorship appointments (Ferris et al., 2003, Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Recently, some reform advocates call for limits on the number of outside directorships that 
directors can hold. Still, there are important potential benefits associated. In addition to these benefits, as 
we discussed earlier, directors, especially independent ones, have reputational concerns, which leads them 
to be effective monitors. If they perform their duties more effectively, this would signal their worth to the 
market. In return, they would be appointed as directors to other firms. Being appointed as directors to more 
firms would improve their reputations as effective monitors. Consistent with this view, one could argue that 
the regulations limiting the number of outsider directorships by directors would decrease their incentives to 
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perform their monitoring functions more effectively. Therefore, these calls for limiting the number of 
directorships would be misleading. 
Based on these arguments and findings, our hypotheses are: 
H18,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer boards with a higher fraction of busy directors. 
H18,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not boards with a higher fraction of busy directors. 
H19,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer busy boards. 
H19,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer busy boards. 
 
3.1.10. Board Committees 
When we discussed board structure, we mentioned the possibility that some directors might avoid 
their responsibilities, leading to free-riding. Committees of the board might be helpful in preventing this 
problem, assigning board members specific responsibilities. 
Since the beginning of the last decade, SEC has been setting requirements for pubic firms to have 
audit, compensation and nominating committees comprising of independent directors. In addition, at least 
one member of the audit committee is required to be a financial expert. All public companies are required 
to comply with the independence requirements, effective April 2003. Therefore, the composition of these 
committees has been of much interest.  
We first discuss the independence of compensation committee. The CEO is believed to have 
influence on the members of the board, especially the inside directors. Due to their power, they might affect 
the decisions of the inside directors, who are members of the compensation committee, as well. Even 
further, CEOs might even be a member of the compensation committee, which leads them to deciding on 
their own compensation (Yermack, 1997). Thus, it is important that the compensation committee is 
comprised of independent directors. On the other hand, the independent directors might be criticized of not 
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having specific information regarding the requirements of the jobs of top executives, and thus the 
compensation they deserve. 
Next, we discuss the independence of the audit committee. Our arguments of the importance of 
independent members on the compensation committee apply to the independence directors on the audit 
committee, as well. Also, it can easily be argued that the composition of the audit committee would have an 
effect on the incidence of fraud, which would affect firm value negatively. In addition to the independence 
of the committee members, the existence of a financial expert would be expected to improve the quality 
and liability of the work of the committee.  
On the other hand, even though greater audit committee independence would provide the 
committee and the firm with benefits, it is also possible that these independent committee members would 
lack specific information regarding the firm’s financial reporting systems and internal control mechanisms 
(Anderson et al., 2003).  In addition, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) criticize that even if the committees are 
comprised of independent directors, it would be difficult for them to detect fraud given the total amount of 
time they spend on committee meetings. However, Beasley (1996), Anderson et al. (2003), and Agrawal 
and Chadha (2005) are unable to find evidence in support of this view. 
Lastly, we investigate the independence of the nominating committee, which is often combined 
with corporate governance committee in firms. Again, the importance of the effectiveness of independent 
directors on other committees applies to the composition of the nominating committee, as well. Powerful 
CEOs might dominate the director nomination process, which could lead to CEOs nominating directors 
who are more likely to support their decisions (Borokhovich et al., 1996). Thus the independence of 
directors on the nominating committee is important in limiting the influence that the CEO has over the 
nomination process. It is argued that potential director candidates should be nominated by committees 
comprised of independent directors, so that they would more likely protect the shareholders’ interest, rather 
than top management who would nominate them in the absence of an independent nominating committee. 
Empirically, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that when the CEO is involved in the 
nomination and selection process, directors that are less likely to monitor effectively are chosen. Their main 
findings are that when the CEO is involved in the selection process; (i) a lower fraction of independent 
directors are selected, (ii) the likelihood of an independent board is lower, (iii) the announcement returns 
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for independent director appointments are significantly negative, (iv) directors that are less likely to 
monitor aggressively are appointed to the board. 
Based on these arguments and prior evidence, our hypotheses are as follows: 
H20,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would not prefer compensation committees with a majority of independent directors. 
H20,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would prefer compensation committees with a majority of independent directors. 
H21,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would not prefer audit committees with a majority of independent directors. 
H21,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would prefer audit committees with a majority of independent directors. 
H22,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would not prefer nominating committees with a majority of independent directors. 
H22,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in portfolio 
firms at the IPO would prefer nominating committees with a majority of independent directors. 
 
3.2. Results 
3.2.1. Results for Delaware Incorporation 
Our results regarding the firms’ incorporation decision at the time of the RLBO are presented in 
Table 2. Panel A shows that 88 % of the firms in our sample are incorporated in Delaware at the time of the 
IPO. On the other hand, 63 % of the firms in the control group are incorporated in Delaware. These 
findings support the arguments in Daines (2001). The evidence suggests that LBO specialists that are 
expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their portfolio firms at the time of the IPO mainly 
prefer Delaware incorporation, potentially due to the improved corporate governance applications for 
public firms. Therefore, we cannot reject H2,A. This is probably due to the likelihood of firms incorporated 
in Delaware receiving takeover bids and being acquired as well as Delaware law’s facilitating the sale of 
public firms, which would lead to improvements in firm value. 
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3.2.2. Results for Staggered Boards 
Our results regarding staggered (classified) boards are presented in Table 2. Panel B shows that 35 
% of the firms in the sample have staggered boards at the time of the IPO. In the two years following the 
IPO, the percentage of firms with a staggered board increases to 53 % and 55 %, respectively. For the firms 
in the control group, the percentage is approximately 56 % for the three years in the same time span. Based 
on our main hypothesis (H1), these findings, especially the 35 % at the time of the IPO which is 21 % lower 
than the control firms, would be considered as supporting previous findings of staggered boards’ decreasing 
firm value. The optimal governance structure would be to have unitary boards, rather than staggered 
boards. Therefore, we cannot reject H3,A. This might potentially be explained by the reduction in the 
probability of removal of the incumbent directors, which would provide them with the opportunity to create 
empire building or extracting private benefits. However, the increase in the number of firms with staggered 
firms in the following years is also consistent with the argument of Easterbrook and Fischer (1991) in terms 
of IPO firms adding takeover defenses after the IPO.  
 
3.2.3. Results for Controlled Firms 
Table 2, panel C presents the percentage of firms that are controlled firms for our sample and the 
control group. At the time of the IPO, 86 % of the sample firms are controlled firms, whereas only 12 % of 
the firms in the control group are controlled firms. The percentage of firms that are controlled decreases to 
51 % and 36 % in the following years, still higher than the percentage of controlled firms in the control 
group. The high percentage of controlled firms at the time of the IPO should actually be treated with 
caution. Due to the nature of our sample, we observe ownership concentration at the time of the LBO, and 
LBO specialists exiting their positions in the firm gradually after the IPO. Thus, the high percentage of 
controlled firms at the time of the IPO would be expected. However, the finding that the percentage of 
controlled firms decreasing substantially following the IPO would be considered as consistent with the 
importance of the cost of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and the remaining 
shareholders. On the other hand, the fact that 36 % of the sample firms still being controlled firms two 
years after the IPO, compared to the control group with 6 % of controlled firms, would suggest that the 
decreased agency costs between managers and general shareholders might be an important factor in terms 
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of firm value, as well. Based on this evidence, we cannot reject H4,A. This is probably a result of potential 
benefits of reduced agency costs between managers and general shareholders being greater than the agency 
cost between controlling shareholders and the remaining shareholders. 
 
3.2.4. Results for Director and CEO Characteristics 
Results for Age 
Our findings regarding director and CEO age are presented in Table 3, panel A. Both at the time of 
the IPO and in the two subsequent years, the board of directors in our sample firms consists of younger 
directors, compared to the firms in the control group. The difference is statistically significant. The average 
age of directors for the sample is 50 at the time of the IPO, increasing to 53 in the following two years, 
whereas it is around 56 to 57 for the control group. Based on this evidence, we are unable to reject the 
hypothesis H5,A. This might potentially be an outcome of younger directors’ bringing more energy and less 
risk-aversion to the boards outweighing the stability and wisdom brought by older directors, in addition to 
the career concerns and willingness to show their worth to the market by younger board members. It is also 
possible that private equity firms might be hiring younger employees, who become board members of the 
portfolio companies. However, this would not necessarily require the rejection of H5,A. 
On the other hand, in terms of CEO age, the average age of the CEOs in the sample is not 
significantly different than the CEOs of the firms in the control group. The average age of the CEOs in both 
groups during the three year period is around 52. Based on this evidence we can reject the hypothesis H6,A. 
However, the fact that the age of the CEOs for the sample firm being close to the age of the directors of the 
same firms, and that the age of the CEOs of control firms being significantly lower than the age of the 
directors of the same firms, should be considered when interpreting these findings. 
 
Tenure 
Our results are presented in Table 3. Panel B shows the tenure of the board members for both the 
sample and the control group. The average tenure of the sample firms is 3.67 years at the time of the IPO, 
for sample firms, whereas it is 7.15 years for the firms in the control group. We observe a slight increase in 
the tenure of the board members in the following two years for the sample firms, to a level of 4.63 at the 
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end of the second year after the RLBO. The tenure of the board members is statistically significantly lower 
for the sample firms in the three years investigated. Based on these findings, we can reject the hypothesis 
H7,A. This would be as a result of the possibility that directors with less tenure would be less likely to be 
entrenched with the CEO, thus more likely to be independent. This, in return, would lead to better 
monitoring of the CEO and as a result, increases in shareholder value. However, it should be kept in mind 
that the causality would be running from independence to shorter tenure, since boards are restructured at 
the time of the LBO for the sample firms and these firms go through the IPO in the following three years, 
on average (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990, Lerner and Cao, 2009). Thus the preferences for directors in 
terms of independence, could be affecting the average tenure of the board members of sample firms. 
We also analyze the tenure of the independent directors (results not tabulated here). The results 
show that the tenure of the independent board members in the sample are significantly shorter compared to 
those in the control group. The tenure of independent directors is actually shorter than the non-independent 
directors for both within the sample and control firms. 
Our results regarding the tenure of CEOS are also presented in Table 3, Panel B. The average 
tenure for the CEOs of sample firms is 5.72 at the time of the IPO, significantly shorter than the tenure of 
CEOs of the firms in the control group. The average tenure of the CEO increases to 7.21 years for the firms 
in the sample, in the following two years, but the average CEO tenure levels are still significantly lower 
than those for the control group firm CEOs. Based on these findings, we can reject the hypothesis H8,A. 
This would be considered as consistent with the argument by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) that 
CEOs should not serve too long, due to lost flexibility and entrenchment related problems. This could result 
in decreased shareholder value. 
 
Gender 
Table 2, panels D and E shows our results. Around 4 % of the board members are females at the 
time of the IPO, for the sample firms and this percentage rises to 5 % in the following two years. The 
percentage of women on the boards is around 5 % to 6 % for the firms in the control group. Panel B show 
the percentage of CEOs that are women. At the time of the IPO, around 1 % of the firms in the sample have 
female CEOs. This ratio increases to almost 2 % in the following two years. For the firms in the control 
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group, the percentage of female CEOs is around 3 % to 2 %. Overall, the percentage of women directors on 
boards and the percentage of firms with female CEOs does not appear to substantially vary for the sample 
and control firms. Based on our results we can reject the hypothesis H9,A. Thus, we cannot provide evidence 
supporting the potential benefits of women on boards suggested by Carter et al. (2003), Anderson et al. 
(2011) and Dobbin and Jung (2011). It appears that gender diversity is not a high priority concern for the 
LBO specialists. This might also be as an outcome of the concerns of RLBO firms in terms of the potential 
conflicts and communication costs due to increased demographic heterogeneity among board members. 
 
Education 
We gathered data regarding the percentage of directors with Masters and MBA degrees .Our 
findings are presented in Table 2. Panel F shows that on average 19 % of the directors in the sample have 
masters degrees, whereas 12 % of the directors of the firms in the control group have masters degrees. Still, 
these findings should be considered with caution. Most companies do not mention the education levels of 
their directors and/or CEOs in their proxies, thus figures might be underestimating the percentage of 
directors and CEOs with Masters degrees.  
 
Professional Expertise 
Our results regarding financial/accounting expertise of board members are presented in Table 3, 
Panels C and D. Panel C shows that 48 % of the board members are financial experts for sample firms, at 
the time of the IPO. For control firms, this figure is 18 %. In the following two years, the ratio of financial 
experts in the sample firms’ boards decreases to 39 %, whereas it 17 % for the control firms. Panel D 
shows the percentage of board members with accounting expertise. In sample firms, 4 % of the board 
members are accounting experts at the time of the IPO, with this percentage increasing to 5 % in the 
following two years. On the other hand, for the firms in the control group, around 3 % to 4 % of the board 
members have accounting expertise in the same time span. Based on these findings, we are unable to reject 
hypothesis H11,A. However, we are able to reject H12,A. 
The finding that LBO specialists’ portfolio firms having a substantially higher percentage of 
financial experts on their boards could be due to the potential benefits such as higher likelihood of detecting 
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financial reporting problems, access to specific investors and extra funds for investments or the signals 
given to the market. However, one point is noteworthy. The high percentage of board members in the 
sample firms would be due to the nature our sample. The RLBO firms are taken public by the LBO 
specialists and the specialist companies are highly represented in the boards of the firms. And by the nature 
of these specialists, their partners on the firms’ boards have financial expertise. This fact might have led us 
to find the substantially higher financial expertise percentage on the boards of sample firms, compared to 
control firms. To check for this possibility, we exclude the LBO specialists’ partners on the firms’ boards 
from our calculation. This time, the percentage of the board members with financial expertise in the sample 
firms is almost identical to those members in control firms. 
On the other hand, the finding that RLBO firms do not have a substantially higher percentage of 
accounting experts on their boards could be explained by the concerns stated by Agrawal and Chadha 
(2005). Since the time that audit committee members spend on reviewing firm’s financial reports is short, 
the existence of member/s on the committee might not be enough to discover problems. The existence of 
the expert might lead other committee members to pay less attention to specific issues. If the financial 
expert is not acting as an effective monitor, this might actually lead the committee to be even less effective 
in detecting accounting related problems.  
Our results regarding the inclusion of academicians in boards are presented in Table 3. Panel E 
shows that at the time of the IPO 2 % of the board members in the sample firm are professors, whereas this 
percentage is 5 % for the board members of control firms. The figures are similar for both groups in the 
following two years. Based on these findings we can reject the hypothesis H13,A. This could potentially be 
due to the concerns that academicians might be more concerned about scholarly research instead of the 
important factors for success in business, which would lead them to devote the majority of their time to 
academia rather than to the firm. In addition, they also could be lacking the on-the-job experience that is 
vital in the improvement of skills required for high quality management.  
 
3.2.5. Results for CEO Duality 
Our findings regarding CEO duality are presented in Table 3, panel F. At the time of the IPO, 44 
% of the firms in the sample have CEO duality structure. For the firms in the control group, this figure is 50 
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%. In the following two years, the percentage of firms with CEO duality increase to 48 % for the sample 
firms, whereas as it is 51 % for the firms in the control group. The percentages are very close for both 
groups. In light of these figures, we can reject the hypothesis H14,A. The RLBO firms do not have a 
substantially higher or lower percentage of CEO duality, compared to the control firms. On the other hand, 
among the RLBO firms only, approximately one out of two firms prefers CEO duality. Based on our main 
hypothesis (H1), neither CEO duality nor chairman independence appears to be preferred more by the LBO 
specialists, which are expected employ optimal governance structures in the portfolio firms, at the time of 
the IPO. Rather, the evidence would be considered to suggest that there might be a tradeoff between the 
potential costs and the potential benefits of CEO duality. Potentially, personal interests and increased 
power and its consequences could bring extra costs to the firm. On the other hand, reduced monitoring 
costs for CEO’s actions, costs related to the transfer of information between the CEO and the chairman, 
incentive mechanisms, removal of rivalry and decreased compensation would be beneficial for the firm, in 
case of CEO duality. Probably firms choose between CEO duality and chairman independence based on 
this tradeoff. 
 
3.2.6. Results for Founder CEOs 
Based on the increased power arguments, we first investigate the ownership stake of the founder 
CEOs in firms. In untabulated results, we see that the ownership stake of the founder CEOs in the sample 
firms is around 10 % at the time of the IPO, decreasing to 8 % in the following two years. The non-founder 
CEOs in the sample firms, on the other hand have significantly less ownership stake. The mean ownership 
percentage is around 3 % at the time of the IPO and the following two years. A similar pattern is observed 
for the firms in the control group. The founder CEOs in this group, on average, have around 17 % 
ownership stake at time t, which decreases to 15 % in the following two years. The nonfounder CEOs, 
again, have significantly less ownership stake, which is around % 5 at the same time span. This evidence is 
consistent with the entrenchment arguments. The founder CEOs have significantly more ownership stakes 
in the firms, which would lead them to have more power.  
Next, we examine the percentages of firms, in both the sample and control groups, that have 
founder CEOs. The results are presented in Table 8, panel A. At the time of the IPO, 15 % of the firms in 
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the sample have founders as their CEOs. This percentage is 15 % and 14 % in the following two years, 
respectively. When we look at the firms in the control group, we see that 12 % of them founders as their 
CEOs. The percentages are 12 % and 14 % for the following two years, respectively. The figures for the 
firms in the sample and control group do not appear to be substantially different. Firms prefer professional, 
non-founder CEOS to founder CEOs. Based on these findings, we can reject the hypothesis H15,A. 
Even though prior studies have shown the positive effect of founder CEOs on firm value and 
performance, still the percentage of firms with founder CEOs are much lower compared to other firms in 
those samples. Our figures are similar. Based on the fewer number of firms with founder CEOs in these 
studies, one would question why founder CEOs are not common despite the potential positive effect on 
performance and value. In other firms, why do majority of the firms hire professional managers? One 
potential explanation would be consistent with Palia et al. (2008) and Fahlenbrach’s (2009) argument about 
entrenchment. As we reported, founder CEOs have higher equity stakes and this probably makes them 
become entrenched. Even though their efforts towards creating value for a firm that they have built are 
valuable at the early stages of the company’s life span, the cost of entrenchment increases in time. In 
addition to this, the benefits of hiring professional managers, combined with the costs of entrenchment, 
become advantageous. Thus firms favor having professional, non-founder CEOs. In addition, the evidence 
that the founder CEOs in the sample firms have significantly less ownership stakes than the founder CEOs 
in the control firms, suggests that LBO specialists would ideally favor founder CEOs with less ownership 
stake, leading to less power, which is consistent with the costs of entrenchment.  
 
3.2.7. Results for Board Size 
Our results are presented in Table 8, panel B. At the time of the IPO, firms in our sample have, on 
average, 7.25 members on the boards.  The firms in the control group, on the other hand, have 7.52 
directors on the board, on average. The difference between the sample and control group are not 
statistically significant. In the two years following the IPO, the average number of board members on the 
boards, for the sample firms, increases to 7.87 in the first year and then to 7.95 in the second year. For the 
control group firms, the average number of board members is 7.51 and 7.55 in the same time span. The 
number of board members is not statistically significantly different for the two groups, at 95 % level. Even 
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though they are different “statistically” at the 90 % level, we do not consider this as enough evidence to 
suggest that LBO specialists would prefer smaller or bigger boards. Based on these findings, we can reject 
the hypothesis H16,A. 
In fact, the sizes of sample firms are similar to control firms. Both groups of firms have smaller 
number of members on their boards, compared to previous findings from earlier decades. Thus, the benefits 
of smaller boards seem to be valued highly, compared to the advantages of larger boards. However, due to 
the similarities between the value maximizing firms and seasonal firms, we cannot suggest that public firms 
should increase or decrease the size of their boards. After all, the view that board size is determined 
endogenously based on firm specific characteristics should, also, be paid attention to, when considering the 
optimal board size. However, we do not test this view by controlling for firm specific characteristics. 
 
3.2.8. Results for Board Composition 
As discussed in greater detail in the appendix B, we follow a similar approach to studies of board 
composition, in classifying directors as inside, gray and independent directors. The only exception is, due 
to the nature of the relationship between the RLBO firm and the LBO sponsor, the partners of the LBO 
firm, who serve on the board of the RLBO firm, are classified as gray directors. Our findings are presented 
in Table 4 
Table 4, panels A, B and C show the number of directors in each category. What should be more 
explanatory than the number of directors is the fraction of each class of director on the boards. The results 
are presented in Table 4, panels D, E and F. Panel D, shows that on average, 22 % of the directors are 
inside directors in the sample firms, at the time of the IPO. The ratio of inside directors decreases to 
approximately 19 % in the following two years. On the other hand, the firms in the control group have 
approximately 22 % to 20 % of inside directors on their boards, on average, which is not significantly 
different from the sample firms. Based on these findings and our main hypothesis (H1), we can suggest that 
LBO sponsors prefer a smaller fraction of inside directors on their portfolio companies’ boards. However, 
we cannot suggest that public firms should increase or decrease the ratio of inside directors on their boards 
since the figures are not significantly different for the sample and control firms. 
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Panel F of Table 4 presents our findings. At the time of the IPO, sample firms, on average, have 
40 % of their boards comprising of gray directors. This ratio decreases to 33 % and 30 % in the following 
two years. On the other hand, the firms in the control group have significantly less fraction of gray directors 
on their boards. In the same time span, the fractions of gray directors are around 3 % to 4 %, for the control 
firms. The sample firms have significantly more gray directors in their boards, which is a natural outcome 
of categorizing the LBO sponsor partners as gray directors for the RLBO firms. When we look at Panel E, 
we observe the fraction of independent directors on the boards. At the time of the IPO, sample firms have 
37 % of their boards comprised of independent directors, on average. At the same time span, however, the 
firms in the control group have significantly more independent directors on their boards; 74 %. In the 
following two years, the fraction of the independent directors for the sample firms increases to 46 % and 51 
%, consecutively, whereas control firms have significantly more independent directors; 75 % and 76 %. 
These findings suggest that the firms in the sample firm have less independent directors on their boards, 
even though the fraction of independent directors for the sample firm increases in the following two years. 
Based on these findings, we can reject the hypothesis H17,A. Actually, it appears that smaller 
fractions of independent directors are preferred by LBO specialists in portfolio companies’ boards. 
However, this conclusion could be misleading. This is due to the unique nature of the firms in our sample. 
As mentioned earlier, the partners of LBO sponsors on the boards of sample firms are categorized as gray 
directors. At the time of the IPO, around 40 % of the board members are LBO sponsors for the sample 
firms. This fraction decreases to 33 % and 29 % in the following two years. Thus the majority of the gray 
directors on the boards of sample firms are actually the partners of LBO sponsors, while some of the 
partners are inside directors, as well. Thus, our findings are unique to the definition of gray directors. 
As stated earlier, independent directors are considered as valuable board members, because of 
effective monitoring they provide. For studies investigating public firms, gray directors make up a very low 
fraction of boards. The majority of the noninsider directors are independent directors. Thus, the arguments, 
in those studies, suggesting that independent directors would benefit the firm highly can be restated as 
noninsider directors are valuable due to their monitoring functions. In RLBOs, as Gertner and Kaplan 
(1996) argue, the existence of an LBO sponsor would provide increased monitoring and thus the need for 
outside directors for better monitoring might be lessened. Therefore, in a RLBO setting, the benefits 
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utilized through the existence of independent directors in other firms, would be achieved through the 
coexistence of independent directors and directors that are partners of LBO sponsors, together. As we 
observe in our findings, as the LBO sponsor decreases its ownership stake in the firm following the IPO, 
their partners serving on portfolio companies leave their director positions. And as the need for monitoring 
increases, firms add more independent directors to their boards. Most importantly, the fraction of inside 
directors stays almost unchanged, during this phase. 
Based on this argument, and the assumption that some corporate governance mechanisms could 
substitute for each other, it would be useful to investigate the fraction of each type of directors on the 
boards, based on effective monitoring arguments. Cornelli and Karakas (2011) have a similar argument in 
terms of the substitution effect of LBO sponsor partners for independent directors. Based on our alternative 
board member definitions, we next investigate the numbers and percentages of inside directors, total of 
independent and LBO sponsor partner directors, and non LBO sponsor partner gray directors. We refer to 
the independent directors and LBO sponsor partner director group collectively as “more effective 
directors”. 
Our findings are presented in Table 5. The findings regarding the number and fraction of inside 
directors for both the sample and control group are presented in panels A and D, and are identical to the 
figures in Table 4, since the definition of inside directors have not changed. Thus our earlier discussion 
about the role of inside directors still applies. However, the definitions of the “more effective directors” and 
non LBO sponsor partner gray directors are different. Panel B and C in Table 5 show the numbers, whereas 
what is more suitable to be considered in the light of prior evidence is the fraction of each class of director 
on the boards, since board sizes change in different sample in various studies. Panel C shows the fraction of 
non LBO sponsor partner gray members of the board. This ratio is around 2 % to 3 % for the sample firms 
at the time of the IPO and the following two years, whereas it is around 3 % to 4 % for the control firms. 
The figures are significantly different only at the time of the IPO. On the other hand, Panel B shows the 
fraction of “more effective monitors”. The ratio of these directors, on average, for the sample firms is 75 % 
at the time of the IPO and it rises to 77 % in the following two years. The figures are very similar for the 
control firms, ranging from 74 % to 76 %, in the same time horizon, which are not significantly different 
from the sample firms.  
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Once again, majority of the discussions and implications about the existence and fraction of 
independent directors on boards is based upon the argument of better monitoring. Thus, we believe that the 
evidence we just provided, should be more appropriate, if we are to accept that some type of directors are 
vital due to their improved monitoring functions. Even though the sample firms do not have a significantly 
different fraction of independent/effective monitors on their boards, based on the high fraction of these type 
of directors on their boards, this time we are unable to reject the hypothesis H17,A. This is consistent with 
the view that effective monitors are vital for companies. In addition to this, we do not control for firm 
specific characteristics. Thus, these findings are not necessarily inconsistent with the arguments of Raheja 
(2005), Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008) suggesting that board composition is determined by firm 
specific characteristics. 
 
3.2.9. Results for Multiple Directorships 
Our first set of results, based on Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) busyness definition are presented in 
Table 6. Panel A shows the number of busy directors on boards, whereas Panel B shows the percentages of 
board members who are busy. For the sample firms, 15.70 % percent of all directors are busy directors at 
the time of the IPO. This ratio rises to 21.93 % in the following year, and to 24.58 % two years after the 
IPO. As the LBO sponsor partners exit board memberships at the sample firms, they are replaced by 
independent directors and the percentage of busy directors increases from 15 % to 24 % as a result. Again, 
for control firms, the ratio of busy directors on the board is significantly higher. At time t, 31.26 % percent 
of board members are busy directors. In the following two years, this ratio is 33.80 % and 34.33 %, 
consecutively. Finally, Panel C shows the percentage of boards that are busy boards among all the firms, in 
the sample and control group. At the time of the IPO, only 4 % of boards are classified as busy for the 
sample. This ratio rises to 7 % and 9 %, in the following two years. On the other hand, significantly more 
boards are considered as busy boards, among the control group firms. At time t, 26 % of the boards are 
busy boards. This ratio is 30 % and 32 %, in the following two years, consecutively. Based on these 
findings we can reject the hypotheses H18,A and H19,A. However, similar to the case in board composition 
findings, we believe that an analysis of an alternative definition would be useful. 
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As mentioned earlier, a significant amount of LBO sponsor partners sit on the boards of RLBO 
firms. These sponsor partners on the boards of sample firms are categorized as gray directors, due to their 
relationship with the sponsor company. Based on Fich and Shivdasani’s (2006) busyness definition, only 
independent directors can be defined as busy directors. For example, even if an LBO sponsor sits on the 
board of the RLBO firm and 10 other public firms’ boards, she cannot be defined as a busy director, since 
she does not match the criteria of being an independent director. This, inevitably, affects our findings and 
the interpretations. However, the proponents of busy directors criticize them mainly based on the argument 
that they cannot perform their monitoring functions effectively. In other words, they criticize that those 
types of directors, who sit on the boards mainly for monitoring functions, cannot monitor effectively, when 
they are busy. Even Fich and Shivdasani (2006) state “ Our variables, however, focus exclusively on 
whether outside directors are busy under the premise that inside and gray directors sit on the board for 
reasons other than the monitoring of management.” We believe that, functions of different type board 
members are what matters, rather than labels used to categorize them. As we discussed before, in our 
sample, the partners of LBO sponsors on portfolio companies substitute for the independent directors, in 
terms of monitoring. Thus, not only the independent directors, but also the LBO sponsor partners sit on 
boards of sample firms for monitoring duties. Therefore, we also present results for the alternative 
definition of “more effective directors”. 
Based on the argument above, we present our findings using a new busyness definition. If an 
independent director, or a director who is also a partner of the LBO sponsor sits on the boards of 3 or more 
public firms, she is considered as a busy directors. The definition of a busy board stays unchanged. We are 
more concerned about the monitoring of “more effective monitors” sitting on multiple boards, rather than 
how we should label them. The findings are presented in Table 7. Panel A presents the average number of 
“more effective directors” who are busy directors, whereas Panel B presents the percentages of board 
members who are busy directors. Again, in contrast to the figures in Table 6, the fraction of busy directors 
on sample firms’ boards is significantly higher compared to firms in the control group. At the time of the 
IPO, 37.81 % of directors are busy for the sample firms and this fraction increases to 40.90 % in the 
following two years. On the other hand, 31.33 % of board members of control firms are busy at time t, and 
it increases to 34 % in the following two years. Lastly, Panel C shows the percentage of boards that are 
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busy among sample and control firms. 35 % of the sample firms have busy boards at the time of the IPO, 
for the sample firms. In the next two years, this ratio increases to 39 %. For the control firms, in the same 
time span, 26 % of boards are busy, which increases to 32 % eventually.  
Based on these findings, this time, we are unable to reject the hypotheses H18,A and H19,A. The 
findings do not support the argument that busy directors and boards would not perform their monitoring 
functions effectively. The directors, who are on the board for monitoring functions, would perform their 
monitoring functions effectively. Another interpretation would be that even if monitoring functions get 
affected negatively by director and board busyness, the benefits associated with the existence of these 
directors and boards would outweigh the potential costs and thus they are preferred by LBO specialists, 
consistent with the argument of Field et al. (2011) about IPO firms. 
Panel D of Table 7 shows average number of directorships held by all board members, including 
inside directors, of sample and control firms. Both at the time of the IPO and in the following two years, 
sample firms’ directors hold significantly more directorships than the directors of control firms, on average. 
In addition, in untabulated results, we observe that, among independent directors only, 50 % of directors 
are busy at the time of the IPO, for the sample firms, whereas 43 % of independent directors are busy for 
the firms in the control group. 
Before we conclude this section, we would like to discuss the importance of appointment of inside 
directors to outside boards for the sending firm. The arguments about the potential benefits and costs of 
busy directors we discussed so far, would also apply to inside directors. However, these directors are also 
expected to perform other important duties at the firm as executive officers, rather than performing solely 
monitoring functions. As Perry and Peyer (2005) argue, executives who hold multiple board seats might not 
be productive for their primary employing firms. They find negative announcement returns in firms with 
greater agency problems, when their executives accept an outside board appointment. On the other hand, 
when the firms have less agency problems, the appointment leads to an increase in firm value. When we 
investigate the board appointments of inside directors for the sample and control firms, the findings suggest 
that the inside directors of sample firms hold significantly less outside directorships, compared to the inside 
directors of firms in the control group. At the time of the IPO, inside directors of the sample firms hold 1.36 
board seats on average, which increases to 1.44 seats in the following two years. On the other hand, inside 
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directors of control firms hold 1.54 board seats at time t, which increases to 1.62 seats in the following two 
years (results not tabulated here). These findings suggest that portfolio firms of LBO sponsors have inside 
directors with less board appointments, probably due to productivity concerns, which are more important 
for executive officers, compared to other directors who are on the boards for monitoring purposes, but not 
as executive officers of the firm. 
 
3.2.10. Results for Board Committees 
Our findings regarding the structure of the board committees are presented in Table 9. To derive 
these findings, we used the independence definitions provided by the firms in their proxies. SEC gives the 
firms the freedom to classify directors as independent while imposing the requirements about committee 
members’ independence. Thus, we believe it is more appropriate to use the independence classifications 
provided by the firms. One issue that should also be considered is that SEC does not require controlled 
firms to have independent compensation and nominating committees. And as presented in Table 2, panel C, 
majority of the sample firms are controlled firms, compared to the firms in the control group. 
Panel A in Table 9 shows the number of total directors on the compensation committee and Panel 
D in Table 9 shows the fraction of independent directors on the compensation committees, which is our 
main focus in this section. At the time of the IPO, 92 % of the committee members are independent 
directors for the sample firms. This ratio increases to 94 % in the following two years. For the firms in the 
control group, approximately 97 % of the committee members are independent directors for the same time 
span. Even though control firms have statistically more independent directors on their compensation 
committees, we still would like to highlight the ratio of independent directors on compensation committees 
for both groups. Based on these findings, we are not able to reject the hypothesis H20,A. 
Next, we present our findings regarding the audit committees in sample and control firms. Panel B 
in Table 9 shows the number of total directors on the audit committee of the sample firms. On the other 
hand, Panel E in Table 9 shows the fraction of independent members on the audit committees. At the time 
of the IPO, 94 % of the committee members are independent for the sample firms, which increase to 97 % 
in the following two years. In the same time horizon, approximately 98 % of the committee members are 
independent directors for the control firms. The fraction of independent director on the audit committees is 
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not significantly different for the sample and control firms, except for year t. More important is the finding 
that almost all members of the audit committees are independent directors for both groups. In untabulated 
results, we also observe the fraction of audit committees which include at least one financial expert. 
Around 55 % of the firms in the control group have at least one independent financial expert on the 
committee, whereas the same figure is 75 % for the firms in the sample. Based on these findings we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis H21,A. 
 Lastly, we present our findings regarding directors on nominating committees. Panel C of Table 9 
shows the total number of directors on the nominating committees of the sample firms, on average. In terms 
of the fraction of independent directors on nominating committees, Panel f of Table 9 shows that the 
sample firms appoint around 92 % to 94 % of their nominating committee members from independent 
directors. For the control firms, the figures are very similar. Based on these findings, we are not able to 
reject the hypothesis H22,A. 
One last issue is the percentages of firms that do not have nominating committees standing. 
Compared to Panel D and E, we can observe that the number of firms with a nominating committee are not 
as high as those with the other two committees. This is due to the sample period we cover. As Linck et al. 
(2008) state, most of the firms, especially small and medium sized firms, did not have nominating 
committee before the Sarbanes-Oxley.  
Overall, our findings are consistent with the arguments that board committees should be 
comprised of independent directors. It appears that the benefits of the independence of committee members 
outweigh the costs, which should not be very significant intuitively. Thus, the independence of committee 
members, in addition to the existence of a financial expert to the audit committee are preferred by LBO 
specialists in their portfolio firms. Therefore, the legal requirements regarding these issues have a valid 
stand point. 
 
 
4. Ownership Structure and LBO Specialists 
The US, a common law country, is considered to be one of the countries with the highest level of 
legal protection for investors. As a result, the ownership structure of public firms in US is mostly widely 
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diffused.  When the shares of firms are diffusely held, the small shareholders may not be able to protect 
their interests by monitoring the management, due to substantial costs. The most significant cost of 
monitoring is the cost of obtaining information. Small investors do not have the resources to obtain enough 
information. In addition, small shareholders are not powerful enough to influence the decisions of 
managers by themselves (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). These might lead to free-riding problems in 
monitoring management. As a result of insufficient monitoring, managers might not act in the best interest 
of the shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
One potential way of overcoming this problem, among other governance mechanisms, would be 
the existence of large shareholders. They have significant investment in the firm, and their wealth is tied to 
the performance and thus, value of the firm. Therefore they would have incentives to conduct more 
effective monitoring of the firm (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990). In addition, large shareholders would 
have better access to information due to their large stakes in the firm (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). More 
effective monitoring, combined with more information, would lead large shareholders to discipline 
management more efficiently. Managers would not have the freedom to pursue their own benefits, at the 
expense of small shareholders. The increased monitoring would lead to increased firm value, which would 
benefit small shareholders, as well. Even, in some cases where they are not satisfied with the actions of the 
management, large shareholders might remove the incumbent managers or even initiate a takeover (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986). Based on these arguments about the importance of ownership structure in firms, in this 
section, we investigate ownership structure, including blockholder, LBO sponsor, managerial and CEO 
ownership. 
 
4.1. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
4.1.1. Blockholder Ownership 
As we just discussed, a potential mechanism to reduce the costs of agency conflict is the existence 
of larger shareholders. These large shareholders are commonly called blockholders. Even though US stock 
markets are characterized with wide diffuse ownership, still the existence of blockholders is not rare. Most 
of the public firms in US have blockholders (Holderness, 2009, Clifford and Lindsey, 2011). 
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 Blockholders would potentially monitor management in a manner that would affect firm value 
positively because they have greater resources to monitor compared to small shareholders and their wealth 
is tied to the value of the firm, which would provide incentives to initiate a takeover if they believe that the 
company is being managed poorly (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). In addition, they could be involved in 
management as active participants, providing them the opportunity to be involved in important 
management decisions such as compensation structure (Mehran, 1995). 
 On the other hand, argument of Denis and McConnell (2003) regarding tradeoff between the costs 
and benefits associated with managerial ownership could apply to the ownership by blockholders. Up to a 
certain point,  blockholders would be beneficial for the shareholders. However, beyond a certain point, they 
might become more involved in pursuing their own interests at the expense of other shareholders, once they 
become too powerful. They might use their power to expropriate corporate wealth, which would affect firm 
value negatively (Loderer and Martin, 1997). 
Another argument about blockholders is that their potential positive effect might depend on the 
existence of other governance mechanisms and issues, such as takeover vulnerability and market for 
corporate control (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Also, it should be kept in mind that all blockholders do not 
necessarily have the same affects on various corporate issues. Their effects might depend on size of their 
shareholdings, board membership and direct management involvement (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). 
 Among the empirical findings of some of the studies related to blockholders are: (i) no significant 
relationship between blockholder shareholdings are firm performance (McConnell and Servaes, 1990, 
Loderer and Martin, 1997), (ii) improved firm performance associated with the existence of active and high 
incentive blockholders (Clifford and Lindsey, 2011), and (iii) increased value associated with the existence 
of independent directors who are blockholders (Agrawal and Nasser, 2012).  
In addition, there are various studies that show that the existence of blockholders would also affect 
the compensation structure (Mehran, 1995, Core et al., 1999 and Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Also, 
Shivdasani (1993) show that the existence of blockholders could initiate takeovers. In addition, Denis et al. 
(1997) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that the existence of blockholders could affect the probability 
of top executive turnover. 
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 Lastly, there are arguments suggesting that blockholders might have an effect through their trading 
of firm’s stocks. They can effect management towards taking efficient investment projects, due to their 
informed trading. More importantly, they can influence management to take investment projects that would 
increase firm value in the long run, even if this means decreased interim profits. This can help reduce the 
problems associated with management myopia (Edmans and Manso, 2011). Bharath et al. (2010) provide 
evidence in support of this argument. Also, Edmans and Manso (2011) predict that it is not only the total 
share ownership of all the blockholders together that is important, but also the number of blockholders in 
the firm. Consistent with this argument, Gallagher et al. (2011) find that multiple blockholders are effective 
in disciplining management through their informed trading. 
Based on these arguments and prior evidence, our hypotheses are: 
H23,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer high ownership stakes by blockholders. 
H23,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer high ownership stakes by blockholders. 
 
4.1.2. LBO Specialist Ownership 
Next we discuss the existence and share ownership by LBO specialists. In leveraged buyouts, 
LBO specialists take public firms private, mainly with the goal of achieving operational efficiencies. These 
operational efficiencies are usually achieved through active involvement of LBO specialists in 
management, themselves. However, active involvement in management is not the only typical behavior of 
LBO specialists. LBO specialists also own a significant fraction of equity in their portfolio firms, which 
gives them the power to be involved in management. Due to high levels of equity ownership in portfolio 
firms, their shareholdings are considered as blockholdings as well. Therefore, the arguments about the 
potential benefits and costs associated with the existence of blockholders do naturally apply to the 
shareholdings of LBO specialists. However, blockholders do not necessarily have to be actively involved in 
firm’s operations. But LBO specialists are actively involved in management. Thus, they have greater power  
to influence the actions of management, compared to any blockholder. And the monitoring by LBO 
specialists would affect the consequences more directly.  
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In addition, Barry et al.’s (1990) argument about venture capitalist involvement in IPOs would 
naturally apply to the case of LBO specialists. Diffused small shareholders would want to know that their 
interests are being protected when they buy shares of a company. The expertise and experience of these 
LBO specialists in monitoring, in addition to efficient restructuring, would send important signals to the 
potential shareholders when they take portfolio firms public. Also, maintaining their equity stake in the 
firm at the time of the IPO, LBO specialists could make this signal more reliable. LBO specialists would 
want to exit eventually. Their marginal productivity would be higher if they deploy their skills in new 
firms, after restructuring of the current firm is completed. Still, they would be expected to keep a 
significant equity stake in the portfolio firm at the time of the IPO and then exit gradually (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1987) due to the signals that their involvement gives to the market. 
Without repeating the potential benefits related with the existence of blockholders, briefly we can 
state that the effects of monitoring would be the most important consideration. Due to their large equity 
ownerships of the portfolio firms, LBO specialists would have the incentives to monitor management 
effectively (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987). On the other hand, one could argue that LBO specialists 
would consider their wealth above other considerations. This might be associated with potential corporate 
wealth expropriation by the specialists. However, these specialists have their reputations as successful 
entities in corporate restructuring. And the amount of resources they need to take firms private in the first 
place depends on this reputation. Thus they would be willing to keep their reputations as successful 
monitors, which lead to successful restructuring. Thus the benefits of monitoring would be expected to 
outweigh the potential costs of increased power by blockholders. As a result, we would expect the 
involvement of LBO specialists in the firm at the time of the IPO to lead to increased firm value. 
Based on these arguments, our hypotheses are: 
H24,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer to hold high ownership stakes in portfolio firms. 
H24,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer to hold high ownership stakes in portfolio firms. 
H25,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer to be actively involvement in portfolio firms. 
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H25,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer to be actively involvement in portfolio firms. 
 
4.1.3. Managerial Ownership 
Ownership by Top Executives and Board Members 
In addition to the ownership by large blockholders, ownership by top executives and members of 
the board of directors is one of the most investigated subjects in corporate governance. One of the main 
concerns of the costs of agency conflicts is the conflict between the interests of managers and other 
shareholders. Management does not necessarily have to act in the best interest of other shareholders. Even 
though board of directors is an important internal governance mechanism to monitor management in an 
attempt to decrease the levels of this conflict, members of the board might become more influenced by the 
CEO. In addition, potential free-riding problems among board members would lead to these directors not 
performing their monitoring and advisory functions effectively. In this situation, some governance 
mechanisms are needed to align the interest of the two parties.  
One potential remedy would be managerial ownership, following the arguments in Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). As the ownership fraction of management increases, managers would be affected by the 
consequence of their actions to a greater degree, in addition to a greater incentive to monitor the CEO more 
effectively (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999, Huson et al., 2001). In addition, high managerial ownership 
would also give the signal to minority shareholders that management would take actions that would 
increase the value of their shareholdings, since the managers themselves have stakes in the firm 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2009). 
In addition to a greater alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders, some of the other 
potential effects of managerial ownership on various corporate issues would be listed as: (i) decreased need 
for more monitoring by independent directors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, Linck et al., 2008, Field et 
al., 2011), (ii) decreased probability of financial fraud (Beasley, 1996), (iii) decreased likelihood of 
removal of managers due to increased entrenchment (Stulz, 1988, Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991, Denis et 
al., 1997), (iv) effects on the behavior of potential bidders and the likelihood of receiving bids in case of 
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takeovers (Stulz, 1988), (v) effects on compensation structure (Mehran, 1995), and (vi) effects on risk 
taking behavior of the firm (Wright et al., 1996). 
Based on all these arguments, we can easily suggest that managerial ownership would have some 
significant effects on firm performance and value. This is probably the most commonly investigated issue 
in ownership structure literature. The findings are mostly parallel especially in the early decades. 
Researchers mostly agree on a hump shaped relationship between managerial ownership and Q. As 
managerial ownership increases up to a certain point, Q is positively affected by it. However, beyond a 
certain point, Q starts to decrease (Stulz, 1988, Morck et al., 1988, McConell and Servaes, 1990, Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991). However some of the findings of these studies are criticized for potential 
endogenetiy problems by Loderer and Martin (1997), and Himmelberg et al. (1999). On the other hand, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2012) find a positive relationship between director ownership and firm performance. 
Based on these findings, it could be suggested that there would be a potential tradeoff between the benefits 
and costs, especially in the form of entrenchment, of managerial ownership (Denis and McConnell, 2003).  
Based on these arguments and prior findings, our hypotheses are: 
H26,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer high levels of managerial ownership. 
H26,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer high levels of managerial ownership. 
 
Ownership by the CEO 
The arguments about the potential benefits and costs of managerial ownership by top executives 
and directors would naturally apply to the effects of CEO ownership. In addition, issues related to the 
power of the CEO, especially her influence on board members and board composition, and the removal of 
the CEO following poor performance would be of concern when discussing CEO ownership. 
Just like other managers, when the CEO has an ownership stake in the firm, she bears the 
consequences of her decisions, whether positive or negative, more directly. Her wealth is tied to the 
outcome of her actions in a tighter manner. Thus, it is probably the most important managerial incentive 
existing (Leslie and Oyer, 2009). Therefore, one would expect her to be willing to act in such a manner that 
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would lead to better performance and increased firm value. This would be in the benefit of other 
shareholders, as well. Also, in corporate decision making process, the CEO probably has the most 
influence. Thus, the effects of managerial ownership would be most significant in the case of CEO 
ownership (Kim and Lu, 2011). 
On the other hand, as the CEO holds more of the outstanding shares, she would become more 
powerful (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999, Denis et al, 1997). One potential effect of increased power 
would be on board composition. As discussed earlier, powerful CEOs would tend to have more insiders on 
the board. However the change in board composition might also be a result of decreased need for 
monitoring. As the CEO’s ownership increases, the need for more monitoring would decrease since the 
interests of the CEO and other shareholders are expected to be better aligned. As a result, the fraction of the 
outsiders on the board would decrease (Weisbach, 1988, Linck et al., 2008). This would lead to even 
greater power, leading to the potential to expropriate corporate wealth. However, increased power due to 
increased shareholdings would not be expected to lead to wealth expropriation by the CEO, due to her 
wealth being tied to firm performance. Still, it would be a valid concern if the private benefits of 
expropriation would outweigh the benefits gained through the increase in firm value. Another consequence 
of increased CEO power would be observed in CEO removal process. When the CEO becomes more 
powerful, she would be harder to remove, following poor performance (Weisbach, 1988, Denis et al., 
1997). In addition, as the CEO becomes more powerful, this could potentially affect the compensation 
structure and risk taking behavior of the CEO (Kim and Lu, 2011). 
Based on these arguments, one would expect a trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
increased CEO shareholdings. Some level of CEO ownership would align the interests of her and other 
shareholders better, leading to increased firm value. However, beyond a certain point, it might have a 
negative effect on firm value. Consistent with this argument, Kim and Lu (2011) find a hump shaped 
relationship between CEO ownership and Q. 
Based on these arguments and prior findings, our hypotheses are: 
H27,0: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would not prefer high levels of CEO ownership. 
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H27,A: LBO specialists that are expected to employ optimal governance mechanisms in their 
portfolio firms at the time of the IPO would prefer high levels of CEO ownership. 
 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Results for Blockholder Ownership 
Our findings are presented in Table 8, panel C. Blockholders hold a very significant amount of 
equity stake in the firm, before the RLBO. 86 % of the shares are held by blockholders in the firm. At the 
time of the IPO, the fraction of shares held by blockholders decreases to 55 %, for the sample firms. In the 
following two years, it decreases to 50 %. On the other hand, the fraction of shares held by blockholders is 
significantly less in the same time span, for the control firms. At time t, 37 %of the shares are held by 
blockholders, whereas in the next two years, this fraction is around 33 %. Based on these findings and our 
main hypothesis (H1), we are unable to reject the hypothesis H23,A. Potentially, the benefits of blockholders’ 
through increased monitoring, decreased entrenchment by management, discipline on management and 
active involvement in management outweigh the potential costs associated with blockholders and this could 
lead to increased value. 
Indeed, the findings are affected by the significant shareholdings of LBO sponsors in the firms, 
which are presented in Table 10. The LBO specialists hold 43 % of the fraction of the shares at the time of 
the IPO and their shareholdings gradually decrease to 30 % in the following two years. Still, this would not 
necessarily affect the interpretations. In addition, in untabulated results, we observe that at the time of the 
IPO, the average number of blockholders is approximately 2 for the sample firms, which increases to 3 in 
the following two years. Thus, even though the shareholdings of LBO specialists decrease after the IPO, 
still more blockholders start to hold shares of the firm and the fraction of shareholdings by blockholders is 
still substantially high following the IPO. 
Also, it should be kept in mind that the main argument about the existence of blockhodlers is the 
trade-off between the costs and benefits, which are active monitoring versus corporate wealth 
expropriation. Based on these findings, we can suggest that the benefits of the existence of blockholders 
outweigh the potential costs and thus LBO specialists prefer to have blockholders with substantial 
shareholdings in portfolio firms, at the time of the IPO. 
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4.2.2. Results for LBO Specialist Ownership 
Our findings regarding LBO specialists are presented in Table 10. Before the IPO, LBO specialists 
hold 67 % of the shares of the RLBO firm, on average. At the time of the IPO, this fraction drops to almost 
44 %. In the following two years, it decreases to 30 %. These figures are consistent with the argument that 
LBO specialists hold a significant amount of equity stake in their portfolio companies. It is also consistent 
with the view that, even at the time of the IPO and the following years, LBO specialists continue holding a 
substantial amount of the shares of the firm. This would give the expected signal to the other potential 
shareholders. Based on the evidence, we are not able to reject the hypothesis H24,A. 
On the other hand, panel B of Table 10 shows that at the time of the IPO, on average, 2.88 
members of the LBO specialist sit on the board of the RLBO firm. This figure decreases to an average of 
2.35 members in the following two years. On the other hand, the proportion of LBO specialist board 
members to the total number of board members is 40 % at the time of the IPO, which decreases to 29 % in 
the following two years. These findings are consistent with the argument that LBO specialists are actively 
involved in management even after couple years following the IPO. Based on these findings, we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis H25,A. 
 Overall, based on our main hypothesis (H1) and these findings, it could be argued that both active 
involvement in management and high equity ownership are preferred by LBO specialists in portfolio firms. 
 
4.2.3. Results for Managerial Ownership 
Ownership of Top Executives and Board Members 
Our findings are presented in Table 8, panel D. Before the IPO, management including the 
members of the board of directors own 58 % of the shares for the sample firms. At the time of the IPO, this 
fraction decreases to 41 %. In continues to decrease in the next two years to a level of 32 %. On the other 
hand, managerial ownership is 21 % for the control firms in year t, which is 18 % and 16 % in the 
following two years. Managerial ownership is significantly lower for the control firms. Based on these 
findings and our main hypothesis (H1), we are not able to reject the hypothesis H26,A. 
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The figures are not inconsistent with previous findings that as managerial ownership increases, 
firm value would increase as well. However, we do not test for to what levels the value increase would 
continue. Still, our figures do not contradict the levels suggested by McConnell and Sarvaes (1990). 
The high levels of managerial ownership that our sample firms carry is an outcome of the 
ownership represented by LBO specialists who are on the boards of the sample firms. Thus, we also check 
for managerial ownership by directors who are not related to LBO specialists in untabulated results. What 
we observe is that before the IPO, these managers own 15 % of the shares, whereas they own 10 % of the 
shares at the time of the IPO, and 10 % and 8 % of the shares in the following two years. These ownership 
stakes are significantly lower than the managerial ownership levels in the control firms.  
Our findings suggest greater levels of managerial ownership by all the managers and board 
members, and lower levels of ownership by managers and directors who are not related to LBO specialists. 
We believe that the appropriate way to comment about these findings is in a way that considers the benefits 
and costs related to managerial ownership and also increased monitoring by LBO specialists, as active 
institutional investors. One can argue that possibly due to potential entrenchment costs, the levels of 
ownership by most managers and directors are kept at lower levels compared to other public firms. In 
addition, majority of the shares are owned by management related to LBO specialists, for whom 
entrenchment concerns would not be pronounced significantly since their involvement in management is an 
outcome of active involvement by the specialists. The specialist related managers and directors would not 
have the freedom to pursue their own interests even at high levels of ownership since they are agents 
pursuing the benefits of LBO specialists in the first place. Thus the costs of entrenchment would probably 
not exist. Based on this argument we can suggest that managerial ownership would lead to increased firm 
value as long as entrenchment related costs are kept under control. Thus, public firms should consider the 
potential trade-off between the benefits of managerial ownership and the costs related to entrenchment. As 
long as entrenchment is taken under control, probably through other complementary governance 
mechanisms, increased managerial ownership would increase value for these firms. 
Before we conclude this subsection, we would like to highlight one important issue, which is 
important while discussing the executive compensation or RLBO firms and control firms. In untabulated 
results, we analyze the composition of managerial ownership in greater detail. What we observe is that top 
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executives of RLBO firms, who are not board members own approximately 2 % of the outstanding shares 
of the firms in the 3 years following the IPO, whereas the non-board members executives of control firms 
approximately 3 % of the outstanding shares. These results will be helpful when we discuss the executive 
compensation and compare it for sample and control firms. 
 
CEO Ownership 
Our results regarding CEO ownership are presented in Table 8, panel E. CEO ownership is around 
a level of 7 % for the sample firms, before the IPO. It decreases to a level of 4 % at the time of the IPO and 
stays around this level in the following two years. On the other hand, the CEOs of control firms in the same 
time span hold around 5 % to 6 % of the shares. Their ownership levels are higher at 95 % confidence level 
at the time of the IPO, and only at 90 % level in the following two years. Still, CEO ownership is not at a 
level of 0 % or not at very high levels. Based on these figures, we can suggest that equity ownership by the 
CEO would be beneficial for firms in terms of aligning the benefits of CEOs and other shareholders. 
However, potential entrenchment problem would incur some costs and this would be harmful for firm 
value. Thus, the entrenchment potential should be kept in mind while considering CEO ownership. Based 
on this findings and the potential trade-off, we can reject the hypothesis H27,A. 
 
 
5. Executive Compensation 
In this section, we discuss the composition of the executive compensation packages and how its 
each component could affect firm value, through the incentives provided to the managers. 
 
5.1. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Executive compensation is among the most important incentive mechanisms that could lead to the 
alignment of management’s and shareholders’ incentives, if designed properly. Therefore, not only its 
levels, but also its composition is very important. Executive compensation is usually composed of 4 main 
parts as the base salary, bonuses, stock options including restricted shares, and long term incentive plans 
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(Murphy, 1999, Bebchuk et al., 2002). Other components of the total compensation are usually relatively 
smaller compared to these components. 
Base salary is the fixed portion of the compensation. Annual bonus is usually offered based on one 
year’s performance, specifically accounting performance as the performance measure. Long term incentive 
plans are reward systems that are somewhat similar to annual bonuses. They provide pay to the executives 
based on three to five years performance (Murphy, 1999). Restricted stocks are the stocks given to the 
executives, which cannot be fully transferred until some pre-specified conditions are met. Stock options 
give the executives the right to buy a pre-specified amount of stocks at a pre-determined price within a 
certain time. The executive benefits from the stock price increases. Their fair value is usually determined 
by using the Black-Scholes formula. Other, less significant, components are the non equity incentive plan, 
change in pension value and nonqualified deferred compensation earnings and all other compensation.  
Jensen and Murphy (1990b) argue that compensation packages should be designed in such a 
manner that it should provide proper incentives for superior performance and penalties for poor 
performance. However, as risk averse individuals, managers would prefer to have their compensation in a 
rather fixed form (Mehran, 1995), which would not necessarily lead to maximized shareholder value.  
On the other hand, annual bonus is usually offered based on one year’s performance and is 
determined based on accounting performance as the performance measure. This would provide the 
managers with the incentives to take actions leading to increased firm value that would benefit 
shareholders. The main advantages they provide are: (i) management knows what creates value, and (ii) 
immediate cash awards could potentially motivate executives better, compared to some distant and 
uncertain gains. However, bonuses based on accounting performance are usually criticized for creating 
short-run goals, which could mean sacrificing long-run profitability and value creation. Also, accounting 
profits might easily be manipulated and managers could be motivated to act in an unethical manner 
(Murphy, 1999, Jensen and Murphy, 2004). On the other hand, long term incentive plans are designed to 
improve long-term performance.  
The main components of top executive compensation that would provide incentives for superior 
performance are restricted stock awards and stock option grants. Murphy (1999) shows that pay 
performance sensitivity is associated mainly with stock options and stock ownership of executives, 
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compared to other components of compensation. They tie the compensation of executives to the 
performance of the firm in a more direct manner than bonuses. The resulting decreased conflicts of benefits 
between managers and shareholders would lead to an increased firm value (Core et al., 2003). Mehran 
(1995) finds a positive relationship between the fraction of equity based compensation and firm 
performance. 
The most important property of restricted stock awards and stock option grants is the way they 
affect the attitudes of executives towards risk-taking. However, when the managers’ wealth is tied to the 
performance of the firm in a linear manner, risk averse managers could have the motivation not to 
undertake risky, positive NPV projects. A potential remedy would be convex compensation contracts, 
which could be provided by option-like compensation (Core et al., 2003, Coles et al., 2006). Coles et al. 
(2006) provide evidence in support of this argument. 
The risk reward relationship created as a result of granting stock options could also be beneficial 
for firms, in terms of attracting relatively more skilled executives. Also, these options are valuable in terms 
of keeping skilled executives at the firm, due to the structure of options grants. These skilled executives 
stay with the firm until they can exercise the options (Core et al., 2003, Jensen and Murphy, 2004). 
On the other hand, there are some concerns about increased risk taking by executives, as a result 
of the compensation structure. The stock options held by executives might motivate them to take sub-
optimal risks (Lund and Polsky, 2011). Based on this argument, Landskroner and Raviv (2011) suggest that 
excessive risk taking by financial institutions was one of the reasons of the most recent financial crisis.  
Another concern is the measurement of performance of individual executives and how much of an 
effect they have on the outcomes (Baker et al., 1988). The difficulty of determining how much a manager 
has contributed could lead to some free-riding problems. In addition, the positive wealth gains achieved due 
to stock option grants are not necessarily an outcome of the executives’ superior performance (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002)  
One other concern is about the degree of sensitivity of pay to performance. Low and improper pay 
performance sensitivity would not discourage executives from extracting private benefits effectively 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). As the sensitivity of executives’ pay to firm performance increases, the interests of 
executives and shareholders would be expected to be better aligned (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a, Shleifer 
108 
 
 
and Vishny, 1997, Denis and McConnell, 2003). In addition, Efendi et al. (2007) provide evidence that is 
suggestive that when compensation package of the executives includes stock based incentives, this might 
motivate the executives to increase short term prices, through earnings management. 
On the other hand, there are arguments about how compensation structure is determined and how 
CEO power could be effective in its design. Unlike the optimal contracting approach, the managerial power 
approach to executive compensation focuses on the CEO’s power in influencing her compensation. CEOs 
could stay on the compensation committee or influence the members of the compensation committee, as 
well as board members (Yermack, 1997, Jensen and Murphy, 2004). The power of the CEO over the 
compensation committee and the board could give her the opportunity to increase the value of her 
compensation, while lowering risk, especially through timing of stock option awards. However, 
opportunistic timing of option grants could be achieved by not only the CEO, but also by other executives 
(Yermack, 1997). Another argument about the power is that the limits of executive power over 
compensation packages would potentially depend on the existence of other governance mechanisms in the 
firm (Jensen and Murphy, 2004). Various studies provide evidence in support of this argument (Core et al., 
1999, Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
  The last issue we discuss in this subsection is excessive pay arguments, which is one of the most 
debated topics by academicians and practitioners. Jensen and Murphy (2004) criticize the grant of stock 
options and restricted stocks, since they are offered to executives without a proper offset such as reductions 
in other forms of compensation. Thus, these options and stocks become free to grant. This potentially leads 
to excessively paid executives. On the other hand, Kaplan (2008) argues that these critics are not correct. 
He argues that CEO pay is determined by the market mostly and that CEOs are not overpaid. In addition, 
Kaplan argues that CEOs are actually paid for performance. Firms of CEOs with the highest actual pay 
levels do outperform other firms. Similarly, firms of CEOs with the lowest actual pay do underperform the 
industry. Consistent with these arguments, Gao et al. (2012) argue that CEOs in US are not overpaid, based 
on a comparison between public and private firms in US. Conyon et al. (2011) show that CEOs in US have 
higher compensation and incentives compared to CEOs in UK. The difference in pay is mainly accounted 
for by the differences in risk premiums. After adjusting for risk, the pay of US CEOs is not consistently 
higher than those in UK. Results are similar for other EU countries. 
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Based on the observation that the main components of total compensation are salary, bonus and 
option grants, and based on the prior literature and findings, out hypotheses are: 
H28,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a lower fraction of total executive compensation in the 
form of annual salary. 
H28,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a lower fraction of total executive compensation in the form 
of annual salary. 
H29,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a higher fraction of total executive compensation in the 
form of bonuses. 
H29,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a higher fraction of total executive compensation in the form 
of bonuses. 
H30,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a higher fraction of total executive compensation in the 
form of option grants. 
H30,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a higher fraction of total executive compensation in the form 
of option grants. 
H31,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a lower fraction of total CEO compensation in the form of 
annual salary. 
H31,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a lower fraction of total CEO compensation in the form of 
annual salary. 
H32,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a higher fraction of total CEO compensation in the form 
of bonuses. 
H32,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a higher fraction of total CEO compensation in the form of 
bonuses. 
H33,A,: LBO specialists would not prefer a higher fraction of total CEO compensation in the form 
of option grants. 
H33,0,: LBO specialists would prefer a higher fraction of total CEO compensation in the form of 
option grants. 
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5.2. Results for Executive Compensation 
In this subsection, we present evidence regarding the compensation package of both top executives 
together and for the CEO separately. The figures are in 2008 dollars adjusted by using CPI, which is the 
cutoff date for our sample data. The data format and components of compensation reported by companies 
in their proxies changed following 2006. Thus we report compensation findings for firm-year observations 
before 2006, since the number of observations is relatively small after that period. Total compensation is 
reported as following its description in ExecuComp dataset. The details are discussed in the appendix B in 
greater detail.  
Table 24 presents total compensation and its components for top executives in 2008 dollars. In the 
year of the IPO, on average, top executives of sample firms are paid $ 1,665K in salary, $ 1,719K in 
bonuses, $ 497K as part of other annual compensation, $ 342K in restricted stock awards, $ 174K in long 
term incentive plans and $ 657K as part of all other compensation. In addition, the present value of stock 
options granted in that year is $ 4,130K and $ 8,690K, when 5 % and 10 % are used as risk free rate, 
consecutively. The value of total compensation is $ 9,183K and $ 13,743K, when 5 % and 10 % are used in 
option valuations, consecutively. On the other hand, the top executives of the control firms are paid $ 
1,572K in salary, $ 994K in bonuses, $ 97K as part of other annual compensation, $ 555K in restricted 
stock awards, $ 69K in long term incentive plans and $ 265K as part of all other compensation. The present 
value of stock options granted is $ 4,580K and $ 10,746K, when 5 % and 10 % are employed in Black-
Scholes estimates, consecutively. With these estimates, the value of total compensation adds up to $ 
8,132K when 5 % is used, and $ 14,298K when 10 % is used in Black-Scholes method. The total 
compensation levels are not significantly different from each other for the sample and control groups, in the 
year following the IPO. However, the level of compensation in the form of bonuses is significantly higher 
for the sample firms. In addition, the levels of other annual compensation and all other compensation are 
higher for the sample firms, at 90 % levels.  
In the following year, the levels of the components of top executive pay show a similar pattern. In 
terms of the total pays, the value of total compensation, including stock option grants, is $ 8,071K and $ 
13,407K, when 5 % and 10 % are used in estimations, consecutively, for the sample firms. On the other 
hand, the value of total compensation for the control firms is $ 7,406K and $ 12,102K when 5 % and 10 % 
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are used in Black-Scholes method, consecutively. In this year, the values of total compensation are again 
insignificantly different from each other, for sample and control firms. On the other hand, among the 
individual components of the compensation package, only the level of bonuses is higher for the sample 
firms, at 90 % level. 
Finally, in the last year we investigate, once again, the levels of the components of top executive 
pay show a similar pattern. The value of total compensation for the sample firms is $ 8,644K and $ 
14,191K, when 5 % and 10 % are used in Black-Scholes estimations, consecutively. On the other hand, the 
value of total compensation is $ 8,621K and $ 15,220K when 5 % and 10 % are used in Black-Scholes 
method, consecutively, for the control firms. Once again, the levels of total compensation are not 
significantly different between the sample and control firms. In addition, none of the components of the 
compensation package are higher for any group, compared to the other. 
The findings so far show that in none of the three years following the IPO, are the top executives 
of the sample firms receive significantly more or less total compensation, compared to the top executives of 
the control firms. In other words, the top executives of other public firms are not paid more than the 
executives of RLBO firms, which are assumed to be structured in an optimal governance manner. 
However, our evidence in section IV suggests that managerial ownership in sample firms is substantially 
high. Thus, one might argue that, these individuals are rather compensated through high ownership in the 
sample firms. However, the high managerial ownership in sample firms is mainly driven by ownership of 
directors; not non-director executives. The non-board member executives of sample firms hold 
approximately 2 % of the shares in RLBO firms, in the 3 years following the IPO, whereas the non-board 
member executives of control firms hold approximately 3 % of the outstanding shares in the same time 
span. Thus we cannot argue that executives are not compensated only through the components of executive 
compensation, but also through their ownership stakes in the firm. Therefore, our evidence could be 
considered while discussing whether executives in US are excessively paid or not. 
On the other hand, some of the individual components of the compensation package differ 
between sample and control firms. However, Jensen and Murphy (1990b) argue that the most serious 
concern about top executive compensation should not be whether they are paid excessively, but rather how 
they are paid. Thus, the fraction of each component in the total compensation, rather than their levels would 
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be more explanatory. We present our findings regarding the proportion of each component to the total 
compensation next. 
Table 12 presents the composition of total compensation for top executives. In the year of the IPO, 
32 % of total compensation for the executives in the sample firms is base salary. 22 % is bonuses, 3 % is 
other annual compensation, 2 % is restricted stock awards and long term incentive plans each, 5 % all other 
compensation and 33 % the present value of stock option grants, discounted at 5 %. On the other hand, for 
the executives in the control firms, salary is 32 % of total compensation, bonuses 16 %, other annual 
compensation and long term incentives plans 1 % each, restricted stock awards 4 %, all other compensation 
3 % and finally the present value of stock option grants is 40 % when 5 % is used as the risk free rate in 
estimations. Compared to the control firms’, the fraction of executives’ of sample firms is comprised of 
significantly more bonuses and all other compensation, but significantly less option grants. The figures are 
parallel when the present value of stock options are estimated using 10 %, rather than 5 % in the 
calculations, with stock options making up a higher fraction of total compensation for both groups.  
In the following year, the composition of compensation for executives is similar to the year of the 
IPO. In this year, the executives of sample firms receive significantly more proportion of their total 
compensation in the form of bonuses, whereas less as option grants. The fraction of restricted stock awards 
make up for less of total compensation for sample firm, at 90 % level. Finally, in the last year, once again, 
the composition of compensation for executives is similar. In this final year, the executives of sample firms 
still receive significantly higher fraction of their total compensation in the form of bonuses, whereas the 
difference between the present value of stock option grants is significantly different only at 90 % level. 
Based on these findings, we are not able to reject H28,0. However, we are not able the reject the 
null hypothesis either. Thus, the fraction of total compensation in the form of annual salary seems to be 
insignificant. On the other hand, based on the evidence, we are not able to reject the hypothesis H29,0. It 
seems that LBO sponsors prefer their portfolio firms to provide a significantly higher fraction of the 
compensation in the form of bonuses, to their executives, compared to public firms. Lastly, we are able to 
reject the hypothesis H30,0. Compared to the public firms, LBO specialists prefer their portfolio firms to 
provide a lower fraction of their compensation in the form of option grants, to their executives. 
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The findings show that in the three years following the IPO, the top executives of sample firms 
receive a higher fraction of their compensation in the form of bonuses, and a less fraction of their total 
compensation in the form of stock option grants. These findings suggest that firms that LBO specialists 
prefer the firms in their portfolios to offer a compensation structure, in which pay is tied to performance. 
However, despite the potential costs of short run focus by the executives, they prefer annual bonuses to 
provide pay performance sensitivity. Probably due to the concerns regarding the potential costs associated 
with stock options, they provide less of the total compensation in the form of stock option grants. Another 
potential explanation would be that these firms in the sample group have other governance mechanisms, 
such as large blockholders, which could be effective in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. 
These mechanisms could be substituting for the use of stock option grants. However, when we consider the 
fraction of all the components of total compensation that ties pay to performance, it is still reasonable to 
suggest that performance sensitive pay mechanisms would be more beneficial in aligning the interests of 
shareholders and managers, compared to fixed components of the compensation package. 
We next present our findings regarding CEO compensation. Table 13 presents findings for the 
level of total compensation and its components for the CEOs. The CEOs of sample firms, in the year 
following the IPO, on average, earn $ 550K in base salary, whereas they earn $ 893K in bonuses, $ 263K in 
other annual compensation, $ 132K in restricted stock awards, $ 56K in long term incentive plans and $ 
274K in all other compensation. The present value of their stock option grants are $ 1,632K and $ 3,344K 
based on 5 % and 10 % as the risk free rate in the estimations, consecutively. This adds up to a total 
compensation of $ 3,799K and $ 5,511K, consecutively. On the other hand, the CEOs of control firms 
receive, on average, $ 517K in salaries, $ 427K in bonuses, $ 43K as other annual compensation, $ 290K in 
restricted stocks, $ 25K in long term incentive plans and $ 91K in the form of all other compensation. The 
estimated present values of the stock options granted to them, on average, are $ 2,260K and $ 5,335K, 
when 5 % and 10 % are used in Black-Scholes estimates, consecutively. The total compensation they 
receive is $ 3,653K and $ 6,728K, consecutively. As in the case of top executive compensation, the levels 
of total compensation for CEOs in sample and control firms are not significantly different. However, the 
levels of bonuses, other annual compensation and all other compensation are different between the two 
groups. 
114 
 
 
In the following year, the CEOs of sample firms earn $ 563K in base salary, whereas they earn $ 
579K in bonuses, $ 41K in other annual compensation, $ 121K in restricted stock awards, $ 2K in long 
term incentive plans and $ 188K in all other compensation. The estimated present values of stock options 
granted to them are $ 1,730K and $ 3,948K, when 5 % and 10 % are used as the risk free rates in the 
estimations, consecutively. The levels of total compensation are $ 3,223K and $ 5,441K, consecutively. On 
the other hand, the CEOs of control firms receive, on average, $ 521K in salaries, $ 417K as bonuses, $ 
35K in the form of other annual compensation, $ 268K in restricted stock awards, $ 56K in long term 
incentive plans and $ 124K in the form of all other compensation. The present values of the stock options 
granted to them, on average, are estimated as $ 1,322K and $ 2,974K, when 5 % and 10 % are used, 
consecutively. The total compensation they receive is $ 2,743K and $ 4,395 based on these estimations, 
consecutively. Once again, in this year, the levels of total compensation for CEOs in sample and control 
firms are not significantly different either. Only the level of bonuses and long term incentive plans are 
different this time, but only at 10 % level. 
In the final year that we analyze, the CEOs of sample firms, on average, are paid $ 593K in base 
salary, $ 502K in bonuses, $ 33K in other annual compensation, $ 137K in restricted stock awards, $ 15K 
in long term incentives, $ 125K as all other compensation. Their stock option grants in that year are 
estimated to have present values of $ 2,208K and $ 4,701K, based on 5 % and 10 % risk free rates in 
estimations, consecutively. The estimated values of total compensation for the CEOs of sample firms, on 
average, are $ 3,594K and $ 6,068K, consecutively. On the other hand, the CEOs of the firms in the control 
group are paid $ 545K in salaries in that year. They are also paid $ 413K in bonuses, $ 26K in other annual 
compensation, $ 205K in restricted stock awards, $ 87K in long term incentive plans, and $ 77K in all other 
compensation. The present value of their stock option grants are estimated to be $ 2,202K and $ 4,360K, 
leading to a total compensation of $ 3,355K and $ 5,712K, when 5 % and 10 % of risk free rates are used in 
Black-Scholes estimates, consecutively. In this year, neither the total compensation nor any components of 
it are significantly different for the sample firms and the control firms. 
The results are parallel to those for the top executives of the sample and control firms. Once again, 
in none of the three years following the IPO, are the top executives of the sample firms receive significantly 
more or less total compensation, compared to the top executives of the control firms. 
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Next, we present our findings for the composition of CEO compensation, for both groups. The 
main components of CEO compensation for the sample firms, in the year following the IPO are base salary, 
bonuses and the present value of stock option grants, with fractions of 33 %, 26 % and 28 %, consecutively. 
On the other hand, the same components make up of 36 %, 18 % and 36 % of total compensation, for the 
CEOs o control firms. Among these components, the fraction of bonuses is significantly higher for sample 
firm CEOs, and the fraction of stock option grants are significantly lower. In the following year, the same 
components make up the largest portion of total compensation, for both the sample and control firms. For 
the sample firms, base salary, bonuses and the present value of stock option grants present 41 %, 24 % and 
28 % of total compensation, consecutively. On the other hand, they make up 39 %, 16 % and 33 % of total 
compensation for the CEOs of control firms, consecutively. Once again, the CEOs of sample firms receive 
a significantly higher fraction of their compensation in the form of bonuses, compared to control firms. 
However, the fraction of stock option grants of the sample firm CEOs is lower only at 90 % level. The 
figures are similar in the final year, as well. Base salary, bonuses and the present value of stock option 
grants present 37 %, 19 % and 36 % of the total compensation, for the CEOs of sample firms. In the same 
year, the CEOs of control firms receive 38 % of their total compensation in the form of base salaries, 14 % 
in bonuses and 41 % in stock option grants. Again, the CEOs of sample firms receive a significantly higher 
fraction of their compensation in the form of bonuses. Also, the fraction of stock option grants of the 
sample firm CEOs is lower only at 90 % level. 
These figures are estimated based on 5 % as the risk free rate in Black-Scholes option value estimates. The 
figures are similar when 10 % is used in the estimates, with the fraction of stock option grants increasing, 
as a natural outcome. 
Based on these findings, as in the case of executive compensation, we are not able to reject H31,0. 
However, we are not able the reject the null hypothesis either. Thus, the fraction of total compensation in 
the form of annual salary seems to be insignificant. On the other hand, based on the evidence, we are not 
able to reject the hypothesis H32,0. RLBO specialists prefer their portfolio firms to provide a significantly 
higher fraction of their compensation in the form of bonuses, to their CEOs, compared to public firms. 
Lastly, we are able to reject the hypothesis H33,0. Compared to the public firms, sample firms prefer 
providing a lower fraction of their compensation in the form of option grants, to their CEOs. 
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Once again, these figures are parallel to those for the top executive officers of firms for both the 
sample and control groups. The CEOs of sample firms receive a higher fraction of their compensation in 
the form of bonuses, and a less fraction of their total compensation in the form of stock option grants. Thus 
our discussions for the composition of top executive compensation would apply to these findings, as well. 
Overall, our evidence regarding the levels of total compensation for both the top executives as a 
whole, and the CEO by herself, suggests that the top executives and CEOs of RLBO firms do not receive 
significantly higher levels of compensation compared to control firms. In addition, based on the evidence 
presented in the previous section, we cannot argue that executives are not compensated only through the 
components of executive compensation, but also through their ownership stakes in the firm. Therefore, our 
evidence could be considered while discussing whether executives in US are excessively paid or not. On 
the other hand, based on the evidence regarding the composition of compensation packages received by 
both groups, we can suggest that portfolio firms of LBO specialists prefer the majority of executive 
compensation in the form of pay structures which are sensitive to performance. However, while choosing 
among performance sensitive pay incentives, the importance of bonuses should not be overlooked and the 
potential costs of stock option grants should be considered carefully. 
 
 
6. Operating Performance and Stock Performance 
6.1 Data and Methodology 
In order to investigate the value implications of the reverse LBOS sponsored by LBO specialists, 
we investigate the stock performance and operating performance of the firms in our sample, and various 
benchmarks. 
We first investigate the returns following the IPO. All the necessary data for return calculations 
are gathered from CRSP. We calculate two types of returns; cumulative returns, and buy-and-hold returns. 
Both returns are calculated in the same manner as they are calculated commonly in the prior literature. 
However, since there is no stock data available prior to the IPO, rather than calculating abnormal returns by 
utilizing estimation specifications such as CAPM, or Fama-French 3 Factor model, we calculate the raw 
returns. 
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We calculate cumulative and buy-and-hold raw returns for the 1st day of the IPO, and the returns 
in the 1st week, 1st month, 3rd month, 6th year, 1st, 2nd and 3rd years, following the IPO. All the returns are 
calculated using daily stock data. Since there is no price data available for the day before the IPO, the first 
day return is measured from the offer price to the first CRSP listed closing price, following Ritter and 
Welch (2002). 
We calculate both raw cumulative and also raw buy-and-hold returns for the sample firms and 
various benchmarks. The results are presented in Table 15, panels A and B, respectively. The returns for 
the sample firms are the mean returns for the firms in our RLBO sample, over the specified time spans, or 
delisting periods. The returns for the control firms are the mean returns for the firms in our control group, 
over the specified time spans, or delisting periods. We also present the value-weighted returns for the firms 
in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index, the equally-weighted returns for the firms in 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index, the returns for the firms S&P 500 market index. In addition, we 
calculate the industry cumulative returns based on the mean returns for the firms with the same 4 digit SIC 
code as of the matching sample firm. The returns for the benchmarks are compared to the returns for the 
sample firms in terms of statistical significance in Table 15, panels A and B. 
Next we investigate the operating performance measures following the IPO. All the necessary data 
for return calculations are gathered from COMPUSTAT. We calculate the performance measures for the 
sample firms, control firms and for the firms with the same 4 digit SIC code as of the matching sample 
firm, as the industry benchmark. We calculate the measures for the year of the IPO, and the following 3 
years.  
We calculate 4 different measures of performance. OIBDP/Total Assets is calculated as the 
operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Return on Assets is calculated as net income 
divided total assets. Q is the ratio of market-to-book ratio of equity. OIBDP/Total Assets is calculated as 
the operating income before depreciation divided by sales. The performance measures for the sample firms, 
the control firms, and industry benchmarks are presented in Table 16. The measures for the benchmarks are 
compared to the measures for the sample firms in terms of statistical significance. 
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6.2. Results 
Our results regarding stock returns for the sample RLBO firms, following the IPO are presented in 
Table 15. The table presents the results for cumulative and buy-and-hold returns for the sample firms, as 
well as various benchmarks. What we observe in Table 15, panel A are the raw cumulative returns for the 
sample firms and the benchmarks. In the first trading day, when the sample firms’ stocks start trading at the 
stock markets, the average raw cumulative return is 2.05 %. This is significantly higher than the returns for 
the other 5 benchmarks, including the returns for the control firms. The average raw cumulative return for 
the sample firms, in the first week following the IPO is 2.36 %, which is significantly higher than the 
returns for the benchmarks, except for the control firms. In the first month and the three months, following 
the IPO, the average raw cumulative returns for the sample firms are 4.45 % and 8.46 %, respectively. 
These returns are again significantly higher than the returns for the benchmarks, except for the control 
firms. In the six months following the IPO, the average raw cumulative return for the sample firms is 13.27 
%, which is higher than the returns for the other benchmarks, however only significantly higher than the 
returns for the value-weighted index and S&P 500 index. 
The pattern for the raw cumulative returns start to change, however, after the first six months. In 
the first year following the IPO, the average raw cumulative return for the sample firms is 19.24 %. This is 
significantly higher than the returns for the value-weighted index and S&P 500 index, and higher than the 
returns for the equally-weighted index and the firms in the same industries, however insignificantly. On the 
other hand, it is insignificantly lower than the return for the control firms. In the two years following the 
IPO, the average raw cumulative return for the sample firms is 21.39 %, which is significantly lower than 
the returns for the control firms and the equally-weighted index. On the other hand, it is significantly higher 
than the returns for the value-weighted index and the S&P 500 index. It is not significantly different than 
the returns for the other firms in the same industries. Lastly, in the three years following the IPO, the 
average raw cumulative return for the sample firms is 36.26 %, which is significantly lower than the returns 
for the control firms and the equally-weighted index. Once again, it is significantly higher than the returns 
for the value-weighted index and the S&P 500 index. It is not significantly different than the returns for the 
other firms in the same industries. 
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Panel B in Table 15 presents the results for raw buy-and-hold returns. The average raw buy-and-
hold return for the sample firms are 2.05 %, 2.39 %, 4.60 %, 10.39 %, and 16.44 % in the first trading day, 
the first week, the first month, the first three months and the first six months, respectively. In terms of 
comparisons with the other benchmarks, they exhibit a parallel pattern to the results for the raw cumulative 
returns. In the first, second and third years following the IPO, the average buy-and-hold returns for the 
sample firms are 25.32 %, 18.91 % and 23.14 %, respectively. These returns are not significantly different 
than the returns for the control firms. Compared to the returns for the value-weighted index and the S&P 
500 index, the average raw buy-and-hold return is significantly higher for the sample firms in the first year. 
However, it is not significantly different in the second and the third years. On the other hand, the returns for 
the sample firms are not significantly different than the returns for the equally-weighted index and the firms 
in the same industries, in the first year. However, it is significantly lower in the second and the third years. 
Next, we present our results regarding the performance measures for the sample firms, control 
firms, and the firms in the same industry as the sample firms, in the year of the IPO and the following three 
years, in Table 16. The mean OIBDP/TA for the sample firms is 0.146, 0.141, 0.129 and 0.127 in the year 
of the IPO and the following three years, respectively. This figure is significantly higher than the values for 
the other two benchmarks in all years. On the other hand the mean return on assets for the sample firms is 
0.009, 0.023, 0.008 and -0.004 in the year of the IPO and the following three years, respectively. This 
figure is significantly higher than the values for the industry benchmark. However, it is significantly higher 
than the values for the control firms, only in the second and third years.  
The mean Q, measured as market-to-book ratio of equity, for the sample firms is 2.97, 2.74, 2.30 
and 2.36 in the year of the IPO and the following three years, respectively. It is only significantly higher 
than the value for the industry benchmark in the first year following the IPO. On the other hand, mean 
OIBDP/Sales for the sample firms is 0.156, 0.158, 0.147 and 0.139 in the year of the IPO and the following 
three years, respectively. In terms of significance compared to the benchmarks, OIBDP/TA shows a pattern 
similar to that of OIBDP/TA. 
The findings suggest that reverse LBOs are underpriced in the short-run. In terms of first day 
returns, their returns are significantly higher than the returns for the other benchmarks, and are statistically 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the first day returns are lower compared to the average 
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first day returns for all the IPOs that took place between 1980-2010 period, which is reported as 18.0 % on 
Jay Ritter’s IPO dataset. This would be considered as evidence that reverse LBOs are priced more correctly 
at the IPO, as suggested by DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), potentially due to being public firms in the 
past. However, it is still surprising that as firms that were public in the past, they would be familiar to the 
public and there would be less uncertainty, but they still provide significant positive returns in the first 
trading day. 
The superior returns or the reverse LBOS continue in the following six months. In the first six 
months, reverse LBOs still provide positive returns that are significantly different than zero. And they 
outperform the other benchmarks, even though not significantly in all the cases. However, in the second 
and third year, the average returns for the sample firms are not significantly superior to some of the other 
benchmarks, including the control firms. In terms of cumulative returns, the control firms’ average return is 
even significantly higher than those of the sample firms. Still the sample firms have positive average 
returns that are significantly different than zero. 
Based on these findings, we can suggest that reverse LBOs are underpriced in the short run, and 
are overpriced, or at least not underpriced in the long run, depending on the returns and benchmarks 
employed in the comparisons. This is a pattern similar to those of IPOs in general. However, it is surprising 
to see this pattern valid in reverse LBOs since they would have public familiarity as previously public 
firms. This could be suggested as evidence of investors believing in the idea that LBO specialists would 
design the governance mechanisms in their portfolio companies in a manner superior to other public 
companies, which would lead to value creation, at least in the short term when the shareholdings and 
management involvement of LBO specialists are at their highest levels in the portfolio firms. 
In terms of operating performance of reverse LBO firms, the findings suggest that in terms of 
operating income before depreciation, the sample firms perform better than the control firms and the other 
firms in the same industries, both in the year of the IPO and the following three years. This evidence 
contradicts a potential view of informational effects, which suggests that LBO specialists would time the 
IPOs due to either adverse selection or performance manipulation as discussed in DeGeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993). On the other hand, again as discussed in DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), it could be 
argued that as the shareholdings and management involvement of LBO specialists in portfolio firms gets 
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less substantial, due to lost incentives, the reverse LBO firms would be expected to perform worse in the 
following years. However, even though there is a slight decrease in the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to total assets and sales, they are still significantly higher compared to the firms in the 
benchmarks. The findings in terms of return on sales also point out to the operating superiority of reverse 
LBO firms, compared to the benchmarks. However, the results are statistically not as significant this time. 
In terms of Q, the performances of reverse LBO firms are not statistically different than the performance of 
the firms in the benchmarks. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Based on our main hypothesis that LBO specialists would design corporate governance 
mechanisms in their portfolio firms in a manner that governance structure of the firms would be optimal at 
the time of the IPO, we investigate the various corporate governance mechanisms employed by the LBO 
specialists in reverse LBO firms. We investigate the following governance mechanisms in reverse LBO 
firms: (i) board structure, board members and CEO characteristics, board committees, (ii) ownership 
structure, and (iii) executive compensation. We also investigate the operating and stock market 
performance of reverse LBO firms. 
Our findings show that RLBO firms mostly prefer to be incorporated in Delaware. They prefer to 
have unitary boards as opposed to staggered boards at the time of the IPO. They are mainly controlled by a 
third party at the time of the IPO. Their board members are significantly younger. However, the average 
age of the CEOs is not significantly different from the control firms’ CEOs’ average age. The tenure of the 
board members is significantly shorter, as well as the tenure of the CEO. They do not vary substantially in 
terms of gender diversity, compared to control firms. They have more board members with financial 
expertise. However, the fraction of directors with accounting expertise does not vary substantially between 
the sample and control firms. The percentage of academicians serving on the boards does not vary 
substantially for the sample and control firms. Also, the percentage of CEOs serving as the chairman of the 
board does not vary substantially for both groups of firms, as well. In addition, minority of the firms have 
CEOs who are also founders of the firms.  
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In terms of board size, the number of board members of the sample firms is similar to control 
firms. However, both groups of firms have smaller number of members on their boards, compared to 
previous findings from earlier decades. Compared to the fraction of independent directors, sample firms 
prefer a smaller fraction of inside directors on their boards. Still, the ratio of inside directors on their boards 
is not significantly different from the control firms’ boards. In addition, sample firms have fewer 
independent directors on their boards, even though the fraction of independent directors for the sample firm 
increases in the following two years. However, the results are driven by the definition of independent 
directors. Thus we employ an alternative definition as a robustness check. Based on this alternative 
definition, we find that the majority of board members of RLBO firms are effectively monitoring directors. 
Compared to the firms in control group, the fraction of effective monitors is not significantly different for 
the RLBO firms. In terms of board busyness, RLBO firms prefer less busy directors on their boards and a 
less busy board as a whole, compared to control firms. As a robustness check, once again, we apply our 
alternative definition. Based on this alternative specification, RLBO firms appear to prefer busy board 
members and busy boards. Lastly, the majority of the board members on various committees of the boards 
are independent directors for the RLBO firms. 
Blockholders own a higher fraction of shares in RLBO firms, compared to control firms. In 
addition, LBO specialists hold substantial directorships in the portfolio firms and they own a substantial 
fraction of shares, both before the IPO and following the IPO. On the other hand, total managerial 
ownership fractions are significantly higher in the RLBO firms, compared to control firms. 
Also, top executives and CEOs of RLBO firms do not receive significantly higher levels of 
compensation compared to control firms. On the other hand, based on the evidence regarding the 
composition of compensation packages received by both groups, RLBO firms prefer the majority of 
executive compensation in the form of pay structures that are sensitive to performance. A similar situation 
is valid for the control firms. However, while choosing among performance sensitive pay incentives, RLBO 
firms usually prefer to pay a higher fraction of total compensation in form of bonuses, and less in the form 
of stock option grants, compared to control firms. 
Lastly, reverse LBOs are underpriced in the short-run. In terms of first day returns, their returns 
are significantly higher than the returns for the other benchmarks, and are statistically significantly different 
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from zero. On the other hand, the first day returns are lower compared to the average first day returns for 
all the IPOs that took place between the years 1980-2010. The superior returns of the reverse LBOS 
continue in the following six months. However, in the second and third year, the average returns for the 
sample firms are not significantly superior to some of the other benchmarks, including the control firms. In 
terms of cumulative returns, the control firms’ average return is even significantly higher than those of the 
sample firms. Still the sample firms have positive average returns that are significantly different than zero. 
In terms of operating performance of reverse LBO firms, the findings suggest that in terms of 
operating income before depreciation, the sample firms perform better than the control firms and the other 
firms in the same industries, both in the year of the IPO and the following three years. The results in terms 
of return on sales also point out to the operating superiority of reverse LBO firms, compared to the 
benchmarks. However, the results are statistically not as significant this time. In terms of Q, the 
performances of reverse LBO firms are not statistically different than the performance of the firms in the 
benchmarks. 
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Table 1: Time Distribution of RLBOs and descriptive statistics 
Panel A provides time distribution of the initial and final reverse LBO sample between 1994 and 2006. The final 
reverse LBO sample excludes firms with missing data necessary including SEC data, as well as financial firms and 
regulated utilities. Panel B provides the median values for various variables for the sample firms and the control firms. 
The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, 
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by 
t. ME is the market value of equity, BE/ME is the market-to-book ratio of equity, total assets is the total assets, equity 
is the stockholder’s equity, book Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total 
assets. Panel C provides the standard deviations for the sample and control firms. 
 
PANEL A: Time Distribution of RLBO Sample 
   
 
  
 
 
RLBO Sample  Firms with  SEC Data  
 
RLBO Percent  RLBO Percent  
1994 22 7.17  1 0.42  
1995 19 6.19  3 1.27  
1996 26 8.47  21 8.9  
1997 28 9.12  26 11.02  
1998 21 6.84  14 5.93  
1999 28 9.12  22 9.32  
2000 27 8.79  24 10.17  
2001 22 7.17  21 8.9  
2002 21 6.84  17 7.2  
2003 11 3.58  11 4.66  
2004 27 8.79  24 10.17  
2005 31 10.1  29 12.29  
2006 24 7.82  23 9.75  
Sum 307 100  236 100  
   
  
PANEL B: Descriptive Statistics (Median) 
  
SAMPLE 
 
CONTROL 
  
t t+1 t+2 
 
t t+1 t+2 
ME 555.8 612.5 551.6 
 
514.9 536.4 463.1 
BE/ME 0.3051 0.3495 0.3911 
 
0.3069 0.3579 0.4476 
Total Assets 466.6 559.1 630.1 
 
284.6 335.8 368.3 
Equity 248.2 308.3 335.8 
 
202.7 246.1 283.5 
Book Leverage 0.3928 0.3549 0.351 
 
0.1509 0.1646 0.1526 
         
  
PANEL C: Descriptive Statistics (Standard Deviation) 
  
SAMPLE 
 
CONTROL 
  
t t+1 t+2 
 
t t+1 t+2 
ME 1249.1 1161.3 1061.1 
 
1173.1 1013.9 1902.4 
BE/ME 0.3381 0.5812 0.6104 
 
0.3102 0.5182 0.4206 
Total Assets 2080.6 2337.1 2430.1 
 
1183.2 1122.8 1079.1 
Equity 1034.7 1138.7 1098.1 
 
763.8 711.6 699.1 
Book Leverage 0.2989 0.2864 0.2956 
 
0.3011 0.2647 0.2559 
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Table  2: Delaware incorporation, classified boards, controlled firms, gender, and education 
The table presents the percentages regarding Delaware incorporation, classified boards, controlled firms, 
board members with Masters/MBA degrees, and gender of board members and the CEO. The sample firms 
are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, 
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is 
denoted by t. Panel A shows the percentage of firms incorporated in Delaware. Panel B shows the 
percentage of firms with classified boards. A classified board is one where only a certain fraction of the 
members of the board are elected annually. Panel C shows percentage of firms that are controlled. A 
controlled firm is defined as a firm that is listed on a stock exchange and that holds an election for the 
board of directors of the firm in which more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group 
or another firm. Panel D shows the percentage of board members that are females. Panel E shows the 
percentage of CEOs that are females. Panel F shows the percentage of board members with Masters and/or 
MBA degrees.  
PANEL A: Percentage of Firms Incorporated in Delaware 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Delaware Inc. Not Delaware Inc.  Delaware Inc. Not Delaware Inc. 
Year t 88% 12%  63% 37% 
Year t+1 87% 13%  63% 37% 
Year t+2 87% 13%  63% 37% 
PANEL B: Percentage of Firms with Classified Boards 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Classified Board 
Not Classified 
Board 
 
Classified Board 
Not Classified 
Board 
Year t 35% 65%  56% 44% 
Year t+1 53% 47%  56% 44% 
Year t+2 55% 45%  55% 45% 
PANEL C: Percentage of Firms that are Controlled Firms 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Controlled Not Controlled  Controlled Not Controlled 
Year t 86% 14%  12% 88% 
Year t+1 51% 49%  8% 92% 
Year t+2 36% 64%  6% 94% 
PANEL D: Percentages of Female Board Members 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Female Male  Female Male 
Year t 4.1 % 95.9 %  5.3 % 94.7 % 
Year t+1 4.4 % 95.6 %  5.5 % 94.5 % 
Year t+2 5.1 % 94.9 %  5.8 % 94.2 % 
PANEL E: Percentages of Female CEOs 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Female Male  Female Male 
Year t 1.2 % 98.8 %  3.4 % 96.6 % 
Year t+1 1.3 % 98.7 %  3.0 % 97.0 % 
Year t+2 1.9 % 98.1 %  2.4 % 97.6 % 
PANEL F: Percentages of Board Members with Masters Degree 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Masters No Masters  Masters No Masters 
Year t 19% 81%  12% 88% 
Year t+1 19% 81%  12% 88% 
Year t+2 18% 82%  13% 87% 
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Table  3: Professional expertise, age, and tenure of board members and the CEO 
The table presents the professional expertise, age and tenure of board members and the CEO. The sample firms are 
matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber and 
Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Panel A shows the 
mean age for board members and the CEO. Panel B shows the median tenure for board members and the CEO.  Panel 
C shows the percentage of board members with financial expertise. Board members who are (or were in the past) 
partners, directors, CEOs or chairmen of financial institutions are considered as financial experts. Panel D shows the 
percentage of board members with accounting expertise. Board members who are CPAs or equivalents are considered 
as accounting experts. Panel E shows board members who are professors. Panel F shows the percentage of firms with 
CEO duality. CEO duality indicates whether the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of directors. 
PANEL A: Age of Board Member and the CEO 
 
Age of Board Members  Age of CEO 
 
Sample Control  Sample Control 
Year t ***50.01 (10.72) 56.15 (10.07)  51.74 (7.58) 52.18 (8.33) 
Year t+1 ***51.71 (10.55) 56.92 (9.94)  52.65 (7.58) 52.92 (8.27) 
Year t+2 ***53.01 (10.47) 57.41 (9.78)  53.44 (7.45) 52.93 (7.57) 
PANEL B: Tenure of Board Member and the CEO 
 
Tenure of Board Members  Tenure of CEO 
 
Sample Control  Sample Control 
Year t ***3.67 (3.55) 7.15 (6.91)  ***5.72 (5.58) 8.38 (6.99) 
Year t+1 ***4.08 (3.52) 7.47 (6.90)  ***6.67 (5.57) 8.95 (7.07) 
Year t+2 ***4.63 (3.66) 7.51 (6.72)  ***7.21 (5.30) 9.13 (7.01) 
PANEL C: Board Members with Financial Expertise 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Expert Non-Expert  Expert Non-Expert 
Year t 48% 52%  18% 82% 
Year t+1 44% 56%  17% 83% 
Year t+2 39% 61%  17% 83% 
PANEL D: Board Members with Accounting Expertise 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Expert Non-Expert  Expert Non-Expert 
Year t 4% 96%  3% 97% 
Year t+1 4% 96%  3% 97% 
Year t+2 5% 95%  4% 96% 
PANEL E: Board Members That Are Professors 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Professor Not  Professor Not 
Year t 2% 98%  5% 95% 
Year t+1 2% 98%  6% 94% 
Year t+2 3% 97%  5% 95% 
Panel F: Percentages of the Firms with CEO Duality 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
No CEO Duality CEO Duality  No CEO Duality CEO Duality 
Year t 56% 44%  50% 50% 
Year t+1 54% 46%  47% 53% 
Year t+2 52% 48%  49% 51% 
Standard deviations are presented in the parenthesis. ***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, 
consecutively. Significance comparisons do not apply to figures in percentages. 
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Table  4: Board composition 
The table presents the board composition. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based 
on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity 
and became public, again, is denoted by t. Full time employees of the firm are classified as insider directors. Directors 
who are former employees of the firm, are relatives of the current employees of the firm, have interlocking 
relationships with the current CEO, have material relationship with the firm are considered as gray directors. Directors 
who are not considered as insider or gray directors are classified as independent directors. Panel A shows the number of 
insider directors. Panel B shows the number of independent directors in the board. Panel C shows the number of gray 
directors in the board. Panel D shows the percentage of insider directors. Panel E shows the percentage of independent 
directors in the board. Panel F shows the percentage of gray directors in the board. 
 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 
 
 
 
PANEL A: # of Insider Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 1.51 0.84  1.58 0.89 
Year t+1 1.48 0.81  1.51 0.86 
Year t+2 1.45 0.77  1.47 0.81 
PANEL B: # of Independent Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 2.83*** 2.00  5.62 2.17 
Year t+1 3.69*** 1.80  5.77 2.13 
Year t+2 4.07*** 1.81  5.82 2.14 
PANEL C: # of Gray Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 2.91*** 1.77  0.32 0.62 
Year t+1 2.68*** 1.78  0.26 0.57 
Year t+2 2.44*** 1.64  0.28 0.59 
PANEL D: Percentages of Insider Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.224 0.131  0.218 0.121 
Year t+1 0.197 0.110  0.206 0.114 
Year t+2 0.192 0.109  0.200 0.108 
PANEL E: Percentages of Independent Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.372*** 0.219  0.740 0.138 
Year t+1 0.467*** 0.180  0.758 0.131 
Year t+2 0.510*** 0.169  0.764 0.125 
PANEL F: Percentages of Gray Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.405*** 0.221  0.041 0.078 
Year t+1 0.333*** 0.197  0.034 0.076 
Year t+2 0.302*** 0.184  0.035 0.072 
128 
 
 
Table  5: Board composition (alternative definition) 
The table presents the board composition, according to the alternative definitions. The sample firms are matched to 
those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber and Lyon (1997). 
The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Full time employees of the firm 
are classified as insider directors. Directors who are former employees of the firm, are relatives of the current 
employees of the firm, have interlocking relationships with the current CEO, have material relationship with the firm 
are considered as gray directors. Directors who are not considered as insider or gray directors and directors who are 
partners of the LBO specialists are classified as independent directors. Panel A shows the number of insider directors. 
Panel B shows the number of independent directors and LBO specialist partners in the board. Panel C shows the 
number of non LBO specialist partner gray directors in the board. Panel D shows the percentage of insider directors. 
Panel E shows the percentage of independent directors and LBO specialist partners in the board. Panel F shows the 
percentage of non LBO specialist partner gray directors in the board. 
 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 
 
 
PANEL A: # of Insider Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 1.51 0.84  1.58 0.89 
Year t+1 1.48 0.81  1.51 0.86 
Year t+2 1.45 0.77  1.47 0.81 
PANEL B: # of  Independent Directors and LBO Sponsor Partners in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 5.56 2.25  5.63 2.18 
Year t+1 6.19** 2.11  5.76 2.14 
Year t+2 6.28** 2.18  5.82 2.15 
PANEL C: # of  Non LBO Sponsor Partner Gray Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.18*** 0.45  0.32 0.62 
Year t+1 0.19 0.52  0.26 0.57 
Year t+2 0.22 0.48  0.28 0.59 
PANEL D: Percentages of Insider Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.224 0.131  0.218 0.121 
Year t+1 0.197 0.110  0.206 0.114 
Year t+2 0.192 0.109  0.200 0.108 
PANEL E: Percentages of Independent Directors and LBO Sponsor Partners in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.750 0.137  0.740 0.138 
Year t+1 0.777 0.121  0.760 0.130 
Year t+2 0.778 0.130  0.764 0.125 
PANEL F: Percentages of Non LBO Sponsor Partner Gray Directors in the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.024*** 0.062  0.041 0.078 
Year t+1 0.024 0.064  0.032 0.070 
Year t+2 0.030 0.074  0.035 0.072 
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Table  6: Number and percentage of busy directors on boards and percentage of busy boards 
The table presents the busy board members and busy boards. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, 
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Board membership number is the total number of board 
memberships in various firms, each director holds. Board directorships in private firms and other institutions such as charities, non-profits and universities are not included. The 
membership in the current firm’s board of directors is included. A busy director is an independent director, who has at least 3 board memberships. A busy board is a board of 
directors is defined as a busy board if at least 50 % of its members are busy directors. Full time employees of the firm are classified as insider directors. Directors who are former 
employees of the firm, are relatives of the current employees of the firm, have interlocking relationships with the current CEO, have material relationship with the firm are 
considered as gray directors. Directors who are not considered as insider or gray directors are classified as independent directors. Panel A presents the number of busy directors on 
the board. Panel B presents the percentage of busy directors on the board. Panel C shows the percentage of busy boards. 
PANEL A: # of Busy Directors on the Board of the Firm 
 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max  N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max 
Year t 236 1.21*** 1.30 0 10  236 2.44 2.12 0 12 
Year t+1 231 1.73*** 1.45 0 10  231 2.60 2.08 0 14 
Year t+2 208 1.97*** 1.51 0 12  208 2.66 1.98 0 11 
PANEL B: Percentage of Busy Directors on the Board of the Firm 
 
   
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max  N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max 
Year t 236 0.1570*** 0.1493 0.0000 0.6000  236 0.3126 0.2282 0.0000 0.9000 
Year t+1 231 0.2193*** 0.1661 0.0000 0.8333  231 0.3380 0.2220 0.0000 0.8888 
Year t+2 208 0.2458*** 0.1691 0.0000 0.9000  208 0.3433 0.2138 0.0000 0.8333 
PANEL C: Percentages of Busy Boards 
 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
BUSY NOT BUSY  BUSY NOT BUSY 
Year t 4% 96%  26% 74% 
Year t+1 7% 93%  30% 70% 
Year t+2 9% 91%  32% 68% 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. Significance comparisons do not apply to the percentage of busy boards. 
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Table  7: Number and percentage of busy directors on boards and percentage of busy boards (alternative definition) 
The table presents the busy board members and busy boards, according to the alternative definition. The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is 
denoted by t. Board membership number is the total number of board memberships in various firms, each director holds. Board directorships in private firms and other institutions 
such as charities, non-profits and universities are not included. The membership in the current firm’s board of directors is included. A busy director is an independent director, who 
has at least 3 board memberships. A busy board is a board of directors is defined as a busy board if at least 50 % of its members are busy directors. Full time employees of the firm 
are classified as insider directors. Directors who are former employees of the firm, are relatives of the current employees of the firm, have interlocking relationships with the 
current CEO, have material relationship with the firm are considered as gray directors. Directors who are not considered as insider or gray directors and directors who are partners 
of the LBO specialists are classified as independent directors. Panel A presents the number of busy directors on the board. Panel B presents the percentage of busy directors on the 
board. Panel C shows the percentage of busy boards. Panel D shows the total board memberships of board members. 
PANEL A: # of Busy Directors on the Board of the Firm 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max  N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max 
Year t 236 2.81** 1.94 0 11  236 2.44 2.12 0 12 
Year t+1 231 3.29*** 2.04 0 12  231 2.59 2.09 0 14 
Year t+2 208 3.33*** 2.10 0 14  209 2.66 1.98 0 11 
PANEL B: Percentage of Busy Directors on the Board of the Firm 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max  N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max 
Year t 236 0.3781*** 0.2186 0.0000 0.8750  236 0.3133 0.2280 0.0000 0.9000 
Year t+1 231 0.4042*** 0.2105 0.0000 0.8888  231 0.3380 0.2220 0.0000 0.8888 
Year t+2 208 0.4090*** 0.2203 0.0000 1.0000  208 0.3433 0.2138 0.0000 0.8333 
PANEL C: Percentages of Busy Boards 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
BUSY NOT BUSY  BUSY NOT BUSY 
Year t 35% 65%  26% 74% 
Year t+1 39% 61%  30% 70% 
Year t+2 39% 61%  32% 68% 
PANEL D: Total Board Membership #s of Board Members 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max  N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Max 
Year t 1710 2.80*** 2.43 1 20  1777 2.41 1.80 1 14 
Year t+1 1820 2.82*** 2.26 1 22  1737 2.46 1.80 1 14 
Year t+2 1661 2.80*** 2.19 1 23  1579 2.48 1.80 1 14 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. Significance comparisons do not apply to the percentage of busy boards.
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Table  8: Founder CEOs, board size, blockholder ownership, managerial ownership, CEO ownership 
The table presents founder CEOs, board size, and ownership of the blockholders, managers and CEOs. The sample 
firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following 
Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Panel A 
presents the percentage of CEOs, who are also co/founders of the firms. Panel B presents the total number of members 
in the boards. Panel C presents the ownership percentage of blockholders in the firms. A party is considered as a 
blockholder when it possesses at least 5 % of the shares. In cases where more than one party has ownership rights on 
the same shares, it is taken into account to prevent double counting. Panel D presents the total ownership percentage of 
board members and top executives of the firms. Panel E presents the ownership percentage of CEOs of the firms. 
 
Panel A: Percentages of CEOs that Are Founders of the Firm 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
CEO is Founder 
CEO is not 
Founder 
 
CEO is Founder 
CEO is not 
Founder 
Year t 15% 85%  12% 87% 
Year t+1 15% 85%  12% 87% 
Year t+2 14% 86%  14% 86% 
 
Panel B: Number of the Members of the Board 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 7.25 2.17  7.52 2.17 
Year t+1 7.87* 2.04  7.51 2.15 
Year t+2 7.95* 2.07  7.55 2.18 
 
Panel C: Ownership Percentage of Blockholders in the Firm 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t-1 0.861 0.150  NA NA 
Year t 0.557*** 0.169  0.370 0.216 
Year t+1 0.540*** 0.183  0.339 0.211 
Year t+2 0.502*** 0.204  0.336 0.207 
 
Panel D: Total Managerial Ownership 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t-1 0.5864 0.3803  NA NA 
Year t 0.4170*** 0.2756  0.2155 0.2105 
Year t+1 0.3765*** 0.2561  0.1862 0.1937 
Year t+2 0.3203*** 0.2445  0.1629 0.1716 
 
Panel E: CEO Ownership  
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t-1 0.0758 0.1362  NA NA 
Year t 0.0482** 0.0839  0.0684 0.1334 
Year t+1 0.0464* 0.0725  0.0618 0.1165 
Year t+2 0.0411* 0.0659  0.0581 0.1112 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. Significance comparisons do not apply 
to Panel A. 
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Table  9: Board committees 
The table presents the number of directors on board committees and the percentage of independent directors on the 
committees. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-
market value, following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, 
is denoted by t. Directors who are former employees of the firm, are relatives of the current employees of the firm, 
have interlocking relationships with the current CEO, have material relationship with the firm are considered as gray 
directors. Directors who are not considered as insider or gray directors are classified as independent directors. Panel A 
show s the number of directors on compensation committee. Panel B shows the number of directors on the audit 
committee. Panel C shows the number of directors on the nominating committee. Panel D shows the percentages of 
independent on compensation committee. Panel E shows the percentage of independent directors on the audit 
committee. Panel F shows the percentage of independent directors on the nominating committee. 
Panel A: Number of Directors on Compensation Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 2.86*** 0.81  3.09 0.98 
Year t+1 2.99* 0.76  3.14 0.98 
Year t+2 3.00* 0.84  3.17 0.95 
Panel B: Number of Directors on Audit Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 2.78*** 0.66  3.14 0.82 
Year t+1 2.91*** 0.56  3.24 0.84 
Year t+2 2.93*** 0.55  3.25 0.83 
Panel C: Number of Directors on Nominating Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 3.11* 1.01  3.43 0.99 
Year t+1 3.28 0.92  3.48 1.10 
Year t+2 3.35 1.08  3.43 1.07 
Panel D: Percentages of Independent Directors on Compensation Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.92*** 0.19  0.97 0.10 
Year t+1 0.93*** 0.15  0.96 0.10 
Year t+2 0.94** 0.15  0.97 0.11 
Panel E: Percentages of Independent Directors on Audit Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.94** 0.18  0.98 0.08 
Year t+1 0.96 0.12  0.98 0.08 
Year t+2 0.97 0.10  0.97 0.11 
Panel F: Percentages of Independent Directors on Nominating Committee 
 
SAMPLE  CONTROL 
 
Mean Standard Dev.  Mean Standard Dev. 
Year t 0.92 0.17  0.91 0.19 
Year t+1 0.92 0.15  0.92 0.15 
Year t+2 0.94 0.14  0.94 0.16 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 
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Table  10: LBO specialist ownership and involvement in sample firms 
The table presents the findings regarding the LBO specialists. The year, when the company issued equity and became 
public, again, is denoted by t. LBO Specialist is a company that is directly involved in the LBO of the firm, and the 
following IPO. LBO specialist members are individuals, who are on the board of the portfolio firm, and are directly 
employed by the LBO specialist company. LBO specialist ownership is the share ownership of the LBO specialist 
company in the portfolio firm. Panel A shows the LBO specialist ownership fraction in portfolio firms. Panel B shows 
the number of board members who are LBO specialists. Panel C shows the percentage of LBO specialist members in 
the portfolio firm’s board. Panel D shows the percentage of CEOs who are LBO specialist members. 
 
LBO Specialist Ownership and Involvement in Sample Firms 
 
PANEL A: LBO Specialist Ownership Fraction in Sample Firms 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Year t-1 230 0.6704 0.2897 0.0000 1.0000 
Year t 234 0.4394 0.2109 0.0000 0.8500 
Year t+1 228 0.3870 0.2170 0.0000 0.8470 
Year t+2 204 0.3036 0.2346 0.0000 0.7780 
 PANEL B: # of Board Members Who are LBO Specialist Members 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
year t 235 2.88 1.75 0 8 
year t+1 230 2.68 1.75 0 8 
year t+2 207 2.35 1.64 0 8 
 PANEL C: Percentage of LBO Specialist Members in the Board 
 
N Mean Stn. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
year t 235 0.4044 0.2211 0.0000 1.0000 
year t+1 230 0.3371 0.1905 0.0000 0.7500 
year t+2 207 0.2908 0.1805 0.0000 0.7500 
 PANEL D: Percentage of CEOs Who are LBO Specialist Members 
 
Specialist Member Non Specialist Member 
year t 3% 97% 
year t+1 3% 97% 
year t+2 3% 97% 
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Table  11: Executive compensation (in 1000s)(in 2008 $s) 
The table presents the executive compensation. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following 
Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Compensation data is reported for both the top 5 executives of the 
firm. The levels of compensation are adjusted to 2008 dollars using consumer price index. For stock option grants, the present value of stock options grants, in that calendar year 
are reported. Firms report the present value of stock options estimated by Black-Scholes model. They report two figures based on 5 % and 10 % employed as the risk free rate in 
the calculations. We report results based on both figures. Total compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock granted in that year, Black-
Scholes value of stock options granted in that year, long term incentive plans and all other compensation. This is the definition of total compensation including option grants in 
ExecuComp Database. Panel A presents the results for sample firms. Panel B presents the results for control firms. 
 
Panel A: SAMPLE 
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Salary 1,665 838 1,765 801 1,754 674 
Bonus ***1,719 2,978 *1,339 1,856 1,225 1,742 
Other Annual C. *497 3,119 113 682 80 379 
Restricted Stock 342 1,783 263 1,414 228 950 
LTIP 174 1,068 6 56 35 206 
All Other Comp. *657 3,026 318 1,320 273 642 
% 5 Option PV 4,130 9,488 4,269 9,437 5,050 11,502 
% 10 Option PV 8,690 19,645 9,604 22,447 10,597 23,063 
Total(% 5 Opt) 9,183 12,372 8,071 10,748 8,644 12,755 
Total(% 10 Opt) 13,743 21,754 13,407 23,284 14,191 24,147 
     
  
 
Panel B: CONTROL
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Salary 1,572 756 1,637 650 1,643 655 
Bonus 994 1,502 1,016 1,635 1,022 1,818 
Other Annual C. 97 344 119 586 58 140 
Restricted Stock 555 2,375 549 2,484 390 2,221 
LTIP 69 445 125 1,140 192 1,215 
All Other Comp. 265 710 317 891 204 539 
% 5 Option PV 4,580 10,486 3,643 5,132 5,113 8,601 
% 10 Option PV 10,746 25,671 8,339 12,801 11,712 24,047 
Total(% 5 Opt) 8,132 12,624 7,406 6,587 8,621 10,953 
Total(% 10 Opt) 14,298 27,487 12,102 13,389 15,220 25,428 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 134
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Table  12: Executive compensation composition (% of total compensation)(CPI adjusted) 
The table presents the composition of executive compensation. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, 
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. Compensation data is reported for both the top 5 
executives of the firm. The levels of compensation are adjusted to 2008 dollars using consumer price index. Firms report the present value of stock options estimated by Black-
Scholes model. They report two figures based on 5 % and 10 % employed as the risk free rate in the calculations. We report results based on both figures. Panel A and B show the 
results for year t. Panel C and D show the results for year t+1. Panel E and F show the results for year t+2. Other annual compensation and long term incentive plans are not 
significantly different for both groups in the 3 years, are make up relatively a small portion of total compensation, and are not presented in the table. 
 
YEAR t 
 
PANEL A: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL B: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 220 0.32 0.20 224 0.36 0.22  220 0.27 0.21 224 0.28 0.23 
Bonus 220 ***0.22 0.17 224 0.16 0.14  220 ***0.19 0.16 224 0.12 0.13 
Restricted Stock 220 0.02 0.11 224 0.04 0.11  220 0.02 0.11 224 0.03 0.10 
All Other Comp. 220 **0.05 0.11 224 0.03 0.06  220 **0.04 0.11 224 0.02 0.04 
Options PV 220 ***0.33 0.29 224 0.40 0.28  220 ***0.43 0.34 224 0.51 0.32 
 
YEAR t+1 
 
PANEL C: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL D: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 175 0.38 0.22 177 0.35 0.23  175 0.32 0.23 177 0.27 0.23 
Bonus 175 ***0.20 0.17 177 0.14 0.13  175 ***0.17 0.17 177 0.11 0.12 
Restricted Stock 175 *0.02 0.08 177 0.04 0.13  175 *0.01 0.07 177 0.03 0.12 
All Other Comp. 175 0.03 0.07 177 0.04 0.08  175 0.02 0.05 177 0.03 0.08 
Options PV 175 **0.33 0.27 177 0.39 0.28  175 **0.45 0.32 177 0.51 0.32 
 
YEAR t+2 
 
PANEL E: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL F: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 135 0.36 0.20 138 0.37 0.24  135 0.29 0.20 138 0.28 0.25 
Bonus 135 ***0.17 0.15 138 0.12 0.11  135 ***0.14 0.15 138 0.10 0.11 
Restricted Stock 135 0.02 0.06 138 0.02 0.07  135 0.01 0.05 138 0.02 0.06 
All Other Comp. 135 0.04 0.06 138 0.03 0.06  135 0.03 0.05 138 0.02 0.05 
Options PV 135 *0.38 0.26 138 0.43 0.28  135 *0.50 0.30 138 0.55 0.32 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 135
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Table  13: CEO compensation (in 1000s)(in 2008 $s) 
The table presents the CEO compensation. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber 
and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t.  The levels of compensation are adjusted to 2008 dollars using consumer 
price index. For stock option grants, the present value of stock options grants, in that calendar year are reported. Firms report the present value of stock options estimated by Black-
Scholes model. They report two figures based on 5 % and 10 % employed as the risk free rate in the calculations. We report results based on both figures. Total compensation is 
the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock granted in that year, Black-Scholes value of stock options granted in that year, long term incentive plans and 
all other compensation. This is the definition of total compensation including option grants in ExecuComp Database. Panel A presents the results for sample firms. Panel B 
presents the results for control firms. 
 
Panel A: SAMPLE 
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Salary 550 349 563 303 593 361 
Bonus ***893 2,312 *579 906 502 725 
Other Annual C. *263 1,857 41 302 33 249 
Restricted Stock 132 651 121 1,099 137 749 
LTIP 56 382 *2 26 15 94 
All Other Comp. *274 1,461 188 1,097 125 454 
% 5 Option PV 1,632 4,937 1,730 4,781 2,208 5,602 
% 10 Option PV 3,344 9,011 3,948 11,227 4,701 12,494 
Total(% 5 Opt) 3,799 6,385 3,223 5,790 3,594 6,424 
Total(% 10 Opt) 5,511 10,109 5,441 12,049 6,068 13,238 
     
  
 
Panel B: CONTROL
 
Year t Year t+1 Year t+2 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. Mean Standard Dev. 
Salary 517 342 521 251 545 256 
Bonus 427 806 417 775 413 801 
Other Annual C. 43 216 35 193 26 101 
Restricted Stock 290 1,466 268 1,155 205 1,199 
LTIP 25 188 56 516 87 600 
All Other Comp. 91 288 124 405 77 244 
% 5 Option PV 2,260 8,452 1,322 2,035 2,002 3,784 
% 10 Option PV 5,335 20,617 2,974 4,788 4,360 8,739 
Total(% 5 Opt) 3,653 9,930 2,743 2,881 3,355 5,079 
Total(% 10 Opt) 6,728 21,999 4,395 5,259 5,712 9,464 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 
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Table  14: CEO composition (% of total compensation)(CPI adjusted) 
The table presents the composition of CEO compensation. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, 
following Barber and Lyon (1997). The year, when the company issued equity and became public, again, is denoted by t. The levels of compensation are adjusted to 2008 dollars 
using consumer price index. Firms report the present value of stock options estimated by Black-Scholes model. They report two figures based on 5 % and 10 % employed as the 
risk free rate in the calculations. We report results based on both figures. Panel A and B show the results for year t. Panel  C and D show the results for year t+1. Panel E and F 
show the results for year t+2. Other annual compensation and long term incentive plans are not significantly different for both groups in the 3 years, are make up relatively a small 
portion of total compensation, and are not presented in the table. 
 
YEAR t 
 
PANEL A: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL B: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 220 0.33 0.23 224 0.36 0.26  220 0.29 0.24 224 0.31 0.27 
Bonus 220 ***0.26 0.21 224 0.18 0.18  220 ***0.23 0.20 224 0.15 0.18 
Restricted Stock 220 0.02 0.11 224 0.04 0.13  220 0.02 0.11 224 0.03 0.12 
All Other Comp. 220 *0.05 0.13 224 0.03 0.08  220 *0.04 0.12 224 0.03 0.07 
Options PV 220 ***0.28 0.31 224 0.36 0.33  220 ***0.36 0.36 224 0.45 0.38 
 
YEAR t+1 
 
PANEL C: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL D: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 175 0.41 0.26 177 0.39 0.29  175 0.36 0.29 177 0.34 0.30 
Bonus 175 ***0.24 0.20 177 0.16 0.17  175 ***0.21 0.20 177 0.14 0.17 
Restricted Stock 175 ***0.01 0.05 177 0.04 0.14  175 ***0.01 0.04 177 0.04 0.13 
All Other Comp. 175 0.03 0.07 177 0.04 0.12  175 0.03 0.06 177 0.04 0.11 
Options PV 175 *0.28 0.30 177 0.33 0.31  175 *0.36 0.36 177 0.42 0.37 
 
YEAR t+2 
 
PANEL E: Black-Scholes % 5 PV  PANEL F: Black-Scholes % 10 PV 
 
SAMPLE CONTROL  SAMPLE CONTROL 
 
N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev  N Mean Stn Dev N Mean Stn Dev 
Salary 135 0.37 0.24 138 0.38 0.28  135 0.31 0.26 138 0.31 0.30 
Bonus 135 ***0.19 0.18 138 0.14 0.15  135 ***0.17 0.18 138 0.11 0.15 
Restricted Stock 135 0.02 0.08 138 0.02 0.07  135 0.02 0.07 138 0.01 0.06 
All Other Comp. 135 0.03 0.08 138 0.03 0.08  135 0.03 0.07 138 0.02 0.07 
Options PV 135 *0.36 0.31 138 0.41 0.31  135 *0.45 0.36 138 0.51 0.36 
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. 137
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Table  15: Cumulative and buy-and-hold returns 
The table presents the cumulative and buy-and-hold returns for the sample firms, and various benchmarks. All the returns are computed using daily return data gathered from 
CRSP. The first day return is measured from the offer price to the first CRSP listed closing price, following Ritter and Welch (2002). Panel A shows the cumulative raw returns. 
Panel B shows the buy-and-hold raw returns. Sample returns are mean returns for the firms in the RLBO sample. Control returns are mean returns for the firms in the control 
group. The sample firms are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber and Lyon (1997). The VW returns are 
value-weighted returns for the firms in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index. The EW returns are equally-weighted returns for the firms in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market 
index. SP500 returns are the returns for the firms S&P 500 market index. The industry cumulative returns are calculated based on the mean returns for the firms with the same 4 
digit SIC code as of the matching sample firm. t-stats are in parenthesis for the sample returns. 
PANEL A: Cumulative Returns 
    1st Day 1 Week 1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
                    
Sample Cumulative Raw R.   2.050% 2.368% 4.456% 8.466% 13.275% 19.241% 21.394% 36.260% 
    (3.86) (2.68) (3.22) (3.47) (4.12) (4.21) (3.62) (5.41) 
Control Cumulative Raw R..   ***0.487% 1.241% 3.340% 5.664% 11.723% 21.018% *34.650% *48.471% 
    
        VW Cumulative Raw Returns   ***0.066% **0.203% ***0.784% ***1.505% ***4.595% **8.848% **15.579% ***17.616%
    
        EW Cumulative Raw Returns   ***0.098% **0.268% **1.289% **3.121% 8.231% 17.647% *34.753% *49.077%
    
        SP500 Cumulative Raw Returns   ***0.068% **0.185% **0.701% ***1.219% ***3.910% **7.332% **11.869% ***10.668%
    
        Industry Cumulative Raw R.   ***-0.001% **0.095% **0.465% **2.718% 7.930% 15.232% 25.455% 39.244%
                    
PANEL B: Buy-and-hold Returns 
    1st Day 1 Week 1 Month 3 Month 6 Month 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 
          Sample Buy&Hold Raw Returns  2.050% 2.395% 4.606% 10.398% 16.449% 25.332% 18.910% 23.143% 
    (3.86) (2.76) (3.15) (3.09) (2.87) (2.83) (2.66) (2.34) 
Control Buy&Hold Raw Returns   ***0.487% 1.410% 3.152% 5.058% 10.206% 20.597% 25.756% 39.268% 
    
        VW Buy&Hold Raw Returns   ***0.066% **0.195% ***0.759% ***1.432% **4.427% **8.930% 16.612% 18.987%
    
        EW Buy&Hold Raw Returns   ***0.098% **0.272% **1.353% **3.410% 8.717% 19.534% ***41.866% ***65.010%
    
        SP500 Buy&Hold Raw Returns   ***0.068% **0.175% ***0.662% ***1.108% **3.685% **7.288% 12.660% 11.520%
    
        Industry Buy&Hold Raw R.   ***-0.001% ***0.084% **0.555% **3.253% 9.650% 18.782% *33.929% **50.067%
***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. The comparisons are performed against the values for the sample firms. 
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Table  16: Performance Measures 
The table presents performance measures for the sample firms and the control firms, and the industry. The sample firms 
are matched to those in the COMPUSTAT universe, based on firm size and book-to-market value, following Barber 
and Lyon (1997). The year of the IPO is denoted as year 0. The industry presents the mean performance measures for 
the firms with the same 4 digit SIC code as of the matching sample firm. The data for necessary calculations are 
gathered from COMPUSTAT. OIBDP/Total Assets is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. 
Return on Assets is net income divided total assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio of equity. OIBDP/Total Assets is the 
operating income before depreciation divided by sales.  
        
 
  Year 0   
 
  Year 1   
 
Sample Control Industry   Sample Control Industry 
        OIBDP/Total Assets 0.146 ***0.085 ***0.066 
 
0.141 ***0.086 ***0.064 
        Return on Assets 0.009 0.004 ***-0.023 
 
0.023 *-0.004 ***-0.026 
        Q (M/B) 2.971 2.942 2.499 
 
2.741 2.635 **1.978 
        OIBDP/Sales 0.156 ***0.097 ***0.094 
 
0.158 ***0.102 ***0.093 
        
        
 
  Year 2   
 
  Year 3   
 
Sample Control Industry   Sample Control Industry 
        OIBDP/Total Assets 0.129 ***0.062 ***0.061 
 
0.127 ***0.06 ***0.062 
        Return on Assets 0.008 *-0.020 ***-0.035 
 
-0.004 -0.033 *-0.030 
        Q (M/B) 2.307 2.546 2.019 
 
2.361 2.211 2.028 
        OIBDP/Sales 0.147 ***0.075 ***0.090 
 
0.139 ***0.085 ***0.090 
        ***, **, and * present significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % levels, consecutively. The comparisons are performed against 
the values for the sample firms. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
OCF: 
Following Denis and McKeon (2012), operating cash flow (OCF) is calculated as: 
Operating Cash Flow = D123 + D124 + D126 + D106 +D213 + D217 + D218 
when D318, the format code for statement of cash flows, is equal to 1, 2 or 3.  
When D318 equals 7, OCF is calculated as: 
Operating Cash Flow = D308 –D302 –D303 –S304 – D305 – D307 + D314 
D106 is equity in net loss (earnings), D123 is income before extra items, D124 is extraordinary 
items & discontinued operations, D126 is deferred taxes, D213 is sale of PPE and investment (loss), D217 
is funds from operations (other), D218 is sources of funds (other), D302 is accounts receivable (decrease), 
D303 is inventory (decrease), D304 is accounts payables & accrued liabilities (increase), D305 is accrued 
income taxes (increase), D307 is other assets & liabilities (other change), D308 is operating activities (net 
cash flow) and D314 is exchange rate effect. When OCF is negative, it is treated as use of equity proceeds 
for the purpose of covering operational cash shortfall. When OCF is a positive figure, it is used in the 
analysis as zero. 
Change in Working Capital: 
Following Denis and McKeon (2012), change in working capital (ΔWC) is calculated as: 
ΔWC = D236 + D274 
When D318 equals 1.  
When D318 equals 2 or 3, ΔWC is defined as: 
ΔWC = - D236 + D274 
And when D318 equals, it is defined as: 
ΔWC = D274 –D302 – D303 –D304 – D305 – D307 – D309 – D312 
D236 is working capital change (other), D274 is cash & cash equivalents (increase), D309 is short 
term investment (change) and D312 is financing activities (other). 
Investment: 
Following Denis and McKeon (2012), investment is calculated as: 
152 
 
 
 
I = D128 + D129 + D113 + D219 – D107 – D109 
when D318 is equal to 1, 2 or 3.  
When D318 is equal to 7, I is calculated as: 
I = D128 + D129 + D113 – D107 – D109 – D310 
D107 is sale of property, plant & equipment, D109 is sale of investments, D113 is increase in 
investments, D128 is capital expenditures, D129 is acquisitions, D219 is uses of funds (other) and D310 is 
investing activities (other). 
 
 
Appendix B 
In this section we summarize some of the definitions of governance related variables and 
necessary discussions. 
Financial Expertise: Indicates whether or not the individual has financial expertise. Board 
members and executives who are (or were in the past) partners, directors, CEOs or chairmen of financial 
institutions are considered as financial experts. It is presented by a dummy variable. 
Accounting Expertise: Indicates whether or not the director or the executive is a CPA, or an 
equivalent. It is presented by a dummy variable. 
Professor: Indicates whether or not the individual is or was a Professor. Includes not only 
professors in business related education, but professors in all areas of expertise. It is presented by a dummy 
variable. 
CEO Duality: It indicates whether the CEO of the firm is also the chairman of the board of 
directors. It is presented by a dummy variable. 
Board Composition: The variables in this category indicate the board members who are insiders, 
independent and gray directors. 
As in majority of the empirical studies, full time employees of the firm are classified as insider 
directors. Based on the definition of independent directors as stated by NYSE and also Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006), directors who are former employees of the firm, are relatives of the current employees of the firm, 
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have interlocking relationships with the current CEO, have material relationship with the firm are 
considered as gray directors. One important point is the classification of LBO sponsor’s partners, who serve 
on the board of the firm. Defining independent directors, NYSE states: 
“(a)  No director qualifies as “independent” unless the board of directors affirmatively determines 
that the director has no material relationship with  the listed company (either directly or as a 
partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the company). “  
The LBO sponsors restructure the RLBO firms and as Cao and Lerner (2009) states, the portfolio 
companies are taken public, on average, 3 years after the LBO. Following the IPO, the LBO sponsor sells 
its stake in the firm gradually until it exits its position totally. Thus, the main responsibility of the partners 
of the LBO sponsor is against the sponsor, not the portfolio company, the RLBO firm. We believe that, due 
to the nature of this relationship between the RLBO firm and the LBO sponsor, the partners of the LBO 
firm, who serve on the board of the RLBO firm, should be considered as gray directors. Similarly, Gertner 
and Kaplan (1996) and Cornelli and Karakas (2011) do not consider the directors related to the LBO 
sponsor as independent directors. Following the definition of the independent directors by NYSE, only a 
part of which is mentioned here, directors who are not considered as insider or gray directors are classified 
as independent directors. 
Ownership Percentage of Blockholders: It is the sum of all the shares owned by blockholders. A 
party is considered as a blockholder when it possesses at least 5 % of the shares. The ownership data is 
gathered directly from the proxy of the firm, as it is reported. In cases where more than one party has 
ownership rights on the same shares, it is taken into account to prevent double counting. 
LBO Specialist Member: Individuals, who are on the board of the portfolio firm, and are directly 
employed by the LBO specialist company. 
Total Managerial Ownership: Ownership stake of the directors of the board members and top 
executives of the firm. In cases where more than one individual has ownership rights on the same shares, it 
is taken into account to prevent double counting. 
Compensation: Compensation data is reported for both the top 5 executives of the firm and the 
CEO of the firm, separately. The levels of total compensation and its components are, in addition to the 
fraction of each component in total compensation are investigated. The levels of compensation are adjusted 
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to 2008 dollars using consumer price index. The components of compensation are base salary, bonuses, 
other annual compensation, long term incentive plans, restricted stock awards, all other compensation, in 
addition to stock option grants. The definitions of all the components are given in Section V, in greater 
detail. For stock option grants, the present value of stock options grants, in that calendar year are reported. 
Firms report the present value of stock options estimated by Black-Scholes model. They report two figures 
based on 5 % and 10 % employed in the calculations. We report results based on both figures. 
Conyon et al. (2011) and Gao et al. (2012) calculate total compensation as a sum of salary, bonus, 
other annual compensation, restricted stock granted in that year, Black-Scholes value of stock options 
granted in that year, long term incentive plans and all other compensation. This is the definition of “total 
compensation including option grants” in ExecuComp Database. We calculate total compensation in the 
same manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
 
Vita 
 
EMRAH ARIOGLU 
 
EDUCATION 
Ph.D. in Finance, Drexel University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (2013) 
M.S. in Finance, Cukurova University, Adana, Turkey (2007) 
B. S. in Business Administration, Hacettepe University, Ankara, Turkey (2004) 
 
RESEARCH 
“Target Capital Structure and Transitory Debt: Evidence from Reverse LBOs”, with Michael Gombola 
“Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Reverse LBOs” with Michael Gombola 
“Modernization of Audit Function under the New Turkish Trade Code” with Koray Tuan 
 
EXPERIENCE 
Research Assistant and Teaching Assistant, Drexel University, 2008-2013 
Research Assistant, Cukurova University, 2006-2008 
 
HONORS AND AWARDS 
Drexel University LeBow College of Business Graduate Assistantship, 2008-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
